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USING THE WEST KEY NUMBER SYSTEM AS A DATA
COLLECTION AND CODING DEVICE FOR EMPIRICAL LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP: DEMONSTRATING THE METHOD VIA A STUDY
OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
Joshua M. Silverstein*

Empirical research is an increasingly important type of legal
scholarship. Such research generally requires the collection and coding of
large quantities of data. These tasks pose critical challenges for legal
scholars. Most crucially, they are often resource-intensive. The primary
purpose of this article is to explain how researchers can use the West Key
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Number System to dramatically streamline the process of data collection
and coding. The article accomplishes this, in part, through a
demonstration: it employs the Key Number System to conduct an empirical
study of contract interpretation.
Contract interpretation is one of the most significant areas of
commercial law. And the subject has received considerable scholarly
attention during the last decade. Virtually all academic work in this field is
doctrinal or theoretical. But numerous contract interpretation issues cry
out for empirical investigation. The secondary purpose of this article is to
test one of the central claims in the judicial and academic debate over the
optimal method of contract interpretation—the claim that the
“contextualist” approach to interpretation results in more litigation over
the meaning of contracts than does the “textualist” approach. The results
of the study set forth below are inconsistent with that thesis. By thirteen of
fourteen measures, there was no statistically significant difference in the
amount of interpretation litigation between textualist and contextualist
regimes. And for the fourteenth measure, while there was a statistically
significant difference, the result was the opposite of that predicted by
textualist theory: there was more litigation under textualism.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Numerous legal and policy issues involve questions of empirical fact.
But legal academics have historically eschewed empirical research.1 As a
result, many of the normative recommendations contained in law review
articles are based on little more than informed speculation.2
Over the last two decades, legal scholarship has changed. Empirical
research on law is an increasingly common and important type of academic
work.3 This is certainly true in the field of contracts, where some of the
theories advanced by contract scholars are finally receiving the type of
empirical scrutiny necessary to test their validity.4 “There is widespread
1
Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top Law Schools,
81 IND. L.J. 141, 141 (2006) (explaining that empirical scholarship “was uncommon in law schools
through most of the last century”); Peter H. Schuck, Why Don’t Law Professors Do More Empirical
Research?, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 323, 323 (1989); see also id. at 331–33 (offering nine explanations for
the paucity of empirical work, including law professors’ lack of training in empirical methods, the
tedious nature of the work, and the resources required); Craig Allen Nard, Empirical Legal Scholarship:
Reestablishing a Dialogue Between the Academy and Profession, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 347, 361–
65 (1995) (reaching similar conclusions based on a survey of law professors).
2
See Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REV.
1835, 1896 (1988) (“In discussing the effects of a judicial decision, for example, legal scholars tend to
opt for speculations that are structured by their own legal discourse, rather than searching for a
methodology that can be used to determine these effects on empirical grounds.”); see also Elizabeth
Warren & Jaw Lawrence Westbrook, Searching for Reorganization Realities, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1257,
1261–63, 1286–89 (1994) (explaining that legal scholarship that addresses bankruptcy policy suffers
from a “dominance of speculation over systemic empirical inquiry” and calling for scholars to both
formulate more empirically-testable hypotheses and produce more empirical studies).
3
George, supra note 1, at 142 (“But [empirical legal scholarship] recently and dramatically has
expanded in law reviews, at conferences, and among leading law faculties.”) (collecting authorities);
Julie Graves Krishnaswami, Nicholas Freudenberg: A Selected Bibliography to Accompany a
Conversation on Health and Law, 12 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 55, 57 (2008) (“[E]mpirical methods are
becoming important within legal scholarship.”); Carolyn Shapiro, Coding Complexity: Bringing Law to
the Empirical Analysis of the Supreme Court, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 477, 477–78 (2009) (“The legal
academy has recently experienced a surge of interest in quantitative empirical analysis.”); see generally
Symposium, The Empirical Revolution in Law, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1195 (2013); Symposium, Empirical
and Experimental Methods in Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 791 (2002). For an empirical study of the
increase in one type of empirical legal scholarship, see Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic
Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 63, 70–73 (2008).
4
See Russell Korobkin, Empirical Scholarship in Contract Law: Possibilities and Pitfalls, 2002
U. ILL. L. REV. 1033 (2002) (setting forth an extensive overview of empirical legal scholarship in the
field of contracts); George S. Geis, Automating Contract Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450, 454 n.18 (2008)
(collecting similar authorities published after Korobkin’s article); see also Zev J. Eigen, Empirical
Studies of Contract, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 291 (2012) (presenting an overview of empirical work
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belief that empirical research can improve both our positive understanding
of law and behavior and inform our normative views of legal doctrine.”5
The increase in empirical scholarship is thus a welcome development.
However, empirical research poses critical challenges.6 For example,
legal academics generally lack training in quantitative methods, a fact that
is cited by many when criticizing the quality of empirical scholarship that
appears in law reviews.7
Other challenges concern the collection and coding of data.8 Most
significantly, gathering and organizing legal materials is often timeconsuming and expensive. The primary purpose of this article is to explain
how researchers can use the West Key Number System to dramatically
streamline the process of data collection and coding. The article
accomplishes this, in part, by using the Key Number System to conduct an
empirical study of contract interpretation.
Contract interpretation is one of the most important topics in
commercial law.9 And the subject has received a great deal of academic
attention during the last decade.10 Indeed, interpretation is recognized as
on contracts in law and several other disciplines). Prior to the recent, general upsurge in empirical work,
contracts suffered from the same lack of empirical research as other legal fields. See Russell J.
Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1, 4 (1992) (“Despite [the]
need for data . . . to date there have been only a handful of empirical studies focusing on particular
contract problems and relationships . . . .”).
5
Korobkin, supra note 4, at 1050 & n.97 (collecting authorities); see also Geis, supra note 4, at
452-53 n.12, 454 n.17 (collecting authorities calling for an increase in empirical research).
6
See Geis, supra note 4, at 453–54; Michael Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical, 26 PEPP.
L. REV. 807, 810–24 (1999).
7
See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6 (2002)
(explaining that “the current state of empirical legal scholarship is deeply flawed”); id. at 9 (“One source
of the problem almost certainly lies in the training law professors receive.”). The lack of training is also
frequently identified as a reason that legal academics conducted little empirical work prior to the last
two decades. See, e.g., Heise, supra note 6, at 817–18; Schuck, supra note 1, at 333.
8
See infra Part II.
9
See STEVEN J. BURTON, ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION 1 (2009) (“Issues of
contract interpretation are important in American law. They probably are the most frequently litigated
issues on the civil side of the judicial docket.”); Benjamin E. Hermalin et al., Contract Law, in 1
HANDBOOK OF LAW & ECONOMICS § 4, at 68 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 1st ed.
2007) (“Probably the most common source of contractual disputes is differences in interpretation . . . .”);
Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926, 928 & n.3 (2010)
(“[C]ontract interpretation remains the largest single source of contract litigation between business
firms.”) (collecting authorities).
10
Steven J. Burton, A Lesson on Some Limits of Economic Analysis: Schwartz and Scott on
Contract Interpretation, 88 IND. L.J. 339, 340 (2013) (“After decades of relative neglect, contract
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“the least settled, most contentious area of contemporary contract doctrine
and scholarship.”11 The vast majority of the work in this field is
theoretical.12 But numerous contract interpretation issues cry out for
empirical investigation.13 The secondary purpose of this article is to test one
of the central claims in the debate between the “textualist” and
“contextualist” schools of interpretation.
Textualists argue that the interpretation of contracts should focus
primarily on the language contained within the four corners of the parties’
agreement. Contextualists believe that interpreting courts generally ought to
consider both the language of the parties’ contract and extrinsic evidence.14
One of the signature claims advanced by textualists in support of their
position is that the contextualist approach results in more litigation over the
meaning of contracts than the textualist approach.15 Critically, no
commentator or court has proffered empirical evidence addressing this
contention. My article is a first step towards filling that gap in the
secondary literature and caselaw.
The results of the study set forth below are inconsistent with the
textualist thesis. By thirteen of fourteen measures, there was no statistically
significant difference in the amount of interpretation litigation between
textualist and contextualist regimes. And for the fourteenth measure, while
there was a statistically significant difference, the result was the opposite of
that predicted by textualist theory: there was more litigation under
textualism.
The data for this study was compiled solely via Westlaw’s electronic
research tools. Most importantly, all of the coding was completed by West
through its Key Number System. I did not manually code any of the
decisions in my dataset. To construct my coded dataset of 8,113 cases, I
simply identified the correct Westlaw search queries. Employing West’s
interpretation became a hot topic of scholarly debate after 2003.”); id. at 340 n.8 (collecting authorities);
David McLauchlan, Contract Interpretation: What Is It About?, 31 SYDNEY L. REV. 5, 5 (2009) (“In
recent times, contract interpretation has become one of the most contentious areas of the law of
contract.”).
11
Ronald J. Gilson et al., Text and Context: Contract Interpretation as Contract Design, 100
CORNELL L. REV. 23, 25 (2014).
12
See infra Part IV.B.5.
13
See infra Part IV.B.5.
14
See infra Part IV.A.
15
See infra Part IV.B.3.
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Key Number System in this manner dramatically sped up my work and
made the cost of the study negligible.
Of course, there are limits to the usefulness of this methodology.16 But
despite those limits, I believe that my approach can serve as a valuable tool
in empirical legal research by making data collection and coding
significantly easier and cheaper in many circumstances.
Part II of this article discusses the challenges scholars face in
collecting and coding data for empirical work. Part III begins with an
overview of the West American Digest System, of which the Key Number
System is a part. It next summarizes how scholars have employed the Key
Number System in empirical legal scholarship. Part III ends with a
discussion of the methodological issues surrounding the use of the Key
Number System as a collection and coding device. Part IV describes the
textualist and contextualist approaches to contract interpretation and the
policy justifications underlying each approach. Part V sets forth the specific
methodology and results of my study and then discusses the findings.
Finally, Part VI contains some concluding thoughts.17
II. DATA COLLECTION AND CODING CHALLENGES IN
EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH
The process of collecting and coding data lies at the heart of empirical
research.18 Empirical data in legal studies is typically gathered via
(1) surveys and interviews, (2) experiments, and (3) the review of material
stored in archives or databases.19 Once the data is collected, it must be
coded. Coding is the “‘process of transforming raw data into standardized

16

See, e.g., infra Part III.C.
There are also two appendices. Appendix 1 sets forth the Westlaw searches I ran for the study
and Appendix 2 contains the statistical analysis of the data recovered by the searches.
18
See Will Rhee, Evidence-Based Federal Civil Rulemaking: A New Contemporaneous Case
Coding Rule, 33 PACE L. REV. 60, 99–100 (2013) (“Generally, the methodology for all empirical
research has four steps: (1) design the empirical project; (2) collect and code data; (3) analyze the data;
and (4) present the final results . . . . Whether qualitative, quantitative, experimental, or multi-method,
all empirical research must code raw data into standardized variables that can be analyzed.”).
19
See ROBERT M. LAWLESS ET AL., EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 59–138 (2010); see also
Korobkin, supra note 4, at 1034 (dividing empirical contract law scholarship into four categories based
on the source of empirical data—“judicial opinions, actual contracting practices, contracting
experiments, and nonexpert opinion about contract law”).
17
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form’”20 so that it can be systematically analyzed for research purposes,21
such as via statistical techniques.22
Data collection and coding both present important challenges. For
example, researchers must address numerous methodological issues in
designing a survey,23 an experiment,24 or an archival study.25 And coding
the information obtained using these techniques raises additional
methodological questions.26
The challenge of greatest concern for my purposes here is that the
process of collecting and coding data is usually time-consuming and
expensive.27 Indeed, additional funding is often required28 so that scholars
can (1) hire and train support staff needed to gather and review data,

20
LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 19, at 166 (quoting EARL R. BABBIE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL
RESEARCH 325 (11th ed. 2006)) (further explaining that “systematizing or standardizing the data . . .
captures the essence of what it means to code data”).
21
Id. (citing Lee Epstein & Andrew Martin, Coding Variables, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL
MEASUREMENT (Kimberly Kempf-Leonard ed., 2005)).
22
Id.
23
Id. at 86 (“Nevertheless, to design an effective survey . . . , it is important to bear in mind the
principles of survey design that we have articulated in this chapter.”); see generally id. at 59–86
(discussing survey methodologies).
24
Id. at 122 (“Whether an experiment is conducted in the laboratory or in the field, careful
attention to the setting up of conditions that are suited to testing a particular hypothesis is critical.”); see
generally id. at 93–122 (discussing methods of conducting experiments).
25
Id. at 136 (noting that researchers must “pay close attention to the nature of the materials . . .
under consideration, to the ways in which the data have been abstracted from them, and to their
relevance to the research questions of interest”); see generally id. at 125–36 (discussing empirical
research based on archival or database materials).
26
See generally id. at 165–83 (discussing proper coding practices); id. at 128 (further explaining
the process of coding archival or database materials).
27
LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 19, at 128 (observing that coding archival material “can be very
time consuming”); Tracy E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top Law
Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 141, 151 (2006) (noting that data collection is “time-intensive”); Michael Heise,
The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making and the New
Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819, 829 (2002) (“Unfortunately, data gathering is frequently laborintensive and time-consuming and, consequently, often quite expensive.”); Korobkin, supra note 4, at
1050 (“[E]mpirical research typically is more expensive and time consuming than purely theoretical
work or traditional doctrinal analysis . . . .”).
28
Numerous empirical studies that I came across in writing this article noted that they were made
possible by funding support from sources outside the author’s institution. See, e.g., Timothy R. Johnson
et al., Oral Advocacy Before the United States Supreme Court: Does It Affect the Justices’ Decisions?,
85 WASH. U. L. REV. 457, 457 n.d1 (2007); Herbert M. Kritzer, The Commodification of Insurance
Defense Practice, 59 VAND. L. REV. 2053, 2053 n.a1 (2006).
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(2) obtain access to archives, databases, and other materials, and (3) pay
research subjects.
Let me elaborate with respect to data coding. For empirical work to be
effective, information must be coded in a reliable manner. This means that
“the same data are coded in the same way at different times or by different
coders.”29 To ensure this level of standardization, any individuals hired to
perform coding must be thoroughly trained and provided with detailed
codebooks to aid them in their work.30 It is also recommended that at least
two people code every piece of data and that researchers compare whether
the coders recorded their results consistently.31
Good [coding] practices almost always involve an iterative process, where the
researcher must code some observations, assess the coding reliability, revise the
coding procedures, and then begin the process again. Reliable coding often
requires multiple passes through the data, coding different aspects of the data or
more finely tuning particular pieces of information.32

Such protocols normally requires considerable time and money. But failing
to follow them fundamentally undercuts the validity of one’s research.33
To further illustrate the time and resources required to collect and code
data for empirical work, I have set forth below summaries of several studies
from the contracts literature. While I included studies that reflect each of
the three methods of data gathering—surveys, experiments, and archival
research—the bulk of the examples come from the third category since that
is the type of scholarship to which my project is most comparable.34
Stewart Macaulay’s groundbreaking article on the contracting
practices of business people was built around a survey. Macaulay
interviewed sixty-eight business persons and lawyers, with the meetings
ranging in length from thirty minutes to six hours.35 After each interview,

29

LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 19, at 166.
Id. at 180.
31
Id. at 181. This is known as “double coding” or “double data entry.” Id.
32
Id. at 168; accord Hall & Wright, supra note 3, at 80–81, 107–17 (describing the protocols for
the systematic coding of judicial opinions).
33
See LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 19, at 166–68 (setting forth an example).
34
See id. at 125–38 (explaining archival and database research). Note that my study might also be
classified as a quasi-experiment, see id. at 115–17 (explaining quasi-experiments), and thus placed into
the second category (experiments) rather than the third.
35
Stewart Macaualy, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC.
REV. 55, 55 (1964).
30
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he dictated a detailed report of the discussion.36 Based on the information
obtained, Macaulay concluded that contract law appears to have a small
effect on how business people organize their dealings and that most
individuals who participate in the contracting process have little knowledge
of contract law.37 While Macaulay’s study was invaluable, the datagathering process he used was quite time-consuming.
More recently, Yair Listokin conducted an experiment in which
identical used iPods were sold via auction on eBay with randomly varying
warranties.38 Consumers paid different prices based on the type of warranty,
and the precise spread in the sales prices suggested that the buyers correctly
understood the scope of their legal protection when there was no express
warranty.39 This research also took a great deal of time to conduct. In fact,
the 166 iPods sold as part of the study were purchased on eBay over a
thirteen-month period.40
Legal scholarship that fits into the third category (archive and database
research) often analyzes judicial opinions. For example, in one study,
Daniel Farber and John Matheson read every published opinion that cited
section 90 of the first or second restatement of contracts over a ten-year
period—a total of 222 cases.41 From this, they drew conclusions about
which factors determine whether a court will find liability under the theory

36

Id.
See id. at 56–61. For another example, see Weintraub, supra note 4, at 2 (survey of eight-four
corporate general counsel about a range of contracting practices). For an example from outside the field
of contracts, see Mark D. Gough, The High Costs of an Inexpensive Forum: An Empirical Analysis of
Employment Discrimination Claims Heard in Arbitration and Civil Litigation, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 91, 91 (2014) (survey of approximately 700 plaintiff employment lawyers; finding that
“employee win rates and award amounts are lower in arbitration compared to those found in federal and
state court” and that the divergence cannot be explained by “systematic differences in case
characteristics between the forums”).
38
Yair Listokin, The Meaning of Contractual Silence: A Field Experiment, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
397, 397, 410 (2010).
39
Id. at 397, 410.
40
Id. at 402. For another example, see Ian Ayres, Further Evidence of Discrimination in New Car
Negotiations and Estimates of Its Cause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 109, 113–15, 119 (1995) (experiment in
which shills were trained to negotiate over the price of cars with actual salespeople using the same
script; the shills varied by race and sex, enabling Professor Ayres to draw conclusions about the effects
of these traits on the negotiating behavior of the salespeople); see also Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender
and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1991).
41
Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the
“Invisible Handshake,” 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 907 n.14 (1985).
37
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of promissory estoppel.42 In particular, they deduced that the presence or
absence of reliance does not explain the results in promissory estoppel
cases despite reliance’s status as an element of the cause of action.43 Robert
Hillman conducted a similar study thirteen years later. Hillman began by
using electronic research tools to compile a data set of every reported
decision over a two-year period in which a promissory estoppel claim
succeeded or failed or in which the cause of action was discussed44—a total
of 362 cases.45 He then “devised a coding sheet that asked fifty-two
questions about each case,” which his research assistants used to read and
code the decisions.46 Hillman’s results contradicted those of Farber and
Matheson: He concluded that reliance plays a critical role in determining
whether a promissory estoppel claim is successful.47 Note that what
distinguishes studies like those by Farber, Matheson, and Hillman from
traditional doctrinal scholarship is “that they attempt to use objective facts
found in judicial opinions as data points in their analysis, rather than
examining the internal logic or reasoning of opinions.”48
Other studies that fit within the third category focus on the terms
contained in contracts. To illustrate, Daniel Schwarcz obtained from state
insurance authorities the homeowners policies offered by twenty-four
insurance groups across six states.49 Schwarcz then analyzed the provisions
of each policy.50 He found that homeowners policies vary significantly from
carrier to carrier, undercutting the common claim that homeowners

42

Id. at 925–29.
Id. at 904, 910.
44
Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the “New Consensus” on Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical
and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 580, 582 (1998).
45
Id. at 582–83 n.15.
46
Id. at 582–83.
47
Id. at 580, 583, 619 (also concluding that promissory estoppel claims have a “remarkable lack
of success . . . in reported decisions”).
48
Korobkin, supra note 4, at 1040; accord Hall & Wright, supra note 3, at 64–66, 76 (explaining
the difference between “systematic content analysis” and traditional doctrinal scholarship) (“Using this
method [of systematic content analysis], a scholar collects a set of documents, such as judicial opinions
on a particular subject, and systematically reads them, recording consistent features of each and drawing
inferences about their use and meaning.”).
49
Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1263,
1277–78 (2011).
50
Id. at 1279.
43
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insurance is highly standardized.51 Florencia Marotta-Wurgler’s study of
end-user license agreements (“EULAs”) for software products is another
helpful example.52 Marotta-Wurgler examined 647 EULAs from 598
different software manufacturers after obtaining the agreements from the
companies’ websites or by direct request.53 She assessed each contract
using an index of “buyer friendliness” that was based on how the
agreements handled “23 important and common terms that allocate rights
between buyers and sellers of software.”54 Among other conclusions,
Marotta-Wurgler found that EULAs almost uniformly favor the seller more
than the default rules set forth in the Uniform Commercial Code.55
The previous two paragraphs summarized four archival or database
studies. Two of these studies—those conducted by Schwarcz and MarottaWurgler on the terms of actual contracts—involved significant data
collection efforts. But all four projects required extensive data coding. In
particular, for each study, the authors or their research assistants had to read
and code every case or agreement in the dataset. This is standard practice in
archival empirical work, whether the inquiry concerns contracts56 or other
legal subjects.57

51

Id. at 1263.
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, What’s in a Standard Form Contract? An Empirical Analysis of
Software License Agreements, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 677 (2007).
53
Id. at 678–79, 681.
54
Id. at 679.
55
Id. at 680.
56
See, e.g., Nathan M. Crystal, An Empirical View of Relational Contracts Under Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 1988 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 293, 299 (1988) (empirical study of the frequency
with which relational contracts appear in litigation under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code);
Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An Empirical Study of
Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1067, 1091–94 (2006) (empirical study of unconscionability law);
Jeffrey L. Harrison, Trends and Traces: A Preliminary Evaluation of Economic Analysis in Contract
Law, 1988 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 73, 78–79, 80 (1988) (empirical study of the influence of law and
economics scholarship on contract law); Fred S. McChesney, Tortious Interference with Contract
Versus “Efficient” Breach: Theory and Empirical Evidence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 173–76 (1999)
(empirical study of the circumstances in which the law recognizes a claim for tortious interference with
contract); James J. White, Evaluating Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A Preliminary
Empirical Expedition, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1262, 1264, 1272, 1274–85 (1977) (empirical study of
litigation under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code).
57
For some classic examples, see Robert A. Kagan et al., The Business of State Supreme Courts,
1870–1970, 30 STAN. L. REV. 121, 122, 124–28 (1977) (empirical study of the “business” of state
supreme courts—“the volume of cases handled, the type of issues that appear, the kind of litigants
served, the rate of affirmance or reversal of lower court decisions, and the variation of these factors
52
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For many empirical studies, data collection and coding will necessarily
take significant time and resources. But in some circumstances, I believe
that the West Key Number System can be used to dramatically streamline
both aspects of the process, especially the coding of data. That system is
discussed in the next part.

across states and over time”; the authors read and coded 5,904 cases obtained using a variety of
selection criteria); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969,
980–82 (1992) (empirical study of the United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding judicial
deference to administrative agency interpretations of statutes; the author read and coded every Supreme
Court case on this subject from a ten-year time period, a total of ninety cases); Richard A. Posner, A
Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 29, 34–35 (1972) (empirical study of the nature negligence
law; the author read and coded every published appellate decision involving an accident issued in the
first quarter of 1875, 1885, 1895, and 1905, a total of 1,528 cases); Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About
Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases
Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1750, 1766–67 (1990) (empirical study
of a defense used by employers to challenge employment discrimination claims based on sex; the author
read and coded fifty-four cases, which constituted every published decision in which a lower federal
court addressed the defense at issue).
For some more recent examples, see Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Test
for Trademark Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1581, 1649–50 (2006) (empirical study of the
multifactor tests used to assess the likelihood of consumer confusion in trademark law; the author read
and coded all reported federal district court decisions for a five-year period in which a multifactor test
was used, a total of 331 opinions; the dataset was created by reviewing 1,252 opinions identified via
Westlaw and Lexis and eliminating the 921 cases that did not make “substantial use” of a multifactor
test); Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Examination of Case Outcomes Under the ADA Amendments Act,
70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2027, 2045–49 (2013) (empirical study of the impact of an amendment to the
Americans With Disabilities Act; the author read and coded 237 reported federal court summary
judgment decisions; the dataset was created by examining 1,289 reported opinions identified in a
Westlaw search and eliminating the 1,052 cases that failed to meet certain criteria); Patricia W.
Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553,
585–86, 589–95 (2010) (empirical study of the impact of the change in federal pleading standards; the
author read and coded 1039 cases obtained via Westlaw); Nick Kahn-Fogel, Manson and Its Progeny:
An Empirical Analysis of American Eyewitness Law, 3 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 175, 177–78, 196–209
(2012) (empirical study of the degree to which judicial evaluation of eyewitness identification testimony
is consistent with the science of eyewitness identification; the author read and coded 1,471 cases
available on Westlaw that cited to the United States Supreme Court’s seminal eyewitness identification
decision).
For an excellent survey of legal scholarship engaging in the systematic coding of cases, see Hall
& Wright, supra note 3, at 67–76, 82 n.72, 90–95, 101–02; see also Geis, supra note 4, at 479
(explaining that the empirical study of caselaw “typically requires intensive tagging, coding, and
interpretation”).
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III. USING THE WEST KEY NUMBER SYSTEM AS A DATA COLLECTION
AND CODING DEVICE
A. The West American Digest System
Digests are tools for locating caselaw on a particular subject.58
“[E]ditors of commercial publishers analyze opinions and write brief
descriptive abstracts of the various points of law in the opinions.”59 The
abstracts are often called “headnotes” or “digest paragraphs”60 and they are
typically included in the commercial reporters prior to the official text of
each decision.61 The headnotes are also “arranged by subject in
classification systems and published in sets known as digests.”62 A digest
operates like an index; “instead of simple one-line entries, however, it
consists of paragraphs describing the legal principles decided.”63
Digests vary by the types of cases they include.64 Some contain
decisions from only a single state or court system.65 Others focus on a small
group of states or on a particular legal subject.66 The West American Digest
System is intended to be a comprehensive digest, serving as a “master
index” to all of American caselaw.67
West classifies headnotes in the American Digest via the “West Key
Number System.”68 “The West Key Number analysis of American law is a
scheme whereby the entire body of American law has been conceptualized
and arranged in an orderly and logical way.”69 The Key Number System

58

STEVEN M. BARKAN ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF LEGAL RESEARCH 78 (9th ed. 2009).
Id.
60
Id.
61
See MORRIS L. COHEN ET AL., HOW TO FIND THE LAW 84 (9th ed. 1989).
62
BARKAN ET AL., supra note 58, at 78 (emphasis removed).
63
COHEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 84.
64
BARKAN ET AL., supra note 58, at 78.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 79.
68
See Daniel Dabney, The Universe of Thinkable Thoughts: Literary Warrant and West’s Key
Number System, 99 LAW LIBR. J. 229, 229 (2007). West is now a unit of Thomson Reuters, but the name
“West” is used in this article because that is the name most familiar to attorneys and best associated with
the American Digest System and the Key Number System.
69
THOMSON REUTERS, WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW, at V (2013) [hereinafter WEST’S
ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW].
59
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contains over 400 topics, each of which is identified by its own topic
number.70 The topics are grouped into seven major categories—1. Persons,
2. Property, 3. Contracts, 4. Torts, 5. Crimes, 6. Remedies, and 7.
Government.71 The topics are also divided into subtopics,72 which are
organized in outline form.73 This outline is known as the “analysis” of the
topic.74 Each subtopic is assigned a unique key number.75 “A particular
point of law, then, is known by its digest topic name [and number] and by
its key number within that topic.”76 For example, 331k18 is the key number
that governs the avoidance of contractual releases on the basis of duress.
Digest topic 331 is entitled “Release.”77 And key number 18 within that
topic is the subtopic “Duress.”78
West’s system is intended to provide a key number “to every
conceivable legal situation that could be treated in a case.”79 As a result,
there are over 100,000 individual key numbers.80 Each headnote that West
writes is classified using one or more key numbers81 and every case in
West’s reporting system contains at least one headnote.82 In a typical year,

70

Id. at XV–XVII.
Id. at V. A few of the topics are included in more than one category. For example, Insurance is
listed under both Persons and Contracts. Id. at X–XI. Note also that all of the categories except for Torts
and Crimes are broken into sub-categories. Id. at IX–XIV. To illustrate, there are four sub-categories
under Contracts: (1) “Nature, Requisites, and Incidents of Agreements in General,” (2) “Particular
Classes of Agreements,” (3) “Particular Classes of Implied or Constructive Contracts or Quasi
Contracts,” and (4) “Particular Modes of Discharging Contracts.” Id. at XI.
72
Id. at V.
73
BARKAN ET AL., supra note 58, at 83.
74
Id.
75
William H. Hilyerd, Using the Law Library: A Guide for Educators Part V: Finding Legal
Materials by Topic, 34 J.L. & EDUC. 533, 545 (2005); Fritz Snyder, The West Digest System: The Ninth
Circuit and the Montana Supreme Court, 60 MONT. L. REV. 541, 542 (1999).
76
Snyder, supra note 75, at 542–43.
77
WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 69, at 1483.
78
Id. at 1484. Note also that 331K18 is contained in the first section of the topic 331 outline—
“Requisites and Validity [of Releases].”
79
COHEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 84.
80
WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 69, at V.
81
COHEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 84, 86; Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and Legal
Concepts: Where Form Molds Substance, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 15, 25 (1987); Snyder, supra note 75, at
541.
82
See COHEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 84; Snyder, supra note 75, at 543; but cf. Charles N.W.
Keckler, The Hazards of Precedent: A Parameterization of Legal Change, 80 MISS. L.J. 105, 132 (2010)
(“Many cases, even at the [state] Supreme Court level, have no Westlaw Key Number Treatment at
all.”).
71
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West writes 450,000 headnotes and adds more than 550,000 headnote
classifications, with an average of eight headnote classifications per judicial
opinion.83
A case is added to the digest in the following manner. First, a West
attorney-editor reads and analyzes the decision and crafts a headnote for
each distinct point of law in the opinion.84 Second, the case is sent to
another West attorney-editor known as a “classifier” who assigns one or
more key numbers to every headnote.85 The classifiers “are experts in
figuring out where points of law” fit in the Key Number System.86 Third,
and last, the classification decisions from the second stage are doublechecked by more senior classification attorneys.87 Note that all of the
lawyers involved in this process receive considerable training in the
performance of their tasks88 and the average headnote classifier has more
than twenty years of experience at West.89
The West American Digest System was created in the late nineteenth
century90 and West began publishing the digest in 1887.91 The Key Number
System was introduced two decades later in 1908.92 Since that time, the two
83
Thomson Reuters, The Westlaw Next Caselaw 22-Step Editorial Process 1, available at
http://info.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/pdf/wln2/L-356219_v3.pdf. Some headnotes receive more
than one key number classification. This explains why the number of classifications is greater than the
number of headnotes added to the digest each year.
84
BARKAN ET AL., supra note 58, at 79; Snyder, supra note 75, at 541.
85
Dabney, supra note 68, at 229; Thomson Reuters, West’s Key Number System, WESTLAW,
http://lawschool.westlaw.com/knumbers/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2014) [hereinafter West’s Key Number
System] (on file with author).
86
West’s Key Number System, supra note 85.
87
Robert C. Berring, Full-Text Databases and Legal Research: Backing Into the Future, 1 HIGH
TECH. L.J. 27, 32 (1986); E-mail from Erin Flood, Reference Attorney, Thomson Reuters, to author
(Mar. 3, 2015, 18:28 CST) (on file with author).
88
See West’s Key Number System, supra note 85 (explaining that the headnote drafters are
“highly trained”); A Guide to Electronic Key Number Research on Westlaw.com, WESTLAW,
https://lawschool.westlaw.com/marketing/display/RE/29 (last visited Feb. 20, 2015) (noting that key
number classifiers are “trained specialists”).
89
E-mail from Erin Flood, supra note 87.
90
Susan Nevelow Mart, The Case for Curation: The Relevance of Digest and Citator Results in
Westlaw and Lexis, 32 LEGAL REF. SERV. Q. 13, 19 (2013).
91
Richard A. Danner, Influences of the Digest Classification System: What Can We Know?, 33
LEGAL REF. SERV. Q. 117, 122 (2014).
92
Douglas A. Hedlin, A Citation History of Pine River State Bank v. Mettille: A Study of
Common Law Change, Judicial Influence, and the Birth of a Discipline, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
297, 298 (2006) (citing WILLIAM W. MARVIN, WEST PUBLISHING COMPANY: ORIGIN, GROWTH,
LEADERSHIP (1969)).
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systems have been in a constant state of evolution, with West regularly
adding, subtracting, and editing topics within the Key Number System to fit
developments in the law and improve the general operation of the digest.93
Indeed, West makes “hundreds or even thousands of changes” to the key
number topics every year.94
Sometimes a researcher can exploit data that a third party has already
gathered and coded.95 Using such data in empirical work is referred to as

93
See BARKAN ET AL., supra note 58, at 88 (“West attempts to keep its key number system
current with changes and developments in law by adding new topics and by expanding or reclassifying
existing topics.”) (further describing these processes); Mart, supra note 90, at 19 (explaining that the
system “has been evolving” since its creation); see also Dabney, supra note 68, at 240–42 (discussing an
example of how a digest topic is modified); Snyder, supra note 75, at 543 (“The number of digest topics
has remained fairly constant . . . . The number of key numbers within each topic, however, has increased
significantly.”); id. at 558–61 (setting forth a history of digest topic changes).
94
Thomson Reuters, West Key Number System on Westlaw Next 1 (2012), available at
https://info.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/pdf/wln2/L-374484.pdf.
For most of the twentieth century, the West American Digest System was the principal tool for
locating caselaw on a given subject. See COHEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 83. And it still plays a
prominent, though reduced, role in legal research conducted by lawyers, judges, and law professors. See
BARKAN ET AL., supra note 58, at 78 (explaining that computerized legal research has supplanted
digests as the “most effective and efficient method for identifying relevant caselaw,” but noting the
important role that digests still play); Jill L.K. Brooks, Great Expectations: New Associates Research
Skills from Law School to Law Firm, 28 LEGAL REF. SERV. Q. 291, 295 (2009) (reporting the results of a
survey of attorneys and law firm librarians; the respondents generally stated that new hires need to know
how to use the Key Number System); Joseph A. Custer, The Universe of Thinkable Thoughts versus the
Facts of Empirical Research, 102 LAW LIBR. J. 251, 259–60 (2010) (reporting the results of a survey of
Kansas lawyers and law professors indicating that digests are still used in legal research by many
individuals). The Key Number System thus remains an important device for gathering cases in
traditional doctrinal scholarship. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, Promissory Estoppel and Judicial Method,
97 HARV. L. REV. 678, 679 n.5 (1984) (using the Key Number System to collect authorities for a
doctrinal analysis of promissory estoppel).
For additional information on the American Digest System and the Key Number System, see
WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 69, at V–VII (explaining the organization of the Key
Number System); Berring, supra note 87, at 29–38 (historical and operational overview of the West
reporters and the Key Number System); Dabney, supra note 68 (assessing the ways in which the West
American Digest System influences the law); Danner, supra note 91 (containing excellent overviews of
(1) the history of the West Digest System, (2) the historical background of the legal classification
movement of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and (3) the literature regarding the influence of the
West American Digest System on both the practice of law and the development of the law); Snyder,
supra note 75 (discussing numerous historical and operational features of the West American Digest
System); see also BARKAN ET AL., supra note 58, at 78–103 (general overview of digests and their use
in legal research); COHEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 83–115 (same); Hilyerd, supra note 75, at 543–53
(same).
95
LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 19, at 128.
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“secondary data-analysis.”96 This type of analysis saves time and money
because “the hard work of recording the data has already been done.”97 The
West Key Number System is essentially a scheme for coding American
caselaw.98 That means that the American Digest is an immense database
ripe for mining through secondary data analysis.99 By crafting Westlaw
search queries,100 a researcher can accumulate a massive array of data coded
by trained professionals using a system honed through more than a century
of development.
B. Literature Review of Empirical Research Employing the Key Number
System
Many legal scholars have used the American Digest System for
empirical studies.101 But in most such work, key numbers are employed

96

Id. at 129 (emphasis removed).
Id. at 130; see generally id. at 128–34 (discussing research based on secondary data-analysis).
98
See Ian Gallacher, Mapping the Social Life of the Law: An Alternative Approach to Legal
Research, 36 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 1, 17 (2008) (explaining that headnotes “are coded according to the
master list” of digest topics and key numbers) (emphasis added).
99
See Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, How Not to Lie with Judicial Votes: Misconceptions,
Measurement, and Models, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 813, 858 (2010) (explaining that the Key Number System
might enable researchers to compile “a database of jurisprudentially meaningful information” without
going through the “intensive and time-consuming” process of “reading each of . . . [the] cases to
classify, disaggregate, and code the issues” discussed therein); Shapiro, supra note 3, at 528 n.213
(“One potential approach worth further investigation would be to turn to the West Key Number System
[as a way of coding caselaw].”); see also Hall & Wright, supra note 3, at 68 n.13 (“. . . West Publisher’s
Key Number System, and Shepard’s Citations. Both are efforts to read cases systematically and to
record consistent information about the cases by using pre-existing categories.”); cf. Geis, supra note 4,
at 477 (“While Lexis, Westlaw, and other avenues for retrieving the full text of judicial opinions have
been available to legal scholars for decades, we have yet to fully exploit their empirical potential.”).
Note that Lexis has a competing digest product that might also be useful for empirical research. See
generally Mart, supra note 90, at 14, 18–21. However, I have not investigated this possibility.
100
See THOMSON REUTERS WESTLAW, https://next.westlaw.com.
101
See, e.g., Richard Fossey, Are Bankruptcy Courts Creating “the Certainty of Hopefulness” for
Student Loan Debtors: Examining the “Undue Hardship” Rule, in CONDEMNING STUDENTS TO DEBT:
COLLEGE LOANS AND PUBLIC POLICY 161, 162, 171–72 (Richard Fossey & Mark Bateman eds., 1998);
Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine,
120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1925 & n.84 (2011); Dr. Joyce Holley & Dannye Holley, Auditor Common Law
Liability in the State Courts: A Recent (1980–94) Outcome Restatement and Perspectives of the
Accounting and Legal Professions, 6 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 2 & n.4, 3–5 (1997); Michael P. O’Shea,
The Steepness of the Slippery Slope: Second Amendment Litigation in the Lower Federal Courts and
What It Has to Do With Background Recordkeeping Legislation, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1381, 1383, 1415
(2014); David W. Romero & Francine Sanders Romero, Precedent, Parity, and Racial Discrimination:
97
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only for data collection. After the opinions are gathered, they are read and
coded by the authors or their research assistants.102 Using the Key Number
System in this way saves time and money, to be sure. But in many contexts,
the system can do more: It can be employed for both the collecting and
coding of data. This dramatically increases the resources saved because the
scholar need not manually code the cases to transform them into a
standardized dataset. The digest classifications for each headnote have
accomplished that already.
Law professors have produced a handful of studies in which they used
the Key Number System for both data collection and coding. For example,
to measure the role of pragmatic reasoning in federal circuit opinions
concerning statutory interpretation, Frank Cross ran Westlaw searches to
determine how often such opinions were coded with key number
361k181(2).103 That key number fell under the topic “Statutes” and
“roughly corresponds to the use of the absurdity doctrine in statutory
interpretation,” a form of pragmatic reasoning.104 Cross found that the
number of opinions tagged with 361k181(2) went from less than five per
year up to roughly twenty per year during the period of the study.105 He
concluded that these “data show a dramatic increase in references to
pragmatism within circuit court opinions.”106 Likewise, William Bratton
and Michael Wachter used a Westlaw search for key numbers 101k1292
and 101k1475, which fall under the topic “Corporations and Business
Organizations” and concern preferred stock, to support the conclusion that
“Delaware courts have emerged as the dominant arbiters of preferred stock

A Federal/State Comparison of the Impact of Brown v. Board of Education, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 809,
814 & n.5 (2003); Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of “Popular Intent”: Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct
Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 110–11, 114–15 & n.27 (1995); Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the
Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1036 n.1, 1044–45 (1991); Richard B.
Wright, Negligence in the Courts: Introduction and Commentary, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 425, 451–53
(2002).
102
Fossey, supra note 101; Gluck, supra note 101; Holley & Holley, supra note 101; O’Shea,
supra note 101; Romero & Romero, supra note 101; Schacter, supra note 101; Thompson, supra note
101; Wright, supra note 101.
103
Frank B. Cross, What Do Judges Want?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 183, 200–01 (2008).
104
Id. at 200. West reorganized the “Statutes” topic after Professor Cross published his article and
361k181(2) was split up into multiple new key numbers. The absurdity doctrine is now covered by
361k1404. See WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 69, at 1597.
105
Cross, supra note 103, at 201.
106
Id.
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disputes.”107 They found that “[s]ince 1980, 60% of cases keyed by West”
with those two numbers were decided in Delaware; “New York came in a
distant second with 20%.”108
Professors of education have also conducted a number of studies using
the Key Number System to measure trends in school-related litigation. To
illustrate, Perry Zirkel and Sharon Richardson divided the key numbers
under the topic “Schools” into five categories—(1) desegregation,
(2) employees, (3) special education, (4) ”Other Macro-Level,” and
(5) “Other Students”—and ran separate Westlaw searches for cases
classified with the numbers in each category.109 They searched for both
state and federal cases containing the relevant key numbers over five tenyear periods.110 Based on their search results, Zirkel and Richardson
concluded that education litigation exploded in the 1960s and 1970s, but
leveled off in the 1980s, especially in federal court, where the volume of
litigation actually declined.111 They also found that the leveling off or
downturn in litigation applied to each of their categories except for special
education.112
The other studies published by legal scholars113 and education
professors114 have the same basic structure as the research conducted by

107
William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A Theory of Preferred Stock, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
1815, 1821 & n.14 (2013).
108
Id. at 1821 n.14.
109
Perry A. Zirkel & Sharon N. Richardson, The ‘Explosion’ in Education Litigation, 53 WEST’S
EDUC. L. REP. 767, 777 n.20 (1989). Note that since Zirkel and Richardson conducted the study, the
“Schools” topic was eliminated and the subjects covered by that topic were moved to the topic
“Education.” See WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 69, at 619–37.
110
Zirkel & Richardson, supra note 109, at 777–78.
111
Id. at 778–81, 789.
112
Id.
113
See, e.g., George S. Geis, Broadcast Contracting, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1153, 1155 & n.9
(2012) (supporting the proposition that claims of third-party beneficiary status are “attempted in
numerous cases each year” via a Westlaw search for key number 95k187, “Agreement for benefit of
third person,” which falls under the topic “Contracts”; the search identified more than one thousand
judicial opinions containing that key number during a ten-year period); Keckler, supra note 82, at 108–
09, 131–32 (In this study of the doctrine of stare decisis in Illinois, the author presented data regarding
how often Illinois courts overrule precedents in different fields of law. To classify cases by field, the
author relied upon the key numbers in the headnotes of each opinion.); David P. Leonard, Character
and Motive in Evidence Law, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 439, 441 & nn.7, 8 (2001) (using data from key
number searches to support the contentions that Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) “has been the subject
of more appeals than any other evidence rule” and that a significant portion of those appeals concern
motive); Gregory C. Lisby, No Place in the Law: The Ignominy of Criminal Libel in American
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Cross, Bratton, Wachter, Zirkel, and Richardson. In each paper, the
author(s) determined how many reported decisions were tagged with the
relevant key numbers in the jurisdictions and time-period of the study.
Then, based on the raw totals, the author(s) reached conclusions about
trends in litigation, the frequency of different types of disputes, or the
behavior of courts.

Jurisprudence, 9 COMM. L. POL’Y 433, 466–67 & nn.252–54 (2004) (manually counting decisions
included in the American Digest under the key numbers relevant to criminal libel; concluding based on
the data gathered that criminal libel prosecutions have been declining since the early twentieth century);
Amy E. Sloan, If You Can’t Beat ‘Em, Join ‘Em: A Pragmatic Approach to Nonprecedential Opinions
in the Federal Appellate Courts, 86 NEB. L. REV. 895, 924–25 & n.203 (2008) (comparing a Westlaw
search, which found that only 632 cases decided from 1941 through 2007 contained the key number
concerning the authoritative value of prior opinions, to Shepard’s Federal Citations, which at the time of
the study contained 820 pages of entries identifying citations to nonprecedential circuit court opinions
“published” in West’s Federal Appendix; from this comparison, the author concluded that courts
“frequently cite nonprecedential opinions without any discussion of their weight”); Snyder, supra note
75, at 547, 576–77 (presenting descriptive statistics regarding how often each digest topic appears in
Montana Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals cases; the author reviewed every decision
by those two courts from 1945 through 1997; contending that this data is relevant to the question of
which areas of law are most litigated, and thus possibly the most important, and that the data helps to
explain “why certain courses are either required in law school or considered to be very important
electives . . . .”); see also Ho & Quinn, supra note 99, at 859–60, 875 (using the Key Number System’s
coding as part of an empirical study of the United States Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation
jurisprudence); William A. Wines, Automobile Insurance Policies Build “Write-Away” Around Frolic
and Detour, A Persistent Problem on the Highway of Torts, 19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 85, 86–87 (1996)
(using total pages in the West American Digest, rather than Westlaw or manual searches for cases, as a
measure of the rate of litigation regarding the “frolic and detour” doctrine in tort law). Another
interesting approach was used by Robert J. Levy in Custody Investigations as Evidence in Divorce
Cases, 21 FAM. L.Q. 149 (1987). To support the proposition that “appellate cases from all jurisdictions
raising custody investigations have grown significantly,” Levy presented statistics indicating that the
phrase “custody investigation” was mentioned in 960 West headnotes from 1951 to 1960, in 3,464
headnotes from 1961 through 1970, and in 8,227 headnotes from 1970–1980. Id. at 151 & n.11. Like the
others authors of articles cited in this footnote, Levy relied upon coding performed by West. But instead
of using the key number tagging completed by West’s classifiers (the attorneys who assign key numbers
to headnotes), he focused on the work performed by the attorney-editors who write the actual
headnotes, treating their use of the phrase “custody investigation” as a form of coding of the opinions.
114
See, e.g., Clifford P. Hooker, Teachers and the Courts, 1965–1986, 48 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP.
7, 7–11 (1989); Michael Imber & David E. Gayler, A Statistical Analysis of Trends in EducationRelated Litigation Since 1960, 24 EDUC. ADMIN. Q. 55, 58–59 (1988); Perry A. Zirkel & Brent L.
Johnson, The ‘Explosion’ In Education Litigation: An Updated Analysis, 265 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 1,
1–6 (2011); id. at 1 n.2 (collecting additional authorities); Perry A. Zirkel, The Volume of Higher
Education Litigation: An Update, 126 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 21, 21–27 (1998); Perry A. Zirkel, Higher
Education Litigation: An Overview, 56 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 705, 705–08 (1990); Zirkel &
Richardson, supra note 109, at 769–77 (reviewing prior research on education litigation, including
several studies that used the West American Digest System).

Vol. 34, No. 2 (2016) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2016.103 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu

224

JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE

[Vol. 34:203

My research uncovered only one scholar who has gone beyond
reliance on raw totals and applied statistical analysis to the results of key
number searches. Nicholas Georgakopoulos followed such a protocol in
two studies of the caselaw on piercing the corporate veil. The first was part
of an article arguing that veil piercing plays a critical role in contract
disputes and is thus a desirable remedy in that type of lawsuit.115
Georgakopoulos began by reviewing the academic consensus that veil
piercing is more justified when the plaintiff’s claim is grounded in tort than
when it is grounded in contract.116 He then presented his empirical study
which was designed to test whether “courts and litigants demonstrate a bias
in favor of piercing in contract disputes compared to tort disputes.”117 His
null hypothesis was that “litigants and courts have the same attitudes about
piercing in contract as in tort.”118 The study involved comparing (1) the
ratio of all contracts cases to all tort cases, with (2) the ratio of veil piercing
cases involving contract claims to veil piercing cases involving tort
claims.119 “If no unique biases applied to piercing opinions, then one would
expect that ratio to be constant. This would mean that whatever fraction of
tort opinions contract opinions are, opinions about piercing in contract
would be the same fraction of opinions about piercing in tort.”120 The ratio
of contract decisions to tort decisions is the result of multiple dynamics. “If
the same dynamics applied when the issue of piercing arose, then the same
ratio would apply in the smaller set of piercing opinions.”121
To measure the total number of contract cases, Georgakopoulos ran
searches for all state and federal cases classified with a key number from
topic 95, which is entitled “Contracts,” in every year from 1947 to 2003.122
He followed the same protocol to determine the total number of torts cases,
except he searched for opinions tagged with torts key numbers rather than

115
Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Contract-Centered Veil Piercing, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN.
121, 123 (2007).
116
Id. at 124–27.
117
Id. at 127–30.
118
Id. at 127.
119
Id. at 127–30.
120
Id. at 127.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 127–28 & n.22.
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contracts key numbers.123 He then ran Boolean term searches for decisions
within this universe of contract and tort cases to determine how many
referenced piercing the corporate veil.124 I have set forth the raw totals from
Georgakopoulos’s study in Table 1.125
Table 1. Number of opinions: contract, tort, and piercing
No Piercing Reference
Piercing Reference
Predicted
Contract
61,040
475
290.53
Contract & Tort
4,375
68
20.98
Tort
109,901
285
520.40
All
175,316
828

The ratio of opinions referring to piercing (828) to those not referring to
piercing (175,316) is 0.47%.126 To get the numbers in the third column
(“Predicted”), multiply 0.47% by the numbers in the first column (“No
Piercing Reference”). The predicted count is “the number of opinions that
would mention piercing if they followed the allocation of the opinions that
do not mention piercing.”127 As the raw totals make clear, the ratio of all
contract cases to all tort cases is considerably smaller than the ratio of veil
piercing cases involving contract claims to veil piercing cases involving tort
claims. Georgakopoulos then ran a statistical test (the chi-test) to “calculate
the probability that the observed allocation of piercing opinions can arise if
the underlying generating dynamics or mechanism was the same” as for tort
and contract cases generally.128 This test resulted in a probability of less
than one in a million or 0.00001%.129 Georgakopoulos elaborates:
Statisticians can say this evidence rejects the null hypothesis with 99.9999%
confidence. In lay terms, it is extremely improbable that so many piercing
opinions are about contract disputes if piercing opinions are produced by the

123
Id. Georgakopoulos used topics 272 (“Negligence”), 379 (“Torts”) and selected portions of
topic 48 (“Automobiles”) to identify tort cases. Id. at 128 n.22.
124
Id. at 128 & n.23. The search terms were “pierc! the corporate veil” and “disregard the
corporate entity.” Id. at 128 n.23.
125
Id. at 129.
126
Id.
127
Id. at 128.
128
Id. at 128–29 (emphasis added).
129
Id. at 129.
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same dynamics as overall contract and tort opinions. Piercing is invoked more in
opinions about contract disputes than it is in opinions about tort.130

Therefore, courts and litigants actually “demonstrate a bias in favor of
piercing in contract disputes compared to tort disputes,”131 contrary to the
academic consensus. In the rest of his article, Georgakopoulos set forth
various theoretical arguments designed to explain why veil piercing is
justified when parties attempt to enforce contract rights against
corporations.132
Georgakopoulos’s second study followed the same approach as the
first, updating the research to cover the time period from 1947 through
2010, and reached essentially identical results.133 This means that “either a
different mechanism produces piercing disputes” or parties choose to
pursue piercing more intensely in the contract context.134 The balance of
Georgakopoulos’s paper analyzed these two possibilities.135
C. Methodological Issues
The scholarship discussed in the prior subpart demonstrates how some
researchers have employed the Key Number System to collect and code
data, sparing the authors considerable resources. In those studies, there was
no need to analyze and code the relevant judicial opinions because West’s
attorney-editors had already completed all or most of the required coding.
Georgakopoulos’s two studies, in particular, also illustrate that using key
number coding enables authors to analyze much larger datasets than in
many other types of empirical research: The sample in his first study
contained over 186,000 cases.136 Most of the non-key number studies
discussed above used samples in the hundreds.137

130

Id.
Id. at 127 (emphasis added).
132
Id. at 130–47.
133
Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Bankruptcy Veil-Piercing, 27 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 471, 473–
75 (2011).
134
Id. at 475.
135
Id. at 475–87. While conducting his analysis, Georgakopoulos included another small study
using the key number system for data coding purposes. See id. at 480 n.24.
136
Georgakopoulos, supra note 115, at 129.
137
My study, while not as large as Georgakopoulos’s, involved a total of 8,113 cases. See infra
Part V.B., Table 4; see also Hall & Wright, supra note 3, at 102–03 (empirical study of academic
131
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However, employing the Key Number System in empirical research
raises a variety of methodological issues beyond resource allocation. Any
assessment of the system’s value as a tool for data collection and coding
must take into account these additional factors. Accordingly, this subpart
discusses the other benefits and several limitations of using key numbers
for empirical work.
There are multiple advantages to employing the Key Number System
as a collection and coding device apart from the time and money that the
system saves. First, key number classifications are assigned by parties who
are “independent of the researcher and of any research hypothesis.”138 This
eliminates author bias from the coding process and distinguishes coding
performed by West’s attorney-editors from coding completed by scholars or
their research assistants.139 Of course, in many circumstances, an author can
use research assistants in ways that preserve the integrity of coding work.
But that requires diligent attention to proper protocols.140
Second, as noted above, West’s attorney-editors have considerable
training and experience in classifying headnotes with key numbers.141
Therefore, they are probably more accurate and reliable coders of caselaw
than law students, the typical research assistants employed by legal scholars
for coding work.142 The attorney-editors may even be superior to academic
authors.

studies engaged in the systematic content analysis of judicial opinions; finding that only eleven of 114
studies using universal sampling coded more than 1000 cases; also finding that twenty-one coded 500–
1000, thirty-nine coded between 100 and 300, and twenty-six coded fewer than 100); id. at 72
(explaining that in the 134 studies that comprised the full data set, the median number of cases coded
was 252).
138
Keckler, supra note 82, at 121 n.38. Keckler is referring to the coding done as part of West’s
citation service, KeyCite. Id. at 119, 121 n.38. But the same reasoning applies to the Key Number
System, and Keckler uses that system for data coding later in his article. See id. at 131–32.
139
In their survey of empirical studies involving case coding, Hall and Wright found that “[o]nly
22% (29/134) of the projects we reviewed primarily used student coders; in the rest, the authors
appeared to do their own coding.” Hall & Wright, supra note 3, at 109.
140
For an excellent discussion of such protocols, see id. at 109–10.
141
See supra text accompanying notes 88–89.
142
See Hall & Wright, supra note 3, at 111 (explaining that some scholars have observed that law
students make “a surprising number of mistakes” when coding judicial decisions) (“Student coders may
lack the level of expertise needed to code reliably the more complex or subtle, yet more meaningful,
aspects of judicial opinions.”); cf. Ho & Quinn, supra note 99, at 858 (concluding that the Key Number
System “has a chief advantage over the Supreme Court Database: unlike the issue codings therein,
which are coded without legal expertise and represent public policy issues, Key Numbers are assigned
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Third, multiple West attorney-editors participate in the process of
assigning key numbers to each headnote.143 This complies with the best
practice that all data be coded by more than one person,144 further
enhancing the accuracy of the information contained in the American
Digest System relative to information generated by author or research
assistant coding.
Fourth, empirical studies using the Key Number System are
exceptionally easy for other scholars to analyze and replicate.145 An
author’s methodology often can be explained in the space of two pages or
less. And other researchers can reproduce the data collection and coding
simply by running identical searches on Westlaw.146
Fifth, because of the ease of replicability, designing and executing
comparable studies takes minimal effort. To illustrate, a subsequent author
can run the same searches in different caselaw databases or during different

by attorneys using expertise to classify propositions of law”). For a general discussion of the process of
selecting and training independent coders for empirical studies of caselaw and the strengths and
weaknesses of using such coders, see Hall & Wright, supra, at 109–12.
143
See supra text accompanying notes 85–87.
144
See supra text accompanying note 31; see also Hall & Wright, supra note 3, at 111 (explaining
that when a scholar codes her own data, “it is especially important from a scientific perspective to
conduct reliability tests, by recruiting a colleague with similar expertise to double code at a least a
subset of cases”); id. at 111 n.196 (“In our literature review, this was done in only five of the ninety
projects where authors did some or all of their own coding.”). Note, however, that West’s attorneyeditors work together in deciding on key number classification. And some sources contend that the best
scientific practice is for coders to work independently. See Hall & Wright, supra, at 109–10 (“In theory,
the most scientifically rigorous method is for researchers to train others to do the coding and for coders
to work completely independently once they are trained.”); id. at 110 n.186 (“Experts caution against
allowing coders to confer with each other once they are trained because this undermines the
independence of their judgment, thus calling into question the objectivity and reproducibility of their
coding.”); but see id. at 116–17 (discussing various forms of coding where the coders work together as a
group to make classification decisions).
145
Cf. Keckler, supra note 82, at 121 n.38 (explaining that one of the virtues of using West’s
citation service, KeyCite, as a device for coding caselaw is that anything done with that system “is
easily replicable”); see generally Hall & Wright, supra note 3, at 105–06 (“An essential attribute of
scientific objectivity is replicability—the ability at least in theory, to test a research project by
reproducing its findings using the same methods. Replicability is the overriding reason for using
systematic content analysis. This is what confers scientific status on research findings.”); Korobkin,
supra note 4, at 1051 (explaining the importance of describing one’s research methodology so that
others can replicate the study).
146
See also Hall & Wright, supra note 3, at 106 (explaining that many empirical studies of
caselaw are not fully replicable because, after running electronic searches, the author uses additional
subjective criteria to “screen out cases”).
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time periods. Alternatively, the scholar can modify the searches and run
them in the same (or different) databases and time periods.
Sixth, when engaging in secondary data analysis, “researchers need to
know as much as possible about the data,” including who collected it, why
it was gathered, the procedures employed in the collection process, and the
coding scheme that was used to standardize the information.147 The
American Digest System meets all of these requirements.
Between the resources saved and the six advantages discussed
immediately above, it is clear that there are substantial benefits to using key
numbers in empirical scholarship. But there are also critical limitations. The
first and most important concerns the scope and content of the American
Digest System. The cases that receive headnotes and key numbers are a tiny
subset of the broader populations that researchers typically wish to study.
And there is compelling evidence that the digested opinions are not a
representative sample of the larger categories.
Starting with the quantitative aspect of this limitation, West normally
writes headnotes and assigns key numbers only for “published” or
“reported” decisions148—i.e., cases selected for inclusion in its National
Reporter System.149 Most opinions printed in that system are issued by

147

LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 19, at 131.
I use the terms “published” and “reported” interchangeably in this article.
149
See BARKAN ET AL., supra note 58, at 86 (“The American Digest System has as its core a
massive set of materials in several units known as the Decennial Digests and their companion volumes
containing later information, the General Digest. . . . Each volume [of the General Digest] consists of all
the headnotes taken from all the units of the National Reporter System for the period covered.”)
(emphasis in original); COHEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 86, 90 (“West . . . publishes two interlocking,
comprehensive services: a system of case reporting which contains the full text of appellate . . .
decisions from state and federal courts, and a digest structure providing for the classification . . . of the
points of law determined in all judicial decisions reported by West.”); id. at 50 (noting that West adds
headnotes and key numbers to all opinions included in the National Reporter System); see also Snyder,
supra note 75, at 542 (“The American Digest System includes the headnotes from the published cases of
all federal courts and the published cases of the appellate courts of every state.”) (emphasis added);
Joseph L. Gerken, A Librarian’s Guide to Unpublished Judicial Opinions, 96 LAW LIBR. J. 475, 480
(2004) (noting that published decisions are the rulings “included in a West print reporter”). However,
there are an increasing number of exceptions. “Selected state appellate and lower court unpublished
decisions receive [headnote and key number] enhancements” when West, in its editorial judgment,
determines that the opinion warrants inclusion in the digest. E-mail from Adrienne Stanley, Reference
Attorney, Thomson Reuters, to Author (July 22, 2015, 9:17 CST) (on file with author). And during my
research, I came across several opinions with headnotes and key numbers that were not printed in any
volume of the National Reporter System. See, e.g., Nat. Lumber Co. v. Brainerd, 76 Mass. App. Ct.
1102, 2009 WL 4824781 (Mass. App. Ct. Dec. 16, 2009).
148
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federal and state appellate courts.150 Exceptionally few state trial court
decisions are published.151 And while a significant number of federal trial
court rulings are included in printed volumes like the Federal Supplement
and the Federal Rules Decisions,152 they are still a small fraction of the
orders issued by district court judges.153 Very few lawsuits result in an
appellate opinion.154 Combining this point with the fact that most reported

150
Lisa R. Pruitt, Her Own Good Name: Two Centuries of Talk About Chastity, 63 MD. L. REV.
401, 433 n.159 (2004) (observing that the “West reporting system contains mostly appellate level
cases”); see Wayne Klein, The Idaho Securities Act: An Analysis of Idaho Courts’ Securities Opinions,
29 IDAHO L. REV. 95, 111 (1992/1993) (“Only appellate decisions are routinely reported.”); see also
COHEN ET AL., supra note 61, at 83 (“The West Publishing Company’s National Reporter System . . . is
a comprehensive scheme of publication of appellate court decisions from all jurisdictions.”).
151
Gerken, supra note 149, at 479 (observing that “very few [state] trial level decisions are
published”); Klein, supra note 150, at 111 (“Most significantly, state trial decisions are not generally
reported.”); Pruitt, supra note 150, at 433 n.159 (“[M]ost trial level cases are not reported.”). Note that
some states do publish a significant number of trial court rulings. For example, opinions from trial
courts in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania are reported sufficiently often to warrant citation
rules. See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 277, 280, 289 (Columbia Law Review
Ass’n et al. eds., 20th ed. 2015). By comparison, California, Illinois, and Texas have no such rules. See
id. at 252, 262, 295.
152
To illustrate, at the time I wrote this section of the article, West’s Federal Supplement 2d had
reached volume 217. Note also that a significant number of opinions issued by district court judges and
bankruptcy court judges are contained in West’s Bankruptcy Reports.
153
See David A. Hoffman et al., Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L.
REV. 681, 708–10 (2007) (study of 980 cases from four federal districts containing 1,091 substantive
orders, such as summary judgment rulings, and 4,631 ministerial orders, such as scheduling orders; 178
orders, all of them substantive, were available on Westlaw; that constitutes 16% of the substantive
orders and 3% of all orders; in addition, only 18% of the 980 cases resulted in an order contained on
Westlaw; note further that the category of opinions available on Westlaw is broader than the category of
opinions contained in a West reporter); Margo Schlanger & Denise Lieberman, Using Court Records for
Research, Teaching, and Policy Making: The Civil Rights Clearinghouse, 75 UMKC L. REV. 155, 164–
65 (2006) (finding that roughly 2.3% of district court rulings that disposed of a case in fiscal 2004 were
published in the Federal Supplement or the Federal Rules Decisions, and 8.7% of such rulings were
available on Westlaw; this result was derived by comparing (1) all 27,890 district court opinions posted
on Westlaw during fiscal 2004 (note that Westlaw also identifies whether the decision was printed in a
reporter), with (2) the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts’ “reported number of civil and criminal
cases ‘terminated’ in each district” for the same period); Peter Siegelman & John Donohue, Studying the
Iceberg from Its Tip: A Comparison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases,
24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1133, 1138, 1141 (1990) (concluding, in this study of 4,310 employment civil
rights cases filed in the Northern District of Illinois between July 1, 1972 and December 31, 1986, that
only 20.1 percent, or 867 cases, generated a published opinion; the study defined published to mean
available on Lexis, which is a broader category than all cases contained in a West reporter).
154
George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 2 (1984) (“It is well known, however, that only a very small fraction of disputes comes to trial
and an even smaller fraction is appealed.”) (collecting authorities); Mark R. Brown & Andrew C.
Greenberg, On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Law: Legal Indeterminacy and the Implications
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cases are decided by courts of appeal establishes that published decisions
containing headnotes and key numbers are a tiny subset of all actions
brought before civil and criminal tribunals.
The set of cases added to the American Digest System is actually even
smaller than I suggested in the previous paragraph. That is because most
states have rules that limit the publication of opinions issued by
intermediate courts of appeal.155 As a result, the majority of rulings made
by such courts not reported.156 Consider Illinois: In 2013, only 531 out of
2248 cases resolved on the merits in that jurisdiction’s intermediate
appellate courts were disposed of by a published opinion. The rest were
concluded via some other type of order.157 For criminal matters, it was 314
reported decisions out of 2386 merits resolutions.158

of Metamathematics, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1439, 1453 (1992) (“Of those cases that do wind up in court,
only a small portion are appealed and reported.”); Eli Wald & Russell G. Pearce, Making Good
Lawyers, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 403, 417 (2011) (stating that only a “miniscule subset of legal matters
. . . result in appellate decisions”).
155
See, e.g., ILL. S. CT. R. 23(a) (providing that a case pending before an Illinois Appellate Court
may only be disposed of via a publishable opinion if (1) “the decision establishes a new rule of law or
modifies, explains or criticizes an existing rule of law; or (2) the decision resolves, creates, or avoids an
apparent conflict of authority within the Appellate Court”); see generally Melissa M. Serfass & Jessie L.
Cranford, Federal and State Court Rules Governing Publication and Citation of Opinions: An Update, 6
J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 349, 358–94 (2004) (setting forth a comprehensive list of such rules as of
2004). Unpublished appellate orders are generally not precedential and, in most states, litigants are
forbidden from citing such rulings except in a narrow set of circumstances. See id.; e.g., ILL. S. CT. R.
23(e)(1) (permitting citation to unpublished decisions only “to support contentions of double jeopardy,
res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case”). Note, however, that some states have eliminated the
distinction between published and unpublished decisions at the appellate level. For example, Arkansas
previously followed the approach used by other jurisdictions. See Jillian R. Jones, Comment, Bound by
Precedent: Arkansas Practitioners Win the Debate over Unpublished Decisions, 63 ARK. L. REV. 619,
621 (2010) (“Opinions intended as precedent were designated as ‘published’ and appeared in the
Arkansas Reports; however, opinions deemed as lacking precedential value were excluded from the
Arkansas Reports and marked as ‘not designated for publication.’”). But in 2009, the Arkansas Supreme
Court “adopted electronic publication and distribution for the official reports of all Arkansas appellate
decisions . . . and abandoned its distinction between published and unpublished opinions and, most
notably, declared that every Supreme Court and Court of Appeals opinion issued after July 1, 2009, had
precedential value.” Id. at 619; see also RULES OF THE S. CT. AND CT. OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF
ARK. 5-2, available at https://courts.arkansas.gov/rules-and-administrative-orders/rules-of-the-supremecourt-and-court-of-appeals-of-the-state-of-arkansas.
156
Pruitt, supra note 150, at 433 n.159.
157
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS COURTS, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS
COURTS 142, 144, available at http://www.illinoiscourts.gov/supremecourt/annualreport/2013/
statssumm/2013_statistical_summary.pdf. Note that the Illinois Appellate Court disposes of many cases
on jurisdictional grounds, pursuant to a motion to dismiss by the appellant, or via a similar proceeding
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Federal circuit courts also have local rules or practices that limit the
issuance of published opinions,159 most of which were initially adopted in
the late 1970s.160 And a substantial majority of the orders issued by these
courts are unpublished.161 However, in 2001, West started producing a new
volume called the Federal Appendix.162 That series contains
“unpublished”163 orders issued from 2001 forward by federal appeals courts
and most of the decisions printed therein receive headnote and key number
treatment.164 Thus, since 2001, West has included a much higher portion of

that does not result in a merits ruling. If these orders are included in the totals, then 531 out of 4370
appellate cases were resolved via a published decision. Id.
158
Id. Including the non-merits orders changes the totals to 314 out of 3384.
159
See generally David R. Cleveland, Local Rules in the Wake of Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1, 11 J. APP. PRAC. PROCESS. 19, 61–72 (2010). However, while unpublished appellate
rulings are generally non-precedential, id., parties may now cite such opinions in the federal system, see
FED R. APP. P. 32.1, contrary to the practice in state court, see supra note 155.
160
See Gerken, supra note 149, at 477–78.
161
See Hon. Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies that
Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1923
(2009) (“[A] huge percentage of [federal] courts of appeals decisions are reported but unpublished. In
fact, in 2007, less than 17 percent of all opinions in the [federal] courts of appeals were published.”);
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLE 2.5, U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS JUDICIAL FACTS AND
FIGURES (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/25/judicial-facts-and-figures/2013/
09/30 (last visited June 24, 2015) (setting forth data indicating that in 2011, 2012, and 2013, a total of
85.0%, 81.4%, and 82.3% of orders issued by the federal circuit courts of appeal were unpublished in
cases terminated on the merits after an oral hearing or submission on briefs).
162
Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 77, 81 n.8 (2010);
Gerken, supra note 149, at 475.
163
I placed the word “unpublished” in quotation marks because the rulings contained in the
Federal Appendix are clearly “published” under the common understanding of that term. See also Perry
A. Zirkel with Amanda C. Machin, The Special Education Case Law “Iceberg”: An Initial Exploration
of the Underside, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 483, 484 (2012) (“In recent years, the concept of ‘published’ has
become more flexible and expansive, ultimately affording a larger available corpus of judicial decisions
for empirical analysis.”).
164
See Thomson Reuters, Federal Appendix (National Reporter System), http://legal
solutions.thomsonreuters.com/law-products/Reporters/Federal-Appendix-National-Reporter-System/p/
100000796 (last visited June 24, 2015) [hereinafter Federal Appendix] (“The Federal Appendix . . .
covers opinions and decisions from 2001 to date issued by the U.S. courts of appeals that are not
selected for publication in the Federal Reporter.”). In particular, the Federal Appendix “includes orders
routinely made accessible as unpublished by federal appellate courts.” E-mail from Adrienne Stanley,
supra note 149; accord Gerken, supra note 149, at 479 (“According to West, the Federal Appendix will
include the full text of unpublished decisions to which the publisher has access. . . .). Some types of
orders, such as rulings addressing various motions, are typically inaccessible. These decisions are
generally not printed in the Federal Appendix. See E-mail from Adrienne Stanley. Finally, all opinions
“that have reasoning/legal conclusions received editorial enhancements.” Id.; see also Federal Appendix
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federal appellate decisions in the American Digest System than other types
of rulings.
To recap: (1) only a tiny percentage of trial court orders are reported;
(2) most state appellate court rulings are unreported; (3) the bulk of federal
appellate decisions were not reported from the late 1970s through 2001; and
(4) a small fraction of lawsuits culminate in an appellate opinion. To these,
we must add the following: (5) the vast majority of human behavior that is
governed or influenced by legal norms does not result in litigation.165 These
five points together entail that the judicial opinions with key number coding
are a microscopic subset of all lawsuits filed and orders issued, and an even
tinier fraction of other potential categories of empirical study, such as
disputes, injuries, accidents, crimes, contracts, or transactions.166
The small number of cases contained in the digest would not be a
significant issue if these decisions were a representative subdivision of the
broader classifications that researchers are interested in analyzing.167 But a
considerable body of literature has found that reported opinions are not
representative of any such larger group.
Beginning with the appellate level, state and local federal rules
ordinarily permit intermediate courts of appeal to publish a decision only if

(“Cases published in this product series are enhanced with headnotes, key numbers, and synopses
prepared by West’s internal staff of highly trained attorney editors.”).
165
Hall & Wright, supra note 3, at 104 (“[M]ost human interactions do not produce disputes, only
some disputes result in legal claims . . . .”); Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, The Case Against Vicarious
Jurisdiction, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1023, 1082 (2004) (noting that “the total number of lawsuits filed is . . .
only a small percentage of the total quantum of behavior affected by prevailing legal norms”).
166
See Brown & Greenberg, supra note 154, at 1453 (explaining that “reported cases represent
only a very small percentage of the controversies and transactions that occur in the United States each
day”); Hoffman, supra note 165, at 1082 (“[R]eported decision are but a small percentage of the total
number of lawsuits filed, and the total number of lawsuits filed is, in turn, only a small percentage of the
total quantum of behavior affected by prevailing legal norms.”); see also Siegelman & Donohue, supra
note 153, at 1133 (“One of the few uncontested truths produced by the application of social science to
law is that only a tiny subset of the ‘action’ in the legal system is revealed in appellate cases. Most
potential disputes never get defined by the actors as such, most actual disputes don’t go to court, most
court cases are settled rather than adjudicated, and most adjudicated cases are not appealed.”) (citing
Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture,
15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 525, 544 (1981)).
167
Cf. Schlanger & Lieberman, supra note 153, at 165 (“It would matter less that so few cases are
observable from the judicial opinions if those cases fairly represented the entire docket.”).
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it has significant precedential value.168 These rules provide a firm basis for
hypothesizing that reported appellate cases are different from those that are
unreported. And there is much evidence supporting this proposition. For
example, it is well known that “the judgments rendered in unpublished
decisions are largely unanimous, and . . . typically involve more
straightforward applications of law.”169 In addition, studies analyzing
appellate rulings have found that: (1) the frequency with which various
types of parties appear and their rates of success differ between reported
and unreported cases;170 (2) reversal rates are higher in published
decisions;171 and (3) panel composition influences whether an order is
reported.172 Note also that the percentage of appellate rulings that are
published varies by federal circuit,173 as does the percentage of reversals
that are published.174 This means that a national sample of reported federal
appellate cases will often be geographically biased. In sum, there is little
question that appellate rulings with headnotes and key numbers are not
representative of appellate matters as a whole.

168
See Shenoa L. Payne, The Ethical Conundrums of Unpublished Opinions, 44 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 723, 726–27 (2008); Cleveland, supra note 159, at 61–72; Serfass & Cranford, supra note 155,
358–94; see also, e.g., ILL. S. CT. R. 23(a), quoted in note 155 supra.
169
Edwards & Livermore, supra note 161, at 1923.
170
See Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Who Wins on Appeal? Upperdogs and
Underdogs in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 235, 249–50, 252–53 (1992).
171
See id. at 249, 257 (referring to an unpublished study conducted by one of the authors); Robert
A. Mead, Unpublished Opinions as the Bulk of the Iceberg: Publication Patterns in the Eighth and
Tenth Circuits of the United States Courts of Appeals, 93 LAW LIBR. J. 589, 603, 605 (2001) (study
comparing published and unpublished decisions of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits for the first six months
of 2000).
172
Carlos Berdejo, It’s the Journey, Not the Destination: Judicial Preferences and the DecisionMaking Process, 51 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 271, 274 n.13 (2013) (explaining that “whether a decision is
published or not may be correlated with the composition of the panel writing the opinion” and collecting
authorities that support this conclusion).
173
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLE 2.5, U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS JUDICIAL
BUSINESS (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/b-12/judicial-business/2014/09/30
(last visited June 24, 2015) (setting forth data indicating that during the 12 months ending September 30,
2014, the percentage of opinions or orders that were unpublished for the twelve federal circuit courts of
appeal ranged from 54.1% in the First Circuit to 93.8% in the Fourth Circuit).
174
See Mead, supra note 171, at 603, 605 (in this study comparing published and unpublished
decisions of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits for the first six months of 2000, the author presented data
indicating that the Eighth Circuit published a considerably higher percentage of its reversals than did the
Tenth Circuit).
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Now consider trial courts. Federal district court judges possess nearly
“complete discretion regarding whether to publish, or even write, an
opinion in a particular case.”175 And they do not randomly select rulings for
the reporters.176 Instead, they are influenced by “formal rules, court culture,
personal predilections, or strategic considerations.”177 It should thus not be
surprising that multiple empirical studies of the federal trial courts have
found that reported cases differ from unreported matters.178 To illustrate,
Peter Siegelman & John Donohue compared a random sample of
employment discrimination cases that involved at least one published
opinion to a random sample of such cases that did not produce any
published decision.179 They found numerous differences between the two
sets of lawsuits.180 For example, the court files for matters with a published
opinion were two and one-half times as thick.181 The proportion of suits that
involved a certified class action was six times higher for the reported set
(13.1% versus 1.9%).182 And both the total dollars awarded ($606,424
versus $12,545) and the dollars awarded per plaintiff ($49,907 versus
$12,375) were much higher in the published cases.183 Siegelman &
Donohue’s results also indicated that lawsuits with a published opinion tend
to last longer, “to include a different mix of plaintiff occupations, to
proceed at a different pace through the legal system, and to end in different
kinds of outcomes.”184

175

Ahmed E. Taha, Data and Selection Bias: A Case Study, 75 UMKC L. REV. 171, 174 (2006).
Pauline T. Kim et al., How Should We Study District Judge Decision-Making?, 29 J.L. &
POL’Y 83, 97 (2009).
177
Id.
178
For an excellent yet brief survey of the literature, see Schlanger & Lieberman, supra note 153,
at 165–67 (among other things, the authors specifically note that “there is now voluminous evidence that
[judges] choose to devote the time to fully developed opinion writing in non-representative ways”).
179
Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 153, at 1150. The two samples contained 114 and 105
cases, respectively. Id. And all of the cases were filed in the Northern District of Illinois. Id. at 1138.
Note that the authors defined “published” to mean available on Lexis. Id. at 1138. This definition
includes cases beyond those contained in West reporters.
180
Id. at 1150–56.
181
Id. at 1150.
182
Id.
183
Id. at 1151–52.
184
Id. at 1156. In the same article, the authors conducted an additional study finding that district
courts vary in the percentage of orders they publish. See id. at 1142–44. Accordingly, relying “solely on
cases with published opinions will generally produce a geographically skewed sample of all cases filed”
in district courts. Id. at 1144. Multiple other studies have reached the same conclusion. See Hoffman et
176
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In another study, Susan Olson found critical variation in the types of
federal cases that produce a published opinion.185 Of the matters in her
dataset,186 very few real property (0%), personal property (0%), personal
injury (0.7%), and labor disputes (1.9%) resulted in a published decision,
whereas bankruptcy (11.8%), civil rights (12.2%), and federal regulatory
cases (17.7%) produced a significant number.187 Olson’s findings suggest
that samples of published decisions will often contain subject-matter
biases.188
Further illumination regarding the unrepresentative nature of reported
decisions can be found in the dispute resolution literature. Researchers in
this field often conceptualize their various categories of study as
constituting a pyramid. The pyramid is best understood as consisting of the
following five levels (proceeding from top to bottom): (1) appellate cases,

al., supra note 153, at 698 (collecting authorities); id. at 710 (setting forth the authors’ own research);
Schlanger & Lieberman, supra note 153, at 166–67 (discussing the authors’ own study).
185
Susan M. Olson, Studying Federal District Courts Through Published Cases: A Research
Note, 15 JUST. SYS. J. 782 (1992). Like Siegelman and Donohue, Olson defined “published” to mean
accessible on Lexis. Id. at 789.
186
The data for this study came from “a systematic sample of every fourth civil case terminated in
Minnesota federal district court from July 1, 1982 through June 30, 1984.” Id. at 788. This resulted in a
dataset of 697 cases. Id. at 790.
187
Id. at 790, 791.
188
Accord Hoffman et al., supra note 153, at 719 (finding, in this study of 980 cases from four
federal districts, that contracts and labor lawsuits produced above-average numbers of opinions
available on Westlaw and torts and habeas prisoner actions produced below-average numbers of such
opinions; all four findings were statistically significant); see also Schlanger & Lieberman, supra note
153, at 166 (“Besides outcome skews, it is plausible that [published] opinions are about different kinds
of cases than are typical on the docket—I would hypothesize that they are more likely to concern
complex than simple cases, more likely to be issued in large stakes than small stakes cases, and so on.”).
For other studies concluding that reported and unreported cases in federal district court differ, see C.K.
ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 123–28 (1996)
(finding that the influence of political ideology appears to be greater in published district court opinions
than in unpublished ones); Evan J. Ringquist & Craig E. Emmert, Judicial Policymaking in Published
and Unpublished Decisions: The Case of Environmental Civil Litigation, 52 POL. RES. Q. 7, 7, 16–17,
27–33 (1992) (In this study of 1074 civil enforcement lawsuits brought by the Environmental Protection
Agency, the authors found (1) that significantly higher penalties were awarded in published cases
($62,380) than in all actions ($28,294), and (2) that political considerations, such as the party of the
appointing President, have greater influence on the decision in published cases); see also Schlanger &
Lieberman, supra, at 165 (discussing four reasons why published trial court rulings are not
representative of all trial court matters); but see Zirkel & Machin, supra note 163, at 499–507 (finding
that unpublished decisions “are not dramatically different from published decisions” based on a sample
of sixty-four cases (forty-three published and sixteen unpublished) brought under the Individuals with
Disabilities in Education Act in federal district court during the year 2000).
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(2) litigated cases that reach judgment before a trial court, (3) filed cases,
(4) disputes, and (5) human interactions.189 Each level in the pyramid is
much smaller than the one immediately below it.190 For example, since few
trial court judgments are appealed, appellate cases constitute a small subset
of litigated cases.191 Likewise, most disputes do not result in the filing of a
lawsuit.192
Critically, the consensus among dispute resolution scholars is that each
level in the pyramid is not a representative subset of the group beneath it.
To illustrate, it is widely accepted that appealed cases are different from
actions litigated to judgment before a lower court.193 Similarly, matters

189
See, e.g., Taha, supra note 175, at 171–72 & n.1. The pyramid is sometimes called the
“grievance pyramid” and it can be conceptualized in a variety of ways, adding considerably more layers.
See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 119,
135–36 (2002).
190
Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 189, at 135–36; Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 153, at
1133 (the relevant language from page 1133 of this article is quoted in footnote 166, supra); Taha, supra
note 175, at 171–73.
191
Taha, supra note 175, at 173.
192
Id. at 172 & n.2 (citing David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L.
REV. 72, 85–85 (1983) (survey of 5,000 households finding that only 11.2% of disputes resulted in a
lawsuit)).
193
Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 153, at 1134 (“[S]ocial scientists studying the law have
come to appreciate that the process by which parties select disputes for litigation or appeal will not, in
general, produce a random (representative) sample of all disputes or cases. . . . The unrepresentative
nature of appellate cases is by now widely accepted among social scientists.”); Christina L. Boyd &
James F. Spriggs II, An Examination of Strategic Anticipation of Appellate Court Preferences by
Federal District Court Judges, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 37, 47 (2009) (“After all, cases that are
appealed and advance into each higher tier represent a non-random sample of all cases that are
litigated.”); Richard S. Grunner, How High is Too High?: Reflections on the Sources and Meaning of
Claim Construction Reversal Rates at the Federal Circuit, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 981, 1012 (2010)
(“[A]ppealed cases involve a nonrandom subset of tried cases, most often involving tried cases that still
have material uncertainties.”).
One older study of eleven states over a ten-year period (ending in 1978) found a strong
correlation between the total level of federal and state trial-court cases and the total level of appellate
cases. See Imber & Gayler, supra note 114, at 57–58. Given the strength of the correlation, “and in the
absence of any empirical or theoretical reason to believe otherwise,” the authors concluded that “it is
reasonable to accept the hypothesis that trends in appellate court cases in a particular category are a
strong indicator of trends in trial court caseloads in the same category.” Id. at 58. The authors thus
decided that it was appropriate to use the results of key number searches on Westlaw as a proxy for total
levels of education-related litigation. Id. at 57–59. Unfortunately, there are now strong “empirical and
theoretical reasons” to believe that various categories of cases result in reported rulings at different rates.
For example, I discussed above two studies that found that different types of lawsuits produce published
opinions at differing frequencies. See supra notes 185–88 and accompanying text. And both of the
articles containing these studies explored various theories and supporting empirical evidence that could
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litigated to judgment are not reflective of all filed cases.194 One key reason
is that lawsuits that reach judgment via dispositive motion or trial are unlike
those that settle.195
If we combine the studies of reported cases discussed above with the
insights of the dispute resolution literature, we see that the problem of
unrepresentative samples is compounded. Published rulings are not
representative of their associated level in the pyramid. And each level in the
pyramid is not representative of the levels beneath it.196
In empirical work, “selection bias” exists when a data sample that a
researcher examines is not representative “of the larger population about
which the researcher is trying to draw conclusions.”197 If selection bias is
present, then “conclusions drawn from the sample may not be valid for the

explain such findings. See Hoffman et al., supra note 153, at 688; Olson, supra note 185, at 790–91.
Accordingly, Imber and Gayler’s research provides only marginal support for the claim that reported
cases are representative of total filings within a given category. See also Zirkel & Machin, supra note
163, at 494 (discussing four other issues with Imber and Gayler’s study).
194
Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and
the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 320 (1991) (noting that “[e]veryone seems to
agree” that the cases that are tried are not a random subset of all lawsuits).
195
See Priest & Klein, supra note 154, at 4 (“This paper presents a model of the litigation process
that clarifies the relationship between the set of disputes settled and the set litigated. . . . From this
proposition, the model shows that the disputes selected for litigation (as opposed to settlement) will
constitute neither a random nor a representative sample of the set of all disputes.”). Regarding the next
level in the pyramid, see Kim et al., supra note 176, at 100 n.54 (“Of course, it is also true that filed
cases are unrepresentative of all disputes, because potential litigants must first recognize their injuries as
grievances and decide to pursue litigation, and their decision is to do so will not be random.”) (citing
William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming,
Claiming . . . , 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631 (1980)); see also Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics
of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1600 n.48 (2005) (“[T]he contracts that get litigated
to the appellate level, which are the contracts scholars mainly discuss, are not a random sample of all
contracts.”).
196
The research comparing published to unpublished cases frequently uses the metaphor of an
iceberg: published decisions are the parts above the water’s surface and unpublished orders and lawsuits
are the parts below the surface. See, e.g., Mead, supra note 171, at 589; Zirkel & Machin, supra note
163, at 486–88. The unrepresentative nature of reported decisions can be summarized by mixing the
iceberg and pyramid metaphors together: Each level in the pyramid is not representative of the level
beneath it, and the top two levels in the pyramid—appellate matters and cases litigated to judgment—are
further distorted by the iceberg effect.
For other sources reviewing the literature on whether published cases are representative, see
Ringquist & Emmert, supra note 188, at 9–10, and Zirkel & Machin, supra note 163, at 488–99; see
also Hoffman et al., supra note 153, at 727–28 (“The underrepresentativeness of opinions is obvious and
well known.”).
197
Taha, supra note 175, at 171.
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wider population.”198 Put in technical terms, findings based on a sample
infected with selections bias may lack “external validity,” which means the
results of the study cannot be “generalized” to a broader population.199
To avoid the problem of selection bias, scholars normally use random
or “probability” sampling.200 For example, in a study of lawsuits filed in a
particular jurisdiction, the author could employ a random number generator
to select the suits that will be included in the analyzed dataset.201
Alternatively, the author might apply systematic sampling, such as picking
every fifth case in the population, which is often the functional equivalent
of random sampling.202 Unfortunately, as just discussed, reported decisions
are not a random subset of other potential categories of study, like litigated
judgments, lawsuits, and disputes.203 This means that empirical studies
based on published cases, including those that employ key number coding,
probably suffer from some degree of selection bias, limiting the
generalizability of any findings.204 Mark Hall and Ronald Wright
summarize this problem exceptionally well:

198

Id.
LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 19, at 39–40; Korobkin, supra note 4, at 1051.
200
See LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 19, at 101 (“Random assignment is one of the central features
of experimental design that makes causal inferences possible.”); Epstein & King, supra note 7, at 110
(“The main reason is that random selection is the only selection mechanism in large-n studies that
automatically guarantees the absence of selection bias. That is because when we use random sampling
we are, by definition, assuring the absence of any association that may exist between selection rules and
the variables in our study.”); id. at 106 (explaining that a “random probability sample” is “a sample in
which each element in the total population has a known (and preferably the same) probability of being
selected”); Hall & Wright, supra note 3, at 102 (“Various forms of random or representative selection
are used to generate a study sample whose characteristics are likely to reflect the true population of
interest—but how likely is often in doubt.”).
201
Hall & Wright, supra note 3, at 102.
202
LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 19, at 145; Hall & Wright, supra note 3, at 102; see also
LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 19, at 143–48 (discussing various types of random sampling); id. at 101–06
(discussing the role of random assignment in experimental design).
203
See also Edwards & Livermore, supra note 161, at 1923 (“Published decisions as a sample of
total decisions are far from random[.]”); Berdejo, supra note 172, at 274 (“[P]ublished decisions are not
a random sample of all decisions rendered by appellate courts.”); Kim et al., supra note 176, at 97 &
n.44 (“Numerous studies have found that published and unpublished opinions differ in systematic
ways.”).
204
Taha, supra note 175, at 174 (“Because published opinions are not representative of all cases
decided by a court, studies that rely on published opinions to study courts’ decision-making are subject
to a selection bias.”); Epstein & King, supra note 7, at 106 (“Just as researchers can introduce bias in
their studies when they draw unrepresentative samples, the world that creates the sets of potentially
observable data can also bias inferences if it differs systematically from the target population. . . .
199
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There is slippage at each point in the litigation process: most human interactions
do not produce disputes, only some disputes result in legal claims, many claims
are settled, and many trial decisions are not appealed. Appellate courts regularly
dispose of cases without opinions or decide not to publish some opinions, and
computer databases inconsistently include cases that are not officially published.
At each juncture, a variety of factors potentially distort what one stage can
reveal about the other. These biases can fundamentally threaten the ability to
generalize or the validity of a study’s findings.205

Note that if the conclusions a researcher intends to draw from a dataset
of reported decisions relate only to that type of decision, then it is of no
consequence that published rulings are unrepresentative of various broader
populations.206 In other words, it is permissible to draw inferences from a
sample of reported cases when the broader population under study is also
constituted by reported caselaw (as long as the sample is randomly
generated). A problem exists only when reported decisions are treated as a
sample of some other type of population, such as all litigated cases or all
lawsuits. To illustrate, a scholar might wish to analyze a feature of binding
precedent.207 In that situation, it is entirely appropriate to focus exclusively

Among the most prominent examples are studies that base their inferences exclusively on published
opinions, rather than on the full population of published and unpublished opinions.”); Hall & Wright,
supra note 3, at 103 (“[T]he sample frame of all published decisions does not fully reflect what all
courts do . . . because most court determinations are unpublished. Whenever the actual cases selected do
not fully match the sampling frame that theoretically applies to the questions posed or studied, sampling
bias potentially exists. The findings from cases studied may not accurately represent those to which the
authors apply their conclusions.”); see also Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 153, at 1134 (“If
appellate cases constitute only a fraction of the population of disputes and potential disputes and if that
fraction is not only minuscule, but systematically unrepresentative of the larger population from which it
is drawn, generalizing from such cases to larger conclusions about law and/or society is hazardous.”);
but cf. Frank Cross et al., Above the Rules: A Response to Epstein and King, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 135, 140
(2002) (“Finally, in many studies a focus on published (and the exclusion of unpublished) decisions will
not necessarily skew the results in any obvious direction.”).
205
Hall & Wright, supra note 3, at 104; accord Korobkin, supra note 4, at 1054 (“Second, it is
well known that cases that result in published opinions are not necessarily a random sample of all cases
filed concerning a particular doctrinal topic, much less all the disputes within that doctrinal area. Thus,
conclusions appropriately drawn about published decisions may not be generalizable to all decisions,
much less all litigation in a particular substantive area, or all disputes.”).
206
Hall & Wright, supra note 3, at 104 (“No concern arises if the researcher defines the research
questions in terms that match the population of cases actually sampled.”).
207
See, e.g., Keckler, supra note 82, at 108–09, 131–32, 146 n.66 (empirical study of how Illinois
courts apply stare decisis); see also White, supra note 56, at 1275 (using a dataset of reported decisions
to conclude that the Uniform Commercial Code “has not caused a radical change in the type of sales
litigation that appears in the reported decisions”).
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on reported, appellate rulings.208 However, most empirical research about
the legal system seeks to draw inferences about categories that go beyond
published opinions. When that is true of a study employing the Key
Number System as the coding tool, the author must be cautious in deriving
conclusions about populations that encompass more than reported caselaw,
for the reasons just discussed.
While the selection bias inherent in datasets of published decisions is
an important weakness of studies using key numbers, it does not justify
abandoning this type of work. It is well recognized that research lacking
features necessary for scientific validity, such as random assignment, can
still provide valuable empirical insights.209 “[S]ocial science data does not
need to be perfect; reasonable approximations are good enough for both
government work and empirical work.”210 That is especially so when the
alternative to a study employing key numbers is not a better project but no
project at all. And in many circumstances, compiling a dataset that is
superior to reported decisions is cost-prohibitive or truly impossible.211
Even when a competing project that reduces or avoids selection bias is
merely more difficult than a key number study, the resources saved in

208
Hall & Wright, supra note 3, at 104–05 (“For instance, unpublished opinions are irrelevant to
the study of precedential law rather than the generalized behavior or attitudes of judges, so excluding
them requires no justification.”); Kim et al., supra note 176, at 96 (“Focusing only on published
decisions may make sense when asking, for example, how formal legal doctrine has evolved.”).
209
See, e.g., LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 19, at 115–17 (explaining that quasi-experiments, which
approximate traditional experiments but lack certain important features, such as random assignment, still
can provide useful empirical findings despite the fact that quasi-experiments “leave open the possibility
of an alternative explanation of any observed effect”).
210
Hall & Wright, supra note 3, at 97.
211
See, e.g., id. at 94, 97 (explaining that in studies of the factors that determine the outcomes of
cases, the imperfect data contained in judicial opinions often “must suffice because observing actual
behaviors and gauging true attitudes would be impossible or cost-prohibitive”); Hooker, supra note 114,
at 9 (using key number searches to measure trends in the quantity of education-related litigation because
“[t]here is no reasonable alternative source of data”). Hooker elaborated as follows:
Theoretically, a complete and accurate account of all litigation involving teachers could be
obtained from the records and archives of the 15,000 school districts in the nation. This
method of gathering data for this study was considered and discarded after conducting a
pilot study in Minnesota. Incomplete records in school districts, school district
consolidations, reporting errors by school officials, incomplete responses to a
questionnaire and numerous additional logistical problems made West’s American Digest
System an easy favorite data base for this study.
Id.
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conducting the latter will often justify following the less scientifically
correct approach.212
To elaborate, studies using the Key Number System have substantially
the same strengths and weaknesses in the area of generalizability as other
research grounded on reported cases. Critically, empirical assessments of
published opinions are increasing in number and social scientists have long
believed that there is significant value in scholarship based on these
materials.213 Moreover, it is common for scholars to draw inferences about
broader populations from samples of reported decisions, including when the
coding is performed via key numbers. For example, Farber and Matheson
used a dataset of 222 published cases involving promissory estoppel to
reach conclusions about promissory estoppel litigation in general.214
Hillman did the same with 363 reported opinions on that subject.215 And
Bratton and Wachter used cases “keyed by West as involving preferred

212
See Lee Epstein & Gary King, A Reply, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 191, 207 (2002) (observing that
“perfectionism in [empirical] method at the expenses of other goals is both inappropriate and
unnecessary”). Hall and Wright offer the following example. Studies of the factors that determine the
outcomes of cases frequently rely upon the facts as presented in court decisions. Hall & Wright, supra
note 3, at 94. But the statements of facts in judicial opinions are not always accurate. Id. at 95. Hall and
Wright nonetheless conclude that the labor saved in utilizing such opinions is one reason that it is
appropriate to rely upon a resource that is only an approximation of reality. Id. at 97.
213
See Hall & Wright, supra note 3, at 98–99 (observing that social scientists have long thought
judicial opinions are extremely valuable source of information on the legal system and that “[m]odern
day legal researchers tend to agree, judging from how many have devoted considerable effort to using
this data source”); see also Taha, supra note 175, at 173 (“Much empirical research of civil litigation
has used published opinions as the source of data.”); see generally Hall & Wright passim.
214
Farber & Matheson, supra note 41, at 904, 907. For additional details regarding this study, see
supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
215
Hillman, supra note 44, at 580–82, 619; see, e.g., id. at 581 (“[T]his article is the first
comprehensive empirical study that demonstrates promissory estoppel’s limited role.”); id. at 619
(“[B]ut the purpose of this Article is to show that courts do not enforce promises without bargain or
reliance.”) (emphasis in original). For additional details regarding this study, see supra notes 44–47 and
accompanying text. For some additional studies from the contracts literature where scholars used a
dataset of published cases to generalize about broader populations, see Crystal, supra note 56, at 299
(using a dataset of 262 reported decisions to answer three questions regarding the litigation of relational
contracts under Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code; each of the questions was phrased in
terms that go beyond published opinions); DiMatteo & Rich, supra note 56, at 1069, 1092–93 (using a
dataset of 187 primarily reported, federal cases to answer four questions regarding the doctrine of
unconscionability; once again, each of the questions was phrased in terms that go beyond published
opinions); McChesney, supra note 56, at 171–73, 185 (using a dataset of 134 reported decisions to
conclude that in tortious interference with contract cases courts are focused on protecting the property
interests of the nonbreaching party rather than with efficient and inefficient breaches).
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stock” to support the broad proposition that “Delaware courts have emerged
as the dominant arbiters of preferred stock disputes.”216 None of this is
meant to suggest that the frequency of studies generalizing from reported
caselaw negates the problem of selection bias. Rather, it is intended to point
out that employing the Key Number System is consistent with protocols
long-used and valued by other researchers.
Note further that legal scholarship based on alternative sources of
information also frequently suffers from selection bias. For example, in
Macaulay’s study of the contracting practices of business people, most of
the subjects he interviewed worked at businesses or law firms in a single
state (Wisconsin), and numerous industries were not represented among the
interviewees.217 As a result, Macaulay recognized that “the likelihood of
error because of sampling bias may be considerable.”218 This problem is
widespread. To illustrate, in 2002, Russell Korobkin wrote an article
analyzing the empirical contracts scholarship produced over the prior
fifteen-years.219 He concluded that none of the twenty-seven studies he
reviewed used “data that makes up a truly representative sample of the
population (i.e., contracting parties or contract disputes generally) about

216
See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 107, at 1821 & n.14. This study is discussed further at
supra notes 107–08 and accompanying text. For other examples of empirical research employing key
numbers where the authors generalized their findings to broader populations, see Lisby, supra note 113,
at 466–67 & nn.252–54 (using cases included in the American Digest under the key numbers relevant to
criminal libel to show a decline in “[p]rosecutions for the crime of libel”); Wines, supra note 113, at 86–
87 (using digested cases as a proxy for total litigation regarding the tort doctrine of “frolic and detour”);
Zirkel & Richardson, supra note 109, at 789 (using cases keyed with education key numbers to draw
conclusions regarding total levels of education litigation and levels of litigation by education
subcategory); Snyder, supra note 75, at 547, 576–77 (contending that how often each digest topic
appears in all Montana Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals cases decided from 1945
through 1997 is relevant to the question of which areas of law are most litigated).
217
Macaulay, supra note 35, at 55–56.
218
Id. at 56; see also Korobkin, supra note 4, at 1052–53 (“Macaulay made no attempt to ensure
that this sample was representative of the world of commercial contracting parties in terms of industry,
size of business, etc.”).
219
Korobkin, supra note 4, at 1033.
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which the author would like to suggest implications.”220 Surveys of
empirical work in other fields of law have reached similar conclusions.221
Korobkin actually went a step further and argued that the problem of
selection bias “cannot be solved merely by researchers paying closer
attention to methodological considerations, for two reasons.”222 First,
resource limitations make it exceptionally difficult for a scholar to gather a
dataset that is properly representative across all relevant dimensions.223 For
example, a number of authors contend that empirical studies of federal trial
courts should focus on dockets and court files rather than published
decisions.224 But docket studies usually suffer from some type of
geographical selection bias.225 And obtaining a representative sample from
across the nation will probably be cost prohibitive in most situations.
Second, and more critically, Korobkin contends that “it is usually
impossible to design a data set that is perfectly representative of the larger
target population in every relevant way.”226 And even if creating such a

220
Id. at 1051, 1064–66; see also id. at 1053 (explaining that all of the studies reviewed in the
article that were based on surveys involved unrepresentative samples because “not everyone asked to
participate agreed, raising the concern that the responses of people who agree to take the time to
participate in a research study might be systematically different from those who would not take the
time”); see generally id. at 1051–56 (discussing the generalizability of empirical findings).
221
See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, The Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil
Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203, 1214–17 & n.45 (2013) (discussing sampling bias in empirical
research regarding the impact of recent changes to federal pleading rules); Nadine Frederique et al.,
What is the State of Empirical Research on Indigent Defense Nationwide? A Brief Overview and
Suggestions for Future Research, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1317, 1325–31 (2014–15) (concluding that empirical
research on criminal defense attorney effectiveness has produced “few generalizable results”); Bryan G.
Garth, Observations on an Uncomfortable Relationship: Civil Procedure and Evidence Research, 49
ALA. L. REV. 103, 108–09 (1997) (explaining that “randomized experiments in civil justice research are
quite rare” and thus many studies suffer from selection bias).
222
Id. at 1054.
223
Id.
224
See Hoffman et al., supra note 153; Kim et al., supra note 176; Schlanger & Liebman, supra
note 153.
225
See, e.g., Hoffman et al., supra note 153, at 708, 734–36 (empirical study of federal trial court
judges based upon the District of Maryland, the Northern District of California, the Southern District of
New York, and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; the authors acknowledged that the latter two
districts “are not ordinary” and that this “confound[s] our results”).
226
Korobkin, supra note 4, at 1054. Korobkin continues: “In studies of actual contracting
behavior of commercial parties, for example, it would be impossible to identify all the features of
contracting parties that might affect their behavior.” Id. These factors include business size, industry
type, geographical region, whether the business is new or established, the number of locations a business
has, who in the business makes the contracting decisions, and various personal characteristics of the
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sample were feasible, “the results would be open to the conjecture that,
while applicable on an aggregate level, they might not be applicable” to
numerous particular subgroups of the overall population.227 Whether
Korobkin is correct or not that selection bias is unavoidable, the following
is undeniable: When it comes to selection bias, key number studies have
many companions in guilt.
Ultimately, the problem of generalizability is not a reason to forego
empirical research using key numbers, cases available on Westlaw and
Lexis, the lawsuits filed in a particular jurisdiction, or other nonrepresentative samples.228 As noted previously, all empirical scholarship is
imperfect.229 Every research protocol has advantages and disadvantages,
requiring scholars to make difficult trade-offs between external validity,
available resources, and other methodological and practical factors.230 And
studies based on non-random datasets, which are quite common,231 often
possess significant value because they contribute to the collective enterprise
of knowledge acquisition regarding the legal system or other social
phenomena.232 Instead, concerns about selection bias are a reason to
principal decision maker. Id. at 1054–55. “No study could conceivably be representative along all of
these dimensions, much less the untold number of other potentially relevant factors.” Id. at 1055; see
also, e.g., Geis, supra note 4, at 462 n.57 (explaining that the EDGAR database of material contracts
filed with the SEC by public firms is subject to two types of selection bias).
227
Id. at 1055.
228
Korobkin, supra note 4, at 1055 (“The generalizability problem, then, should not discourage
would-be empirical researchers . . . .”); see also Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and
Ideology: Public and Academic Debates About Statistical Measures, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 743, 792 (2005)
(making the same point about methodological problems in general).
229
See supra text accompanying note 210.
230
LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 19, at 46; Epstein & King, supra note 212, at 207–08; Jack
Goldsmith & Adrian Vermeule, Empirical Methodology and Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 153,
154 (2002).
231
LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 19, at 148 (noting that when random (i.e., “probability”) sampling
is impossible or difficult, “it is common for a variety of” nonrandom (i.e., “nonprobability”) sampling
techniques to be used, including “convenience sampling—sampling units that are readily available
rather than those that are randomly selected”); see also id. at 148–49 (discussing various types of
nonrandom sampling); Kevin H. Smith, External Validity: Representativeness and Projectability in the
Probative Value of Sample Surveys, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1433, 1503–04 (1993) (identifying the
circumstances in which non-random sampling is justified, including (1) when insufficient resources are
available to obtain a random sample, and (2) when trying to determine whether a problem exists that
might justify a considerably more expensive study involving probability sampling).
232
Korobkin, supra note 4, at 1055 (explaining, inter alia, that when a study “is able to reach
strong conclusions about its limited data set . . . such a study undoubtedly makes a valuable contribution
to scholarship”); A. Lynn Phillips et al., What’s Good in Theory May Be Flawed in Practice: Potential
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carefully acknowledge any such weakness and exercise caution in
extrapolating from one’s sample to broader populations.233 As Hall and
Wright explain in the context of empirical work based on judicial decisions,
[a]ll empirical studies are imperfect, especially observational (nonexperimental)
social science studies. The goal in selecting cases is not a perfect match between
sample frame and research conclusions, but only a reasonable connection
between the two. Inevitable imperfections in case selection methods often will
not seriously threaten the entire validity of the study’s findings. It usually
suffices to acknowledge limitations fairly briefly.234

The unrepresentative nature of reported decisions is not the only
limitation involved in using the Key Number System for data coding. There
are multiple others. I discuss ten such limitations over the next few pages.
Nine of these concern the precise manner in which West writes and
classifies headnotes for cases. The tenth concerns the search capacity of
Westlaw. Note that I also address a number of issues that are specific to my
study protocol later in this article.235
First, West does not always digest cases accurately. Classifiers
sometimes code a headnote with the wrong key number.236 Second, and
Legal Consequences of Poor Implementation of a Theoretical Sample, 9 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 77, 89
(2012) (“Sometimes there are good reasons for a doing a nonprobability sample—if a researcher does
not know the characteristics of the target population or it would be prohibitively expensive to do a
probability sample, he might still learn valuable information from a nonprobability sample.”); see also
Smith, supra note 231, at 1502 (acknowledging that, in some contexts, as the number of studies on a
topic using non-probability sampling and reaching the same conclusion grows, the likelihood that the
results are representative of the relevant larger population increases).
233
See Epstein & King, supra note 212, at 208 (“The sign of good science is not that every
problem be fixed in every project, since that is impossible and trying to do so would mean we would not
accomplish much of anything, but rather that the problems be noted and the uncertainty in substantive
conclusions be responsibly and honestly reported.”). When using a non-random sample, scholars should
also consider explaining why they chose to employ a less scientifically sound methodology.
234
Hall & Wright, supra note 3, at 105; see also Hoffman et al., supra note 153, at 686–87
(noting that most authors who conduct empirical research based on published opinions “are careful to
recognize the opinions might be unrepresentative of how trial courts resolve legal problems”) (collecting
authorities).
235
See infra notes 476–80 and accompanying text; Part V.C.1.
236
Michael H. Fox & Robert A. Mead, The Relationship of Disability to Employment Protection
Under Title I of the ADA in the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 485,
496 n.106 (2004) (noting that there is a “slight potential for a relevant case to not be categorized under
the appropriate topic and key number”); Spencer L. Simons, Navigating Through the Fog: Teaching
Legal Research and Writing Students to Master Indeterminacy through Structure and Process, 56 J.
LEG. EDUC. 356, 362 (2006) (noting that “cases are occasionally misclassified by digest editors”); see
Daniel P. Dabney, The Curse of Thamus: An Analysis of Full-Text Legal Document Retrieval, 78 LAW
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related, there may be some variation in the level of detail that classifiers use
in coding opinions. One attorney-editor might tag a decision with many key
numbers that represent highly specific points of law, while another would
code the same case with only a few key numbers that denote more general
legal concepts.237 However, “the reliability and accuracy of the West
editorial staff” has long been considered one of the principal strengths of
the American Digest System.238 Errors and disparate classification practices
should thus be rather uncommon.239 And, as previously explained, West
attorneys (1) lack certain biases that can infect coding performed by
authors, and (2) are probably superior coders to law students.240
Third, key numbers are sometimes included in cases even though the
associated topic was not litigated. This typically occurs when courts explain
general principles that are related to the contested issues.241 Such “overcoding” can impact the reliability of a dataset created via the American

LIB. J. 5, 14 (1986) (“This short review of ideas in indexing shows that the indexing process is prone to
many sorts of errors and uncertainties. . . . Finally, like any human enterprise, it is not always done as
well as it might be.”); Geis, supra note 4, at 479–80 (offering an example of how coding mistakes by
West attorney-editors might have biased the results of an empirical study that used the Key Number
System to collect opinions); see also LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 19, at 130 (noting that one issue with
secondary data analysis “is the reliability of the data that is recorded”).
237
Shapiro, supra note 3, at 528 n.213 (“On the other hand, the level of detail provided appears to
vary greatly from case to case, with some cases identified by many, often repetitive keys, and others
identified by only the most general.”). There may also be differences in headnote writing practices. I
have at times found that points of law in a case were not abstracted. I suspect that variations in headnote
drafting are most common with respect to (1) discussions of related legal principles not directly relevant
to the matter before the court, and (2) long summaries of basic principles set forth prior to the specific
governing rules and authorities.
238
Berring, supra note 87, at 33.
239
See id. at 34 (“It is difficult to assess the extent of this problem [misclassification]. My
impression is that it was not severe. West’s reputation for accuracy was well deserved.”). I contacted
West about this issue. A representative explained that West uses various quality control procedures. But
unfortunately the company does not have specific reports or studies that they could share with me. Email from Scott Augustin, Senior Director, Corporate Affairs, Thomson Reuters, to Author (Oct. 30,
2015, 9:45 CST) (on file with author).
240
See supra notes 138–42 and accompanying text.
241
See, e.g., City of Fort Wayne v. Consol. Elec. Distr., Inc., 998 N.E.2d 733, 734 (Ind. Ct. App.
2013) (opinion contains a headnote with key number 95k158, a contract interpretation classification,
because the court stated a general principle about contract interpretation in the course of addressing a
statutory interpretation question; there was no contract at issue in the case).
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Digest System.242 For example, suppose a scholar is using decisions tagged
with various key numbers to measure how often a particular type of case is
brought.243 Any over-coding involving the selected key numbers will cause
Westlaw search results to exaggerate the incidence of the measured type of
lawsuit.
What is the prevalence of over-coding? Unfortunately, that is
unknown. But I suspect that for most empirical projects involving large
samples, either (1) the over-coding will balance out, or (2) the frequency of
over-coding will be too small to have a significant impact on the ultimate
findings. Let me briefly elaborate on what I mean by “balance out.” In my
experience, the level of key number over-coding generally does not differ
by subject or jurisdiction. Thus, in an empirical study comparing two sets of
cases, the amount of over-coding normally should be the same in each set—
i.e., it should “balance out.” If this is correct, then the over-coding will not
bias the study results.
However, there are reasons to believe that over-coding might vary by
topic or state in some circumstances. Over-coding could thus be a concern
for certain empirical projects. Accordingly, it is advisable that researchers
assess the potential for over-coding problems early in their research.244 Here
is an example that illustrates the issue. New York reported decisions are
frequently very short. Over-coding is less likely in short opinions because
such cases typically omit the extensive discussions of background legal
principles that are the primary cause of over-coding. As a result, a key
number study comparing New York to another jurisdiction where longer
opinions are more common might be infected with over-coding bias.245
Fourth, there is considerable overlap between many of the digest topics
and subtopics.246 That creates room for judgment when West’s staff is

242
See Hall & Wright, supra note 3, at 106 (“Supplemental techniques are needed to screen out
cases that mention a topic of interest only in passing or those that decide an issue on technical or
procedural grounds irrelevant to the study.”).
243
See, e.g., Bratton & Wachter, supra note 107, at 1821 & n.14. This study is discussed supra at
notes 107–08 and accompanying text.
244
See infra notes 472–76 and accompanying text (setting forth how I assessed the possibility of
over-coding bias in my contract interpretation study).
245
My thanks to Royce Barondes for pointing out this possibility.
246
See Snyder, supra note 75, at 548 (noting that “some digest topics . . . closely shade into one
another”); Zirkel & Richardson, supra note 109, at 769 (“For example, the West’s [sic] key number
system . . . is subject to inevitable imprecision with regard to the identification, placement, and addition
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making classification decisions. As a result, for numerous key number
topics, there will be cases with headnotes that could have been classified
under that topic, but which were instead classified under another, related
topic.247 This might be thought of as a type of “under-coding.” To illustrate,
scholars who have used key number searches to measure the quantity of
education litigation frequently note that cases concerning that subject are
sometimes not coded with any key numbers that directly implicate
education. Instead, they are classified with key numbers from other topics
such as Constitutional Law and Civil Rights.248 One study attempted to
measure the extent of this problem and found that, of all the cases listed in
the Education Reporter over a two-year period, only seven lacked any
education-related key numbers.249 This suggests that the number of undercodings is often too small to warrant concern.250 But that is not always true.
For example, there are more than 10,000 decisions involving the
construction of insurance contracts that are coded with contract
interpretation key numbers from the topic Insurance (217) but contain no
interpretation key numbers from the topic Contracts (95).251 This means that
an empirical study of interpretation caselaw that uses only key numbers
categorized under Contracts will miss numerous insurance-related decisions
on the subject.252
Fifth, the American Digest System “does a poor job of classifying
cases in certain areas.”253 For example, Fritz Snyder argued that because

of categories. And as with any other indexing system, some cases fit within more than one subject
category.”).
247
See Snyder, supra note 75, at 548 (explaining that researchers sometimes have to check
multiple digest topics in order to find all cases regarding a particular subject).
248
See Irene Gavin & Perry A. Zirkel, An Outcome Analysis of School Employee-Initiated
Litigation: A Comparison of 1977–1981 and 1997–2001 Decisions, 232 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 19, 22–
23 (2008) (observing that some K-12 litigation is coded with key numbers from topics other than
Schools (345), such as Civil Rights (78), Constitutional Law (92) and Labor Relations (232A)); Zirkel
& Johnson, supra note 114, at 8 & n.26 (“[P]revious studies . . . revealed that some of the K-12
decisions only have key numbered head notes for categories outside 345 (Schools).”).
249
Hooker, supra note 114, at 9.
250
Id.
251
To see this, run the following search on Westlaw in the database containing all state and
federal caselaw: 217XIII(G) % 95II(A). The result contains over 10,000 cases.
252
For a discussion of this issue in the context of my contract interpretation study, see infra notes
468–71 and accompanying text.
253
Snyder, supra note 75, at 549.
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Evidence (157) and the various topics related to civil procedure254 are not
organized by rule, it is easier to conduct research about these subjects using
other sources.255 Likewise, much of my practice before entering academia
concerned antitrust law, and I found Monopolies (265), which previously
covered this field, to be rather unhelpful in my work.256 Topics that are not
useful in traditional legal research are likely to be even less suitable for
empirical studies.
Sixth, some of the digest topics and subtopics are exceptionally
broad.257 Indeed, many individual key numbers cover multiple, distinct
legal subjects. For example, several of the key numbers relating to contract
interpretation also apply to the construction of other types of legal
documents, such as wills.258 Fortunately, I suspect that this type of
“overbreadth”—as with over-coding—will balance out in studies
employing large samples. But classifications that suffer from overbreadth
are probably not appropriate for empirical work in at least some
circumstances.259
Seventh, because changes to the American Digest System come at a
slow pace, certain topics do not keep up with developments in their
associated legal field.260 This potentially limits the value of key numbers for
empirical research on newer issues.
The third through seventh limitations entail that when using key
numbers for data coding, scholars must develop some expertise with the

254
For example, Federal Civil Procedure (170A), Federal Courts (170B), Pleading (302), and
Pretrial Procedure (307A). WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 69, at 751, 778, 1356,
1376.
255
Snyder, supra note 75, at 549–50.
256
Note that since I left practice, West moved antitrust law out of Monopolies (265) and into a
separate topic called Antitrust and Trade Regulation (29T). See WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW,
supra note 69, at 54, 1235.
257
See Snyder, supra note 75, at 577 (“Some of the 404 digest topics are confusing. Some are
extremely broad and, in fact include other, narrower topics. Some are very narrow.”).
258
See WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 69, at 706–10 (setting forth the key
numbers under topic 157 (“Evidence”) which govern “Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting Writings”).
To illustrate, 157k452 concerns latent ambiguities in multiple types of legal documents, including
contracts.
259
See infra notes 472–76 and accompanying text (setting forth how I addressed the overbreadth
issue in my contract interpretation study).
260
Simons, supra note 236, at 362; see also Lee F. Peoples, The Death of the Digest and the
Pitfalls of Electronic Research: What is the Modern Legal Researcher to Do?, 97 LAW LIBR. J. 661, 666
(2005) (observing that digest topics are changed at a “conservative pace”).
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pertinent digest topics. This will enable them to (1) determine whether their
proposed study is feasible, (2) construct appropriate Westlaw searches, and
(3) provide any necessary qualifications when presenting their findings.
Eighth, West frequently makes changes to the key number topics. This
includes both restructuring individual topics and moving material from one
topic to another.261 Such alterations can make it difficult or even impossible
for an author to run searches in Westlaw that are identical or comparable to
those run by prior authors. This limits the replicability of earlier work and
will sometimes prevent a researcher from crafting studies that make small
adjustments to previously-employed protocols in an attempt to test an
hypothesis using a slightly different research design.262
Ninth, the American Digest System does not code for numerous
elements of judicial opinions. When a headnote is classified with a given
key number, all this conveys is that a particular legal subject was discussed

261

For more, see the sources cited in notes 92–94 supra.
See Zirkel & Johnson, supra note 114, at 7 (“West’s reclassification of cases from one key
number subcategory to another also contributes to changes in the numbers from one data collection to
another, especially with approximately ten years intervening between the tabulations. Similarly, the shift
in key numbers for certain subcategories also contributes to the variance.”).
To elaborate, when West reorganizes a segment of the Key Number System, the changes are
retroactively applied to all cases contained on Westlaw. E-mail from Scott Augustin, supra note 239.
But to aid researchers, West generally includes references identifying the original key number
classifications for amended headnotes. Id. These references are set forth directly in the revised
headnotes and begin with the word “formerly.” See id. For example, Insurance (topic 217) was
restructured in 1998; a completely new set of key numbers was adopted for that topic. The key number
classifications for all Insurance headnotes digested prior to the change were retroactively updated
online, while the now-defunct key numbers assigned to each case were preserved via the “formerly”
references. (They were also preserved in the print copies of the reporters.) Note that cases published
after a switch are classified only with the revised key numbers. And thus more recent insurance cases
contain only the newer classifications. (To skim through opinions reflecting the amendments to the
Insurance topic, run the following search on Westlaw for all state and federal cases: (TO(217) /p
(formerly /1 217k!)) & DA(aft 05/01/1998) & DA(bef 08/01/1998). The switch took place in June of
1998.)
Suppose a scholar conducted an empirical study using the Insurance key numbers in early 1998
that concerned the time period 1996 through 1997. A second researcher today could run identical or
modified searches using the old classifications for any time period prior to June, 1998, thanks to the
“formerly” references. But if the second researcher wants to replicate the original study in a more recent
time period, that will often be impossible—or at least extremely difficult—for two reasons. First, the
insurance cases decided since the topic restructuring in 1998 only have the new key numbers. Second, in
many if not most circumstances, the topic was changed too dramatically to craft searches using the new
key numbers that are truly comparable to the searches run in the original study with the older key
numbers.
262
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by the court—and, for multi-judge courts, that it was addressed by the
majority.263 Critically, many empirical studies of caselaw concern aspects
that go beyond the subject matter of the litigation. The author wishes to
analyze “the substance of judicial reasoning, as expressed through the legal
and factual content of written opinions.”264 Such information typically can
be ascertained only via a careful reading of the decision.265 In that
circumstance, key numbers will obviously not be helpful.266 But other
studies focus on more basic information, such as subject matter, parties, and
outcomes.267 For this type of work, key numbers can prove quite valuable.
Tenth, Westlaw caps the number of characters (including spaces) that
may be included in a search of its databases at 600.268 That restriction will
sometimes prevent a scholar from using the digest system to conduct
studies that necessitate including a large number of key numbers in single
search.269
The ten limitations just discussed, even when taken together, are no
more reason to avoid empirical research based on the American Digest
System than the problem of generalizability. Accordingly, given the
263
West does not write headnotes for concurrences and dissents unless “‘a point of law within the
concurrence or dissent commands a majority on that point of law. This is not a frequent occurrence, and
when it does happen it is generally in plurality decisions.’” E-mail from Steve Hanson, Reference
Attorney, Thomson Reuters, to Author (June 19, 2015, 16:51 CST) (on file with author) (apparently
quoting an e-mail from Patty Larson, Director of Judicial Editorial, Thomson Reuters, to Steve Hanson).
Thus, concurrences and dissents are almost never tagged with key numbers.
264
Hall & Wright, supra note 3, at 72–73.
265
Id. at 71 n.29 (in this study of case coding research, the authors limited their analysis to
“projects that coded for legal, factual, analytic, or linguistic elements of legal decisions that could be
gleaned only by a close reading of the opinions, rather than, for instance, information available in a
digest or abstract of the decision”).
266
See Cross, supra note 103, at 200–01 (explaining that the author’s study using the Key
Number System to measure an increase in references to pragmatism by circuit courts only measured the
“tip of the iceberg of pragmatism’s usage” in part because “many applications of pragmatism are outside
of Westlaw’s coding measure”). For additional details regarding this study, see supra notes 103–06 and
accompanying text.
267
See Hall & Wright, supra note 3, at 72 (in this study of case coding research, the authors
“excluded projects using a method we call ‘docket analysis,’ which codes only for information about
cases—such as subject matter, parties, and basic outcomes—that could be obtained from docket sheets
or brief abstracts”) (identifying two examples); id. at 82 n.72 (“Some [studies] code only for case
subject matter and outcome. . . . Others simply code for which authorities the opinion cites.”)
(identifying four examples of the first type of study and five examples of the second type).
268
E-mail from Daniel Reynolds, Reference Attorney, Thomson Reuters, to Author (Aug. 5,
2015, 17:54 CST) (on file with author).
269
For more on this issue, see infra note 449.
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advantages identified above, using key numbers in empirical work will
often be worthwhile.
Of course, whether a key number protocol is suitable for a particular
project will depend on a variety of theoretical and practical factors. For
example, on the one hand, key number studies can employ much larger data
sets than many other types of empirical work because the researcher need
not spend time reading the cases that make up the data set. But key number
classifications only capture a narrow range of information about judicial
opinions and may lack the necessary level of precision due to over-coding
and under-coding. On other hand, carefully reading cases or comparable
materials enables a scholar to gather richer data and can address many
precision concerns. But completing such reading requires the expenditure of
considerably more resources and generally entails using a much smaller
sample size. In deciding between a key number study and an alternative
methodology, scholars must consider these types of trade-offs.
To further demonstrate both how to deploy the Key Number System as
a data collection and coding device and the value of a project that does so,
Part V of this article sets forth an empirical study of contract interpretation
using key numbers. But to place that study in context, Part IV first presents
an overview of the law and policy of contract interpretation.
IV. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
A. The Textualist and Contextualist Approaches
Interpretation is the process of determining the meaning of contractual
language.270 The goal of contract interpretation is to ascertain the intentions
of the parties at the time the agreement was formed.271 But accomplishing

270
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 200 (1981); ALLAN E. FARNSWORTH,
FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.7, at 439 (4th ed. 2004).
271
BURTON, supra note 9, § 1.1, at 1 (“American courts universally say that the primary goal of
contract interpretation is to ascertain the parties’ intention at the time they made their contract.”); accord
RICHARD LORD, 11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 30:2, at 17–18 (4th ed. 2012); JOSEPH M. PERILLO,
CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 3.13, at 136 (6th ed. 2009); but see Val D. Ricks, The
Possibility of Plain Meaning: Wittgenstein and the Contract Precedents, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 767, 807
(2008) (distinguishing between the intention of the parties and the meaning of words).
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this task can be difficult because party intent is often unclear and
disputed272 and contracts frequently contain ambiguous language.273
There are two general approaches to contract interpretation set forth in
the caselaw. These approaches have multiple names, but I shall use the
labels “textualist” and “contextualist.”274 Under textualism, interpretation
focuses principally on the language of the parties’ agreement.275 The locus
of contextualist interpretation is broader. While adherents of contextualism
grant critical weight to the words set forth in the parties’ compact,276
contextualist interpretation emphasizes reading contractual language in
context.277 Thus, contextualist authorities focus on both the contract’s
express terms and extrinsic evidence278—i.e., evidence outside the four

272
See George M. Cohen, Interpretation and implied terms in contract law, 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS 125, 130 (Gerrit De Geest ed., 2011) (discussing the uncertainty of party intent).
273
Contractual ambiguities exist for numerous reasons. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 270, § 7.8,
at 443–44 (setting forth a list). For example, parties typically lack the knowledge and foresight
necessary to anticipate every contingency that might be worth addressing in their agreement. BURTON,
supra note 9, § 1.2.2, at 12–13. Likewise, the stakes in most transactions do not justify the costly and
protracted negotiations that would be needed to carefully address all of the issues known to the parties.
Id. at 13. Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, language is simply an imperfect medium for
expressing ideas. CHARLES KNAPP ET AL., PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW 374 (7th ed. 2012).
274
See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9, at 928 (using the terms “textualist” and
“contextualist” to describe the two schools of interpretation); Cohen, supra note 272, at 131, 137
(same). For other approaches to labeling the two schools, see FARNSWORTH, supra note 270, § 7.12, at
465 (“restrictive” interpretation versus “liberal” interpretation); James W. Bowers, Murphy’s Law and
the Elementary Theory of Contract Interpretation: A Response to Schwartz and Scott, 57 RUTGERS L.
REV. 587, 589–90 (2005) (“formalist” interpretation versus “contextualist” interpretation); see also
Grumman Allied Industries, Inc. v. Rohr Industries, Inc., 748 F.2d 729, 733–34 (2d Cir. 1984)
(“classical” interpretation versus “modern” interpretation).
275
See Grumman Allied Industries, 748 F.2d at 733–34 (“Adherents of the classical approach,
animated by a belief that a contractual agreement manifests the intent of the parties in a completely
integrated form, favor the construction of contracts by reference to explicit textual language.”).
276
Bowers, supra note 274, at 592 (“Words the parties expressly use play decisive roles in
interpretation questions [for contextualist courts].”); see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 214, cmt. b (1981) (“[T]he words of an integrated agreement remain the most important evidence of
intent.”).
277
See Grumman Allied Industries, 748 F.2d at 734 (“Modern . . . interpretation . . . seems to
derive from the premise that a contextual inquiry is a necessary and proper prerequisite to an
understanding of the parties’ intent.”).
278
See Casey v. Semco Energy, Inc., 92 P.3d 379, 383 (Alaska 2004) (“[E]xtrinsic evidence is
always admissible on the question of the meaning of the words of the contract itself.”); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 214, cmt. b (1981) (“Any determination of meaning or
ambiguity should only be made in the light of the relevant evidence of the situation and relations of the
parties, the subject matter of the transaction, preliminary negotiations . . . , usages of trade, and the
course of dealing between the parties.”).
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corners of the parties’ written agreement.279 Such evidence includes prior
negotiations, statements made at the time the contract was executed, the
surrounding commercial circumstances (such as market conditions), course
of performance, course of dealing, and usages of trade.280
To elaborate, textualist jurisdictions typically follow what is called the
“plain meaning rule” or “four corners rule.”281 That rule sets forth a twostage process.282 During the first stage, the court assesses whether the
contract is ambiguous.283 An ambiguity exists when the relevant contractual
language is “reasonably susceptible” to more than one meaning.284 The
ambiguity determination is a question of law for the judge.285 And in
making that determination, the judge may consider only the contract itself;
the investigation is restricted to the “four corners” of the document.286 If the

279

Nautilus Marine Enterprises, Inc. v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 305 P.3d 309, 316 (Alaska 2013).
PERILLO, supra note 271, § 3.9, at 128–29. For an excellent overview of the types of extrinsic
evidence, see BURTON, supra note 9, ch. 2, at 35–62.
281
See MARGARET N. KNIFFIN, 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.7, at 33 (Joseph M. Perillo ed.,
rev. ed. 1998); Aaron D. Goldstein, The Public Meaning Rule: Reconciling Meaning, Intent, and
Contract Interpretation, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 73, 75 (2013). Courts often use the descriptions
“four-corners rule” and “plain meaning rule” synonymously. See, e.g., In re Zecevic, 344 B.R. 572, 578
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006); Benz v. Town Center Land, LLC, 314 P.3d 688, 694 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013);
Gary’s Implement, Inc. v. Bridgeport Tractor Parts, Inc., 702 N.W.2d 355, 376 (Neb. 2005); but see
BURTON, supra note 9, § 4.2.1, at 111, § 6.3, at 224–25 (distinguishing the “four corners rule” from the
“plain meaning rule”). And sources frequently distinguish between the “plain meaning rule” and the
“context rule.” See, e.g., Brown v. Scott Paper Worldwide Co., 20 P.3d 921, 929 (Wash. 2001);
Goldstein, supra, at 75. But some scholars use the phrase “plain meaning rule” more broadly to refer to
both textualist authorities and most contextualist authorities. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 270,
§ 7.12, at 466; PERILLO, supra note 271, § 3.10, at 129–30.
282
FARNSWORTH, supra note 270, § 7.12, at 463.
283
Id.
284
KNIFFIN, 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 281, § 24.7, at 33–34 & 41–42 (explaining that
both textualist and contextualist courts use this definition of ambiguity); see, e.g., Pioneer Peat, Inc. v.
Quality Grassing & Services, Inc., 653 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (textualist decision);
California Teachers’ Ass’n v. Governing Bd. of Hilmar Unified School Dist., 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 323, 328
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (contextualist decision).
285
Gulf Ins. Co. v. Burns Motor, Inc., 22 S.W.3d 417, 423 (Tex. 2000); W.W.W. Associates, Inc.
v. Giancontieri, 566 N.E.2d 639, 643 (N.Y. 1990); Quake Construction, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc.,
565 N.E.2d 990, 994 (Ill. 1990); PERILLO, supra note 271, § 3.10, at 131.
286
BURTON, supra note 9, § 4.2.2, at 111–12; KNIFFIN, 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note
281, § 24.7, at 33. Note that in assessing ambiguity, textualist courts generally interpret the document
“in light of rules of grammar and the canons of construction.” BURTON, supra, § 4.3.2, at 126; see
generally id. § 2.4, at 57–60 (surveying the canons of construction); FARNSWORTH, supra note 270,
§ 7.10, at 456–61 (same). They also use dictionaries. BURTON, supra, § 2.1.2, at 38. It is only evidence
from beyond the four corners that is forbidden. Id. § 4.3.2, at 126.
280
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court concludes that the contract is unambiguous, it simply applies the
unambiguous, “plain meaning” of the language to the facts of the case.287
Extrinsic evidence is never reviewed by the judge.288 And the case can be
disposed of via a motion to dismiss, a motion for summary judgment, or
some other preliminary proceeding.289 If the judge concludes that the
contract is ambiguous, then interpreting the agreement moves to the second
stage—resolving the ambiguity. At that stage, interpretation is a question of
fact290 and extrinsic evidence regarding the contract’s meaning is
admissible.291 Generally, ambiguities are resolved by the jury when (1) it is
the finder of fact, and (2) the resolution “depends on disputed extrinsic
evidence.”292 The judge resolves the ambiguity in all other circumstances.293
Because textualist courts conduct the initial ambiguity determination
without considering materials beyond the four corners of the document, the
text of the contract is often the only evidence reviewed in ascertaining the
meaning of the agreement. Hence the name of this interpretive school:
“textualism.”
Contextualism generally involves the same two-stage process as
textualism.294 But the contextualist approach differs in the method used for
establishing whether a contract is ambiguous. According to this view, both
the language of the agreement and extrinsic evidence are relevant in

287
BURTON, supra note 9, § 4.2.3, at 118 (“If the document does not appear to be ambiguous, the
analysis ends; the plain meaning rule comes into play to require that the judge give the unambiguous
meaning to the contract as a matter of law.”).
288
Id. (“No extrinsic evidence then is admissible for the purpose of giving meaning to the
writing.”).
289
Saregama India Ltd. v. Mosley, 635 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11th Cir. 2011); Abundance Partners LP
v. Quamtel, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 758, 767 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Seaco Ins. Co. v. Barbosa, 761 N.E.2d 946,
951 (Mass. 2002).
290
Seaco Inc. Co., 761 N.E.2d at 951.
291
BURTON, supra note 9, § 4.2.3, at 118 (“If the contract is ambiguous on its face, extrinsic
evidence is admissible for” the purpose of interpreting the contract.).
292
Id.
293
See Pamado, Inc. v. Hedinger Brands, LLC, 785 F. Supp. 2d 698, 707–08 (N.D. Ill. 2011);
BURTON, supra note 9, § 4.2.3, at 118.
294
See FARNSWORTH, supra note 270, § 7.12, at 466–67 (explaining that Pacific Gas & Electric
Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968), the foundational and seminal
contextualist case, endorsed the same two-stage process used by textualist authorities); BURTON, supra
note 9, § 4.2.2, at 112–14; see generally id. § 4.1, at 106–20 (outlining both the textualist and
contextualist approaches to the ambiguity determination).
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deciding whether an ambiguity exists.295 In other words, at stage one, the
judge must consider extrinsic evidence proffered by the parties, something
forbidden by textualism. However, the ambiguity issue is still a question of
law for the judge.296 And it can be resolved via summary judgment or at
trial by holding an evidentiary hearing or ruling upon a motion for a
directed verdict.297
Both textualist and contextualist courts generally consider all extrinsic
evidence admissible at stage two once a contract is determined to be
ambiguous.298 The essence of their disagreement is over what evidence may
be considered during stage one in making the ambiguity determination.299
In sum, under textualism, before extrinsic evidence of the context may
be admitted, ambiguity must be apparent on the face of the agreement.300

295

BURTON, supra note 9, § 4.2.2, at 112.
Id. § 4.2.3, at 118–19.
297
BNC Mortgage, Inc. v. Tax Pros, Inc., 46 P.3d 812, 819–20 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002), overruled
on other grounds, Columbia Community Bank v. Newman Park, LLC, 304 P.3d 468, 472 (Wash. 2013);
BURTON, supra note 9, § 4.2.3, at 118–19.
298
BURTON, supra note 9, § 1.2.3, at 14 (“Under the prevailing law, all of the elements [of
extrinsic evidence] are available after a court has determined that a contract is ambiguous.”); accord id.
ch. 5, at 151; Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9, at 963 n.94 (“But what if there is a genuine ambiguity in
the written agreement? In such a case, the divide between formalist and anti-formalist positions
essentially disappears: a court will consider extrinsic evidence to resolve the ambiguity.”); see, e.g.,
Bank of New York Trust Co., N.A. v. Franklin Advisers, Inc., 726 F.3d 269, 276 (2d Cir. 2013)
(applying New York law) (textualist decision); Wagner v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 52 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 898, 901 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (contextualist decision). Note that some scholars support using a
narrower range of evidence to resolve ambiguities. See, e.g., BURTON, supra note 9, §§ 6.1.2.2 & 6.1.3,
at 211–12 (arguing that only “objective” evidence should be considered both in determining whether an
ambiguity exists and in resolving ambiguities); see also infra notes 306–09 and accompanying text
(explaining the difference between objective and subjective evidence).
299
See Goldstein, supra note 281, at 80 (“The various jurisdictions then diverge as to what
additional evidence [beyond the language of the contract] courts should consider to determine whether
the contract is ambiguous.”); BURTON, supra note 9, § 4.2.2, at 111 (“On the question of ambiguity,
there is a significant controversy among the courts.”).
Note that there are some judicial opinions that could be read as dispensing entirely with stage
one—the ambiguity determination. See BURTON, supra note 9, § 4.3.3.2, at 131–34 (collecting
authorities). But I think most such decisions are better read as standard examples of contextualism that
preserve stage one. See also id. § 6.1.2.1, at 204–05 (arguing that the procedural posture of a contract
interpretation case requires the court to make an ambiguity determination because, under the rules of
civil procedure, if the contract is unambiguous, the court must decide the case as a matter of law).
300
BURTON, supra note 9, § 4.2.2, at 112; see, e.g., IDT Corp. v. Tyco Grp., 918 N.E.2d 913, 916
(N.Y. 2009).
296
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Such an ambiguity is typically called “patent,” “intrinsic,” or “facial.”301
Under contextualism, extrinsic evidence of the context may be used to
establish that facially clear language is actually ambiguous.302 Such an
ambiguity is typically called “latent” or “extrinsic.”303 Put simply,
textualism recognizes only patent ambiguities, whereas contextualism
recognizes both patent and latent ambiguities.
While most scholars and many courts endorse the basic framework set
forth above,304 it must be noted that this framework is a considerable
oversimplification of the caselaw.305 For example, contextualist courts can
be subdivided based on the type of extrinsic evidence they permit in
assessing contractual ambiguity. Some courts consider all relevant evidence
in making the ambiguity determination.306 Others limit the inquiry to
“objective” evidence—i.e., evidence that can be provided by disinterested
third parties, such as testimony regarding usages of trade.307 “Subjective
evidence,” such as testimony from the parties about what they believed the
contract meant and preliminary negotiations, may not be used to establish
an ambiguity.308 This distinction is often justified on the ground that
objective evidence is more reliable than subjective evidence because it is
much more difficult to fabricate.309 Courts following the plain meaning rule

301
See Watkins v. Ford, 304 P.3d 841, 847 (Utah 2013); BURTON, supra note 9, § 4.1, at 107;
FARNSWORTH, supra note 270, § 7.12, at 464.
302
BURTON, supra note 9, § 4.2.2, at 112; see, e.g., Shay v. Aldrich, 790 N.W.2d 629, 641 (Mich.
2010).
303
See BURTON, supra note 9, § 4.1, at 107; FARNSWORTH, supra note 270, § 7.12, at 464 &
n.16.
304
For several examples, see supra note 274; but see Margaret N. Kniffin, Conflating and
Confusing Contract Interpretation and the Parol Evidence Rule: Is the Emperor Wearing Someone
Else’s Clothes?, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 75, 95 (2009) (dividing the cases into three broad schools rather
than two).
305
GERARD MCMEEL, THE CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS: INTERPRETATION, IMPLICATION,
AND RECTIFICATION § 1.31 (2d ed. 2011) (explaining that dividing the interpretation caselaw into
literalist and purposivist schools is “too simplistic”).
306
See, e.g., Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Ass’n, 907 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1995); Adams v.
MHC Colony Park Limited P’ship, 169 Cal. Rptr. 3d 146, 161 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014); see also BURTON,
supra note 9, § 4.2.2, at 112–14 & 117 (explaining this approach).
307
See, e.g., AM Int’l, Inc. v. Graphic Mgmt. Assoc., Inc., 44 F.3d 572, 575 (7th Cir. 1995); see
also BURTON, supra note 9, § 4.2.2, at 114–15 & 117 (explaining this approach).
308
See AM Int’l, 44 F.3d at 575; BURTON, supra note 9, § 4.2.2, at 115.
309
See, e.g., AM Int’l, 44 F.3d at 575; PERILLO, supra note 271, § 3.10, at 130.
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can also be subdivided in various ways.310 In reality, there are “innumerable
gradations” of textualism and contextualism in the caselaw.311
Moreover, the law of contract interpretation is extraordinarily
convoluted. “In virtually every jurisdiction, one finds irreconcilable cases,
frequent changes in doctrine, confusion, and cries of despair.”312 The
precise formulation of a rule is frequently inconsistent with the way the rule
is applied.313 And courts sometimes set forth inconsistent rules within a
single opinion.314 As a result, most states fall somewhere between

310
See Goldstein, supra note 281, at 75 n.2 (“There are also variants of the plain meaning rule
that differ in the strictness with which courts limit themselves to the text of the contract alone.”); PETER
LINZER, 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 25.13, at 146 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 2010) (explaining that
some textualist courts take a narrow view of what constitutes a facial ambiguity, while others have “a
greater willingness” to find such ambiguities).
311
LINZER, 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 310, § 25.13, at 146; see also Peter Linzer, The
Comfort of Certainty: Plain Meaning and the Parol Evidence Rule, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 799, 805–06
(2002) (“A detailed survey will reveal countless variations around the country and remarkable
gradations of what seem to be fixed rules, even within a given jurisdiction.”).
312
Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, The Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of
Contract Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533, 540 (1998); accord PERILLO, supra note 271, § 3.1, at
106 (noting that the courts do not consistently follow the rules of contract interpretation); id. § 3.2(b), at
110 n.29 (collecting secondary authorities that address the confused state of the law in Alaska,
California, Illinois, Montana, Oregon, Texas, and Wisconsin and further noting that “[o]ther
jurisdictions could be cited”); LORD, supra note 271, § 33:42, at 1190 (“Not only do various
jurisdictions disagree as to how and when extrinsic evidence of the circumstances surrounding the
execution of a contract becomes admissible, but the decisions within a given jurisdiction are often
difficult and sometimes impossible to reconcile on this point.”). For my favorite “cry of despair,” see
Jake C. Byers, Inc. v. J.B.C. Investments, 834 S.W.2d 806, 811 (Mo. App. 1992).
313
See LINZER, 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 310, § 25.14[A], at 148–61 (collecting
examples).
314
Id. § 25.15[c], at 192 (“At times a state court seems to be saying contradictory things.”); id. at
195 (discussing as an example Wadi Petroleum v. Ultra Resources, 65 P.3d 703, 706–10 (Wy. 2003)).
Consider the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Some commentators believe the Restatement endorses
a standard version of contextualism. See, e.g., PERILLO, supra note 271, § 3.12, at 135. Others contend
that the Restatement goes further and dispenses with the ambiguity determination entirely. See, e.g.,
BURTON, supra note 9, §§ 4.2.2, at 115–17, & 4.5.2. This confusion is understandable, for the
Restatement contains language strongly supporting both positions. In two places, the Restatement
provides that extrinsic evidence is only admissible to support an interpretation if the language of the
parties’ contract is “reasonably susceptible” to the proffered reading. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 213, cmt. b (1981); id. § 215, cmt. b. These provisions require that courts conduct a
standard ambiguity inquiry. However, the Restatement also says that words can mean whatever the
parties intend them to mean. See id. § 201(1) (“Where the parties have attached the same meaning to a
promise or agreement or a term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning.”); id. § 212
cmt. b, illus. 3 & 4 (each providing that parties can use words to mean the exact opposite of their
standard meaning). These provisions indicate that the ambiguity analysis is unnecessary; a proffered
interpretation supported by extrinsic evidence need not fit the language of the parties’ contract at all, at
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textualism and contextualism, rather than firmly on one side.315 This likely
explains why commentators differ over which is the majority approach in
this country.316

least as such language is generally understood. See also Helen Hadjiyannakis, The Parol Evidence Rule
and Implied Terms: The Sounds of Silence, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 35, 60 n.134 (1985) (explaining that
the portions of § 212 cited immediately above endorse the view that parties may adopt a “private code”
to be used in interpreting their agreement, under which words can mean the exact opposite of their
meaning under standard usage); KNIFFIN, 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 281, § 24.8, at 54–59
(discussing private codes generally). If the drafters of the Restatement were this confused, it should not
be surprising that generations of courts, lawyers, and law students have struggled with the principles of
contract interpretation and the parol evidence rule.
315
There are two generally prevailing theories as to why this confusion exists. Some believe that
it is because courts fail to carefully distinguish between interpretive principles like the plain meaning
rule, on the one hand, and the parol evidence rule, on the other hand. See, e.g., BURTON, supra note 9,
§§ 3.1, at 64, & 4.2.4, at 120; see also Kniffin, supra note 304 (discussing how courts and scholars
confuse interpretation and the parol evidence rule and the injustice that results). Others suggest that it is
because interpretation and the parol evidence rule are exceptionally difficult to distinguish. See, e.g.,
PERILLO, supra note 271, § 3.9, at 201; Linzer, supra note 311, at 801; see also FARNSWORTH, supra
note 270, § 7.12, at 466 (“The question then is: where does ‘interpretation’ end and ‘contradiction’ or
‘addition’ begin?”). I think both explanations have considerable validity.
316
Compare BURTON, supra note 9, § 4.3.2, at 126 (“Most courts follow the four corners rule
when deciding whether a contract is ambiguous, sometimes under the guise of the parol evidence rule.”),
and Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9, at 928 n.1 (“A strong majority of U.S. courts continue to follow the
traditional, ‘formalist’ approach to contract interpretation. A state-by-state survey of recent court
decisions shows that thirty-eight states follow the textualist approach to interpretation. Nine states,
joined by the Uniform Commercial Code for sales cases (U.C.C.) and the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, have adopted a contextualist or ‘antiformalist’ interpretive regime. The remaining states are
indeterminate.”), with LORD, supra note 271, § 30:5, at 80 (“While there is authority that the court is
limited in its consideration solely to the face of the written agreement, many more courts take the
position that a court may provisionally receive all credible evidence concerning the parties’ intentions to
determine whether the language of the contract is reasonably susceptible to the interpretation urged by
the party claiming ambiguity; if it is, this evidence may then be admitted and heard by the trier of
fact.”). Note also that in cases involving the sale of goods, the Uniform Commercial Code expressly
requires that courts use a form of contextualist interpretation. See U.C.C. § 1-303(d); id. § 2-202 & cmt.
1(c). But at least one respected source contends that judges frequently ignore the dictates of Article 2
and use a form of textualism, requiring a finding of facial ambiguity before admitting extrinsic evidence
for interpretive purposes. See 1 JAMES J. WHITE ET AL., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3:14, at 221–22
(6th ed. 2010).
The picture appears to be clearer abroad, with contextualism now dominate both in other nations
and in international law. See MCMEEL, supra note 305, § 2.01 (explaining that the general trend in
common-law jurisdictions is towards adoption of the contextualist approach); CATHERINE MITCHELL,
INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES IN LAW 58 (2007) (explaining that the
same trend exists in European civil-law jurisdictions); United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sales of Goods, art. 8(3), Apr. 11, 1980, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/
texts/sales/cisg/V1056997-CISG-e-book.pdf; Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts,
art. 4.3 (2010), available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2010/
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Like the courts, contracts scholars can also generally be divided into
textualist and contextualist camps,317 with a clear majority falling into the
latter group.318 But commentators have also proposed positions that do not
fit precisely into the textualist-contextualist continuum. For example, some
believe that different interpretive approaches should be applied to different
types of contracts, often distinguishing commercial agreements between
businesses from consumer and employment agreements.319 Others argue
that the parties should be permitted to decide which interpretive approach
will be used should a dispute over contractual meaning arise.320 Some of
these positions are discussed further in the next part.
B. The Policy Debate
Contract interpretation is an exceptionally important subject.321 And
the central policy issue in this field is the proper role of extrinsic evidence
in the interpretive process.322 The rules regarding such evidence can

integralversionprinciples2010-e.pdf; Principles of European Contract Law, art. 5:102 (1998), available
at http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/eu.contract.principles.parts.1.to.3.2002/.
317
Juliet P. Kostritsky, Plain Meaning vs. Broad Interpretation: How the Risk of Opportunism
Defeats a Unitary Default Rule for Interpretation, 96 KY. L.J. 43, 43–44 (2007–2008).
318
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9, at 938 (“The (almost) scholarly consensus shares the UCC
and Restatement view . . . that [courts should be permitted] to access a broad evidentiary base in
determining both the terms of the contract and the meaning to be attached to those terms.”); accord
PERILLO, supra note 271, § 3.10, at 130. For older sources supporting a contextualist approach to
interpretation, see, for example, JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 428–29 (1898); 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM
OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2470 (3d ed. 1940); and Arthur L. Corbin, The
Interpretation of Words and the Parol Evidence Rule, 50 CORNELL L.Q. 161, 188–89 (1965). For
modern sources, see, for example, BURTON, supra note 9, § 6.1.2.1, at 209; PERILLO, supra, § 3.10, at
130; FARNSWORTH, supra note 270, § 7.10, at 453–54; KNIFFIN, 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note
281, § 24.7, at 36–39; and LINZER, 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 310, §§ 25.14, at 39, &
25.14[B], at 163.
319
See infra notes 425–28 and accompanying text.
320
See infra notes 429–36 and accompanying text.
321
See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text.
322
See Hermalin et al., supra note 9, at 88–89 (“The key policy question underlying contract
interpretation is how thorough the interpretive process should be; and this question is commonly
articulated in terms of the dichotomy of form and substance.”); see also PETER A. ALCES, A THEORY OF
CONTRACT LAW: EMPIRICAL INSIGHTS AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 153 (2011) (“The parol or extrinsic
evidence tension in contract is fundamental; it concerns the very foundations of agreement . . . .”);
MCMEEL, supra note 305, § 5.01 (“One of the most controversial areas in the principles governing the
interpretation of contracts is the question of what materials are admissible to assist the court in carrying
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influence virtually every aspect of the parties’ contractual relationship.323
Thus, numerous factors are potentially relevant in deciding the optimal
interpretive regime.324 Given these points, it should not be surprising that
the debate among courts and scholars over the proper approach to extrinsic
evidence has been fierce,325 with some judges adopting “sky-is-falling”
rhetoric when criticizing the opposition.326 The disputants have advanced a
wide array of conceptual, theoretical, and empirical arguments in support of
textualism and contextualism.327 But the debate has focused on three basic
topics: (1) interpretive accuracy; (2) transaction costs; and (3) enforcement
costs.328

out the task.”) (focusing on contract interpretation in jurisdictions outside the United States, particularly
England and other common law nations); Goldstein, supra note 281, at 74 (“When and what kinds of
extrinsic evidence should courts admit in order to interpret the meaning of a contract? . . . [T]he answer
has profound implications for whether courts achieve the goals of predictability and fairness that
motivate the law of contracts.”); Steven Shavell, On the Writing and Interpretation of Contracts, 22 J.L.
ECON & ORG. 289, 311 (2006) (“Third, the issue of the use of evidence extrinsic to contracts in their
interpretation is of significance in actual practice and is also much debated. . . . [T]he question whether
the value of extrinsic evidence in contractual interpretation exceeds its costs to the parties is a real
one.”).
323
Hermalin et al., supra note 9, at 90 (“The regime of contract interpretation will influence the
contracting parties’ behavior in many respects: with regard to decisions to breach, to take advance
precautions, to mitigate damages, to gather and communicate information, to allocate risk, to make
reliance investments, to behave opportunistically, and to spend resources in litigation, and so on.”).
324
Id. (“The considerations that determine the optimal approach to contract interpretation are thus
quite broad-ranging.”); see id. at 90–91 (setting forth a list of some of the key considerations).
325
Kostritsky, supra note 317, at 54 (concerning scholars); McLauchlan, supra note 10, at 5
(“There are fundamental divisions among commentators, practitioners and judges . . . as to the nature of
the task and the permissible aids to interpretation.”).
326
For perhaps the best example, see infra notes 395–98 and accompanying text.
327
See Burton, supra note 10, at 341 (“Among contract scholars, there is no consensus about how
an interpreter should accomplish these tasks. Consequently, normative theories of contract interpretation
proliferate.”). For an outstanding overview of the economic arguments for and against the two
approaches to contract interpretation, see Cohen, supra note 272.
328
See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9, at 930 (“Since no interpretive theory can justify devoting
infinite resources to achieving interpretive accuracy, any socially-desirable interpretive rule would trade
off accuracy against contract-writing and adjudication costs.”); Cohen, supra note 272, at 148 (“The real
question is which [interpretive] methodology has the lowest error rate and at what cost.”); J.J.
Spigelman, Contractual Interpretation: A Comparative Perspective, 85 AUSTR. L.J. 412, 413 (2011)
(“Like many other aspects of contract law, interpretation requires the resolution of a tension between
certainty or efficiency on the one hand and accuracy or fairness on the other.”); see also MITCHELL,
supra note 316, at 108 (“The first and most obvious reason for confining a court’s enquiry to the four
corners of the agreement relates to the possible costs involved in the contextual approach. . . . Two
particular kinds of costs are pertinent: transaction costs (broadly, the cost of reaching and recording the
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1. Interpretive Accuracy
As noted above, the purpose of contract interpretation is to ascertain
the intent of the parties.329 But which school of interpretation best
accomplishes this task? Both sides maintain it is their approach.330
Adherents of textualism typically offer the following arguments in support
of their position. First, the express terms of a contract are the best evidence
of contractual intent.331 The parties likely chose the words of their
agreement with care to reflect their mutual understanding.332 By contrast,
contextual evidence is often unreliable, particularly in light of the problems
with memory.333 And such evidence is frequently ambiguous and/or
contradictory.334 Second, judges can more skillfully apply textualist
methodology. They are better at adopting the perspective of “a reasonable
recipient of the document” who is focused on the contractual language than

deal) and enforcement costs (broadly, the cost of insuring compliance in resolving disputes).” (emphasis
added)).
329
See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
330
See Cohen, supra note 272, at 145 (“Scholars disagree, however, over whether strict
approaches to interpretation and implied terms, such as textualism, lead to more court error than broader
approaches, such as contextualism.”); see also Steuart v. McChesney, 444 A.2d 659, 662 (Pa. 1982)
(noting that textualism “has been supported as generally best serving the ascertainment of the
contracting parties’ mutual intent”).
331
ALCES, supra note 322, at 149 (“The case favoring ‘plain meaning’ is clear: Courts cannot
read the minds of litigants, so the clear expression of their intent is the best evidence of what that intent
actually is (or, at least, was).”); Cohen, supra note 272, at 131 (explaining that textualists presume that
“the express terms of the contract . . . best approximate the parties’ intentions”); see also MITCHELL,
supra note 316, at 94 (“Rather, the hallmark of a more serious kind of formalism in contract would be
the tendency to regard the contractual text as supreme evidence of the parties’ intentions, over more
elusive and equivocal evidential material, such as trade customs, previous dealings and so on . . . .”);
Slamow v. Del Col, 594 N.E.2d 918, 919 (N.Y. 1992) (“The best evidence of what parties to a written
agreement intend is what they say in their writing.”).
332
See Steuart v. McChesney, 444 A.2d 659, 662 (Pa. 1982) (“Where the contract evidences care
in its preparation, it will be presumed that its words were employed deliberately and with intention. . . .
Courts in interpreting a contract do not assume that its language was chosen carelessly.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
333
See Shavell, supra note 322, at 311 (observing that “extrinsic evidence . . . is highly
imperfect”); Goldstein, supra note 281, at 75–76 (“While the context rule responds to the issues
associated with interpreting language in a vacuum, it relies upon unreliable evidence in order to give
meaning to contract language. Parties lie and misremember, especially regarding extrinsic evidence such
as prior negotiations, course of performance, and course of dealing.”).
334
Goldstein, supra note 281, at 76 (“Also, extrinsic evidence of parties’ prior acts is often
compatible with numerous contradictory accounts of what the parties intended, and thus fails to shed
light on the parties’ actual bargain.”).
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the perspective of someone who participated in the preliminary negotiations
and is familiar with the surrounding circumstances.335 In part, that is
because judges often misunderstand the economic context in which
business contracts are made, even when presented with significant evidence
on the subject.336 Such evidence overwhelms them with information that
they lack the training to fully comprehend.337 Moreover, the difficulties
judges face in applying contextualist methodology are particularly acute
when the parties assert that they were using some type of private language
(such as an industry dialect) in which words have a meaning that differs
from standard usage.338 Third, the quantity and quality of evidence available
under contextualism confuses juries, leading to more mistakes in
ascertaining contractual meaning.339 Fourth, the first three arguments are
strengthened by the fact that parties often intentionally use extrinsic
evidence to distort the meaning of an otherwise clear agreement. Under
contextualism, parties have an incentive to sift through the preliminary
negotiations, prior dealings, and industry custom, in the search for some
remark or practice that can be deployed to alter the contract and obtain an
unbargained-for advantage.340 And judges have difficulty policing such
manipulated contextual evidence.341

335

MITCHELL, supra note 316, at 116 (explaining this position).
See VICTOR GOLDBERG, FRAMING CONTRACT LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 163 (2006);
see also MITCHELL, supra note 316, at 116 (“A court’s conclusions on the social context of a
commercial agreement may be impressionistic at best, despite hearing testimony of witnesses and
experts.”).
337
See MITCHELL, supra note 316, at 115 (“The contextual approach arguably increases the
chances for error by increasing the amount of information deemed relevant to the interpretation exercise.
Judges may have to deal with a significant amount of contextual material, some of it connected to
particular frameworks of analysis whose conventions will be unfamiliar to them.”).
338
See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113
YALE L.J. 541, 587 (2003).
339
See KNIFFIN, 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 281, § 24.7, at 53 (noting that judges often
argue that “juries might incorrectly assess the extrinsic evidence” that is admissible under a contextualist
approach); see, e.g., W.W.W. Assoc., Inc. v. Giancontieri, 566 N.E.2d 639, 642 (N.Y. 1990); see also
MITCHELL, supra note 316, at 110 (“[T]he greater the amount of contextual material, the greater the
possibility for error. Decision-makers may easily become bewildered by a large set of conflicting
evidence.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); LINZER, 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 310,
§ 25.17, at 241 & n.4 (“It is a commonplace that underlying the restrictive use of the parol evidence rule
is distrust of juries in contract cases.”).
340
MITCHELL, supra note 316, at 113 (“A further problem is that much reliance on context may
be done strategically—the problem of ‘threshing through the undergrowth’ for the chance remark upon
which to build a case. The suspicion is often raised of the strategic reliance on context to sanction an
336
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Contextualists’ primary argument on the issue of interpretive accuracy
is that meaning can only be determined by considering the context in which
language is used.342 First, as dictionaries demonstrate, “most words have
several meanings in the abstract (acontextually).”343 Second, words can
have meanings that are not set forth in dictionaries, meanings that textualist
interpretation largely ignores.344 Third, it is sometimes impossible to
perceive an ambiguity without reviewing evidence from beyond the four
corners of the contract.345 For example, in the famous case of Raffles v.
Wichelhaus,346 the parties’ agreement provided, in perfectly clear terms,
that certain cotton would arrive on the ship Peerless. But there were two
ships with that name, creating an ambiguity that became apparent only upon
the consideration of extrinsic evidence.347 Judge Posner explains this
problem as follows: “The contract’s words point out to the real world, and
the real world may contain features that make seemingly clear words,

escape from a bad bargain[,] . . . even in circumstances where the written terms appear relatively
complete.”); accord Steuart v. McChesney, 444 A.2d 659, 663 (Pa. 1982) (“Likewise, resort to the plain
meaning of language hinders parties dissatisfied with their agreement from creating a myth as to the true
meaning of the agreement through subsequently exposed extrinsic evidence.”); Linzer, supra note 311,
at 804 (offering the following as a possible justification for the plain meaning rule: “strict rules protect
against the fear that the more we allow the words of a contract to be challenged in the name of the
parties’ actual intent, the more we produce disorder and even chaos, waiting to be exploited by
unscrupulous litigants who demand a bonus to do what they already promised to do”).
341
See Cohen, supra note 272, at 145–46.
342
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 cmt. d (1981) (“Meaning is
inevitably dependent on context.”); FARNSWORTH, supra note 270, § 7.10, at 454 (“Indeed, it is
questionable whether a word has a meaning at all when divorced from the circumstances in which it is
used.”); KNIFFIN, 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 281, § 24.7, at 36 (“Before the meaning of
words and a contract can be plain and clear, at least some of the surrounding circumstances must be
known[.]”).
343
BURTON, supra note 9, § 6.1.2.2, at 210.
344
See Goldstein, supra note 281, at 75 (“The plain meaning rule also ties the interpretation of
contract terms to a judge’s subjective notions of what words mean in language and prevents parties from
submitting evidence of alternate meanings that may be publically used and acknowledged, but not set
forth in a standard dictionary.”).
345
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 214, cmt. b (1981) (“Even though words seem on
their face to have only a single possible meaning, other meanings often appear when the circumstances
are disclosed.”); FARNSWORTH, supra note 270, § 7.12, at 465 (same).
346
159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Exch. 1864).
347
Charter Oil Co. v. American Employers’ Ins. Co., 69 F.3d 1160, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1995);
LINZER, 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 310, § 25.4, at 32.
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sentences, and even entire documents ambiguous.”348 Given these points,
textualism is impossible; “plain meaning” simply does not exist.349
Excluding evidence from outside the four corners thus fatally undermines
the interpretive process.350 And this position finds support in the philosophy
of language, linguistics, and other related fields.351
Similarly, contextualists argue that it is impossible to exclude material
from outside the four corners of the contract when engaging in
interpretation. The only question is what type of extrinsic evidence gets
emphasized—the background of the judge (under textualism) or the
background of the parties to the transaction (under contextualism).352 The
latter, contextualists argue, is clearly more useful in attempting to ascertain
the intent of the parties.353 For example, judges frequently come from
backgrounds that are quite different from the “the specialized worlds of
trade” that serve as the context for many commercial agreements.354 In such

348
Posner, supra note 195, at 1597 (then offering Raffles as an example); accord Charter Oil Co.,
69 F.3d at 1167 (“Latent ambiguity can arise where language, clear on its face, fails to resolve an
uncertainty when juxtaposed with circumstances in the world that the language is supposed to govern.”);
see also KNIFFIN, 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 281, § 24.7, at 36 (“[P]roof of the
circumstances may make plain and clear a meaning that was not apparent when in the absence of such
proof some other meanings seemed plain and clear.”).
349
See BURTON, supra note 9, § 4.6.1, at 144 (“The chief criticism of the plain meaning and four
corners rules has been that there are no plain meanings that an interpreter can find on a contract
document’s face.”); KNIFFIN, 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 281, § 24.7, at 54 (“[T]he
conclusions are inescapable that words used in a contract do not have only one true meaning and that
words are never so ‘plain and clear’ that proof of surrounding circumstances and other extrinsic aids to
interpretation can be excluded.”).
350
See, e.g., BURTON, supra note 9, § 6.1.2.2, at 211 (“The necessity of context for ascertaining
the meaning(s) is the strongest argument against the four corners rule here.”); PERILLO, supra note 271,
§ 3.10, at 130 (arguing that the “plain meaning rule has been properly condemned because the meaning
of words varies” with changes in context); KNIFFIN, 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 281, § 24.7,
at 37 (“The plain meaning rule can exclude proof of [the parties’] actual intentions.”).
351
See, e.g., MCMEEL, supra note 305, § 2.43 (“However there are lessons to be learned from
these other fields. One insight stands out: in ascertaining the meaning of an utterance, the context in
which it is made is indispensable.”); see generally id. §§ 2.37, 2.39, 2.40, 2.43, 2.57 (discussing the
relevancy of the philosophy of language, linguistics, and related fields for contract interpretation).
352
For the classic statement of this position, see Corbin, supra note 318, at 164 (“[W]hen a judge
refuses to consider relevant extrinsic evidence on the ground that the meaning of written words is to him
plain and clear, his decision is formed by and wholly based upon the completely extrinsic evidence of
his own personal education and experience.”).
353
See Posner, supra note 312, at 560 (“The parol evidence rule excludes extrinsic evidence from
consideration, while allowing the judge to rely on his or her personal knowledge, even though the
former, more so than the latter, would enable the court to determine the parties’ intentions.”).
354
See Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit, 619 F.2d 1001, 1011 n.12 (3d Cir. 1980).
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cases, “the parties’ linguistic reference” is far more likely to provide insight
into their intent than the judge’s language background.355 “Using the
interpreter’s context injects arbitrariness into the process; it bears no
reliable relation to the parties’ intention and, indeed, may be quite foreign
to them.”356 And evidence of the context can be particularly useful to less
experienced judges, bringing their “information sets” more closely into
alignment with those of experienced judges who may already have some
understanding of the relevant commercial practices.357
Lastly, contextualists have no sympathy for textualist concerns that
extrinsic evidence may confuse or fool juries. First, judges can use
preliminary proceedings such as summary judgment to prevent baseless
arguments from reaching the jury.358 Remember that even under
contextualism the language of the agreement places a critical limit on the
spectrum of possible interpretations: the words must be reasonably
susceptible to the meanings proffered by the parties. Any reading that fails
this test is barred from evidence.359 Second, as explained by Peter Linzer,
textualists’ worries regarding juries prove too much:
If the jury system is so defective that juries cannot be allowed to hear the story
of black meaning white, they should not be allowed to decide wrongful death
actions, complex anti-trust suits and patent cases, much less psychological
defenses in capital murder cases. Since we are not about to abolish the jury
system generally, there is no reason to constrict it in the one area of
interpretation of integrated agreements.360

And the same argument applies to the claim that judges lack the capacity to
apply contextualist methodologies. In sum, textualism violates “the basic
precept that a court should make its decisions based on full information, not
conjecture.”361

355

See id.
BURTON, supra note 9, § 2.1.3, at 40.
357
Avery Wiener Katz, The Economics of Form and Substance in Contract Interpretation, 104
COLUM. L. REV. 496, 526 (2004).
358
LINZER, 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 310, § 25.14, at 163.
359
Id. § 25.16[B] at 219.
360
Id. § 25.4 at 36; see also Posner, supra note 312, at 567 (“The concern is that if juries
considered all of the extrinsic evidence, rather than just the writing, they would not render good
judgments. . . . If juries are incompetent, why would limiting them to certain kinds of evidence lead to a
more accurate result?”).
361
LINZER, 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 310, § 25.14, at 163.
356
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Textualists can respond to some of these arguments as follows. Plain
meaning is not an impossibility; indeed, most meaning is plain.362 And the
philosophy of language does not suggest otherwise.363 That is because the
“plain meaning” sought by textualism is not acontextual.364 In other words,
textualists do not advocate acontextual interpretation. Rather, they simply
“disagree over what is the correct context, over how much context is
relevant or necessary to assessing meaning.”365 And, they contend, a
“minimum evidentiary basis ordinarily will convey sufficient contextual
information.”366
2. Transaction Costs
One of the chief arguments in favor of contextualist interpretation is
that it reduces transaction costs.367 It does so by enabling the parties to draft
less complete contracts.368 “Parties can write a simpler document, leaving it
to the courts to fill the gaps through the process of contextual
interpretation.”369 This saves on negotiating and drafting costs since the
parties need not “reduce all the terms and standards that govern the
agreement to writing.”370

362
Ricks, supra note 271, at 769 (“Plain meaning rests instead on our unreflective, public,
conventional practice of language use. Most meaning is plain. Part III explains that, though plain
meaning is immune from attack on grounds of impossibility, . . . .”); accord Kent Greenawalt, A
Pluralist Approach to Interpretation: Wills and Contracts, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 553, 592 (2005).
363
Ricks, supra note 271, passim.
364
See Greenawalt, supra note 362, at 592 (further noting that acontextual interpretation may
indeed be philosophically incoherent); Ricks, supra note 271, at 769.
365
MITCHELL, supra note 316, at 9; accord Posner, supra note 195, at 1598.
366
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9, at 952; accord MITCHELL, supra note 316, at 9.
367
Cohen, supra note 272, at 132 (calling this a “key economic argument for an expansive court
role in interpreting and implying terms”); see also MITCHELL, supra note 316, at 108–09 (“One of the
arguments in favor of contextualism over literalism is that it lowers transaction costs . . . .”).
368
Cohen, supra note 272, at 132 (explaining that contextualism “enables and encourages parties
to write less complete contracts than they otherwise would”).
369
MITCHELL, supra note 316, at 109; see also Posner, supra note 195, at 1600 (“Were evidence
of trade usage barred in contract litigation, parties to contracts would be driven to include additional
detail in their contracts . . . .”).
370
MITCHELL, supra note 316, at 109; accord Cohen, supra note 272, at 132 (“Writing less
complete contracts saves on drafting and negotiating costs so long as the court-supplied interpretations
and terms sufficiently approximate the parties’ intentions.”).
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Textualists essentially concede that contextualism reduces transaction
costs. But they argue it does so at the price of greater enforcement costs.371
That is, in part, because contextualist interpretation incentivizes parties to
draft worse contracts—contracts with more open terms and ambiguities.372
Under textualism, parties are motivated to spend additional time negotiating
and writing their agreements, leading to better contracts that reduce
litigation.373
The next section reviews the debate over which interpretive approach
minimizes enforcement costs. For now, assume that textualists are correct
that there is a trade-off between transaction and enforcement costs. “In
balancing contracting and litigation costs, it is important to keep in mind
that contracting costs are certain and incurred across all contracts, while
litigation costs, though often much larger than contracting costs, are
incurred in only a small fraction of contracts.”374 A critical question, then, is
what will be less expensive: drafting a more complete contract for every
transaction, a contract that can be interpreted with minimal contextual
evidence when a dispute arises; or drafting shorter, less complete
agreements that increase the likelihood of a lawsuit and require the
assessment of substantially more material should there be litigation. Given
how rare contract disputes are relative to the total number of agreements
executed, one could plausibly argue that reducing transaction costs via the

371
See Cohen, supra note 272, at 133–34 (explaining a model developed by Judge Posner under
which, “as parties spend less on ex ante contracting and rely more on extrinsic evidence to prove their
intent, drafting costs go down, but expected litigation costs rise,” because there is an increased
likelihood of litigation and the expense of any litigation that does occur will be greater).
372
In a somewhat different context, Cohen offers the following: “If a court is willing to ‘insure’
parties through flexible interpretation and implied terms it creates a classic moral hazard problem: the
parties have less incentive to write good contracts themselves.” Cohen, supra note 272, at 137.
373
Id. at 133–34 (again explaining Posner’s model). There are reasons to be skeptical of this
argument. The odds of there being a dispute—let alone a lawsuit—over any given contract are
incredibly low. See BURTON, supra note 9, § 1.1.2, at 12 (“And, in light of the millions of contracts
concluded each day, interpretive disputes must be rare; by far, most contracts are performed without a
hitch.”). Thus, the incentives created by textualism to work out more details and address a greater
number of contingencies in case a conflict arises might be quite minimal.
374
Cohen, supra note 272, at 134; accord Posner, supra note 195, at 1600.
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latter approach best minimizes overall expenses. But the actual answer to
the question is unknown.375
3. Enforcement Costs
Perhaps the signature argument textualists offer in favor of their
interpretive approach is that enforcement costs are higher under
contextualism than under textualism.376 Both courts and scholars have
regularly pressed this claim.377 The claim has two components: enforcement
costs are greater in a contextualist regime because (1) there are more
lawsuits, and (2) the lawsuits that are filed last longer.378
Start by recalling that a much broader range of material is relevant in
deciding whether a contract is ambiguous under contextualism. Textualism
recognizes only patent ambiguities. Thus, when attempting to convince the
court that a contract is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning, a
party may rely solely upon the language within the four corners of the
agreement. The judge is barred from considering any other evidence.379
Contextualism recognizes both patent and latent ambiguities. Accordingly,
a party may use the language of the agreement as well as preliminary
negotiations, courses of performance and dealing, trade usages, and other
aspects of the surrounding context in attempting to establish the existence
of an ambiguity.380 Next, recall that textualists maintain that extrinsic

375
Note that even if we could be reasonably certain about which approach best reduces overall
costs, we would also need to know the magnitude of the difference in order to weigh cost reduction
against interpretive accuracy and any other factors under consideration.
376
See MITCHELL, supra note 316, at 108 (“The first and most obvious reason for confining a
court’s enquiry to the four corners of the agreement relates to the possible costs involved in the
contextual approach.”).
377
See id. (noting that the costs of the contextualists approach, including enforcement costs, “has
been a particular concern of some judges”); Cohen, supra note 272, at 133 (“Law and economics
scholars often argue that contextualism is associated with higher litigation costs than textualism.”).
378
As used here, “last longer” denotes more than the mere passage of time. Rather, it means
moving into later stages of the litigation process, with each stage requiring new activities that entail the
expenditure of resources. Note also that the number of lawsuits filed and the length of those suits are
only indirect measures of enforcement costs. Directly quantifying such costs would require analyzing
party and court expenditures on items like attorney’s fees, taxable costs, filing fees, and time spent by
the judiciary addressing interpretation disputes. Nonetheless, there appears to be almost universal
agreement that the number of actions brought and how long those actions last are sufficient proxies.
379
See supra notes 286–88, 300–01 and accompanying text.
380
See supra notes 295–97, 302–03, and accompanying text.
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evidence has many problematic features: it is frequently unreliable,
contradictory, and/or ambiguous.381 This means that contextualism both
dramatically increases the quantity of relevant interpretive material that
courts must consider at the ambiguity stage and reduces the quality of the
material that goes into the ambiguity determination. These two features of
contextualism raise enforcement costs from the textualist baseline through
four pathways—in addition to the incentives that contextualism create to
draft worse contracts discussed in the prior section.382
First, it is much more difficult for contextualist courts to decide
contract interpretation cases on the pleadings. Since a party is entitled to
argue that an agreement is ambiguous via extrinsic evidence, the court
generally must permit discovery so that such evidence can be gathered.
Therefore, the ambiguity determination typically can be made no earlier
than at the summary judgment stage.383 Second, it is easier to establish that
a contract is ambiguous when extrinsic evidence is available because the
parties have more material out of which to craft reasonable constructions of
the operative language.384 And contextualism incentivizes parties to invest

381

See supra notes 333–34 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 372–73 and accompanying text.
See Bank v. Truck Ins. Exch., 51 F.3d 736, 737–38 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.) (observing that
contextualist interpretation “makes it difficult to decide contract cases on the pleadings”); see also
MITCHELL, supra note 316, at 110 (observing that contextualist litigation is expensive because “the
relevant ‘context’ has to be established”); id. at 63 (explaining that judges are justifiably concerned that
contextualism adds to the costs and delays of litigation because they must consider the context before
deciding what the contract means). Indeed, some courts have held that an interpretation case may never
be decided on the pleadings under contextualism. See, e.g., A. Kemp Fisheries, Inc. v. Castle & Cooke,
Inc., 852 F.2d 493, 497 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that under California law, “courts may not dismiss
on the pleadings when one party claims that extrinsic evidence renders the contract ambiguous”). But
unless a jurisdiction has adopted the “private code” theory endorsed by the Restatement (Second), see
supra note 314, this goes too far. Remember that the language of the agreement must be reasonably
susceptible to the proffered interpretation. Therefore, a contextualist court may bar discovery and decide
the case on the pleadings when the construction advanced by one party is so inconsistent with the text
that no set of extrinsic evidence could make the text reasonably susceptible to the asserted reading. See
Hervey v. Mercury Cas. Co., 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 890, 895–96 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (“Although parol
evidence may be admissible to determine whether the terms of a contract are ambiguous, it is not
admissible if it contradicts a clear and explicit provision.”) (emphasis added) (further explaining the
circumstances in which contract interpretation cases can be decided on the pleadings).
384
See Goldstein, supra note 281, at 75 (“The plain meaning rule allows more sophisticated
parties to hide behind carefully worded contracts of adhesion without fear that the circumstances
surrounding the contract might intrude.”).
382
383
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heavily in the search for evidence that can support their preferred
construction of the contract.385
Given these two points, lawsuits will generally last longer when courts
employ contextualist methodology; more cases will reach discovery,
summary judgment, and trial.386 In addition, the parties are more likely to
file a lawsuit to begin with since those challenging the apparently clear
terms of a contract stand a better chance of surviving the ambiguity stage
and making it to a jury than if the courts use textualism.387
Third, the quantity and quality of the extrinsic evidence available
under contextualism makes it more difficult to predict how judges will

385
See MITCHELL, supra note 316, at 113 (“A further problem is that much reliance on context
may be done strategically—the problem of ‘threshing through the undergrowth’ for the chance remark
upon which to build a case. The suspicion is often raised of the strategic reliance on context to sanction
an escape from a bad bargain[,] . . . One may use the ‘context’ to seek an unbargained for advantage in
imposing terms after the parties are in a contractual relationship, even in circumstances where the
written terms appear relatively complete.”); Cohen, supra note 272, at 133 (“For example, allowing
more contextual evidence may encourage parties to spend more on litigation because the marginal
benefit of expenditures to develop such evidence is higher than under a textualist regime.”); Katz, supra
note 357, at 530 (“Under a regime of substantive interpretation, for instance, parties may be tempted to
invest substantial resources in litigation in order to maximize the chance of a favorable outcome.”); id.
at 531 (“Formality, by limiting the scope for ex post interpretive disputes, probably reduces the marginal
productivity of litigation expenditure, and thus reduces the amount of such expenditure.”). See also
Steuart v. McChesney, 444 A.2d 659, 663 (Pa. 1982) (“Likewise, resort to the plain meaning of
language hinders parties dissatisfied with their agreement from creating a myth as to the true meaning of
the agreement through subsequently exposed extrinsic evidence.”).
386
See Ward v. Intermountain Farmers’ Ass’n, 907 P.2d 264, 269–70 (Utah 1995) (Russon, J.,
concurring) (“When a motion for summary judgment can be defeated merely by the opposing party’s
affidavit averring that an otherwise clear contract provision was intended to mean something different,
attorneys will discontinue the futility of composing summary judgment motions, and every contract
dispute will be formally resolved only through trial.”); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9, at 963 (“The
plain meaning rule operates in tandem with a hard parol evidence rule to reduce expected adjudication
costs. If the contract is fully integrated, and if contractual terms are facially clear, then the dispute can
be resolved at summary judgment.”); Spigelman, supra note 328, at 413 (“Furthermore, the length and
cost of the process is increased [by contextualism].”). See also BURTON, supra note 9, § 4.6.2, at 147
(“For both parties and others, investigating the parties’ subjective intentions can be costly, if such
investigations are possible without rights to discovery and perhaps even then.”); Shavell, supra note
322, at 311 (observing that “extrinsic evidence . . . is very costly to consider (especially because of the
tendency of the parties to contest negotiating history, oral statements, course of dealing).”).
387
See FDIC v. W.R. Grace & Co., 877 F.2d 614, 621 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.) (“The older
view, sometimes called the ‘four corners’ rule, . . . tends to cut down on the amount of litigation.”). Note
that most textualists would probably contend that contextualist interpretation also increases the number
of disputes over contractual meaning that do not result in a lawsuit. Such disputes are another type of
enforcement cost. But this argument does not appear to play a significant role in the secondary literature
or caselaw.
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resolve the ambiguity question.388 Parties do not know which contractual
language or other evidence the court is likely to find dispositive.389 And, if
no lawsuit has been filed yet, neither party will even have access to all of
the materials the judge is going to consider since discovery will not have
started. Fourth, as noted above, interpretation cases are more likely to reach
trial under contextualism than under textualism.390 And jury trials are
considered notoriously difficult to predict.391 It is generally accepted that

388
See GOLDBERG, supra note 336, at 162 (“The danger of a Nanakuli-Columbia Nitrogen
[contextualist] interpretative strategy is that parties will be frustrated in trying to devise the terms of
their agreement, and they will have little confidence in their ability to predict the outcomes if their
disputes do end in litigation.”); FARNSWORTH, supra note 270, § 7.12, at 465 (“The restrictive view is
defended on the grounds that it . . . gives predictability in the interpretation of commonly used terms.”);
KNIFFIN, 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 281, § 24.7, at 53 (noting that various “judges have
expressed the view that discarding the plain meaning rule would interfere with predictability and
uniformity in interpretation of contracts . . . .”); MCMEEL, supra note 305, § 1.107 (observing that after
English courts adopted contextualism, “fears were expressed” that this would “generate greater
uncertainty in the context of commercial transactions”); MITCHELL, supra note 316, at 92 (“The
weakness of contextualism is its unpredictability.”); Posner, supra note 312, at 562 & n.14 (“Courts that
support hard-PER argue that this rule increases commercial certainty by enabling parties to predict the
promises that courts will enforce.”) (collecting authorities); Goldstein, supra note 281, at 76 (“Most
problematically, by looking to evidence of the parties’ subjective intent, rather than the shared and
public meaning of terms, the context rule undermines the usefulness of contracts as tools to predictably
constrain another party’s behavior.”); Kniffin, supra note 304, at 100 n.30 (“The plain meaning rule is
intended to avoid unnecessary expenditures of judicial resources and to further predictability; the court
avoids examining extrinsic evidence when the court is certain of the meaning of a disputed term, . . . .”);
Spigelman, supra note 328, at 412 (arguing that “the general use of extrinsic materials” undermines
certainty “in contracts between commercial parties” and results “in an increase in the cost of commercial
dispute resolution”); see also Herson v. Gibraltar Building & Loan Ass’n, 864 F.2d 848, 853 (D.C. Cir.
1989) (“Nonetheless, it is fundamentally important that parties be able to rely on the explicit language of
written contracts. The public interest in certainty and finality is too critical to allow every agreement to
be subjected to collateral attack.”); W.W.W. Assoc., Inc. v. Giancontieri, 566 N.E.2d 639, 643 (N.Y.
1990) (“An analysis that begins with consideration of extrinsic evidence of what the parties meant,
instead of looking first to what they said and reaching extrinsic evidence only when required to do so
because of some identified ambiguity, unnecessarily denigrates the contract and unsettles the law.”).
389
See MITCHELL, supra note 316, at 91 (“Parties, and their lawyers, may . . . have little idea of
what outcomes [contextualism] may lead to, since they may be unaware of what particular context, and
contextual material, is regarded as controlling.”).
390
See supra note 386 and accompanying text.
391
Valerie P. Hans & Theodore Eisenberg, The Predictability of Juries, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 375,
375 (2011) (“The jury is said to be the least predictable of the decision makers in the legal system.”).
See, e.g., Dru Stevenson, The Function of Uncertainty Within Jury Systems, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV.
513, 513 (2012) (“Indeed, current jury selection methods all but guarantee that jury trial outcomes are
uncertain and unpredictable.”); Byron G. Stier, Another Jackpot (In)justice: Verdict Variability and
Issue Preclusion in Mass Torts, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 715, 720 (2009) (“Evidence of variability conforms to
lawyers’ long-held beliefs about the unpredictability of trial. Juries may well deliver verdicts that
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adjudicative uncertainty increases litigation.392 Therefore, the uncertainty
contextualism creates at the ambiguity stage and through the greater
number of trials increases the likelihood that parties will file a lawsuit.393 In
addition, because uncertainty reduces the probability of settlement,
contextualism tends to lengthen any interpretation litigation that is
commenced.394
When courts advance the claim that contextualism increases
enforcement costs, they often do so with considerable stridency and with

substantially differ, though based on identical facts.”); but see Hans & Eisenberg, supra, at 379–80
(reviewing the literature and concluding that juries are “generally predictable in the sense that we know
what particular factors will lead to plaintiff verdicts and substantial compensatory and punitive damages
awards”).
392
James M. Fischer, Discretion and Politics: Ruminations on the Recent Presidential Election
and the Role of Discretion in the Florida Presidential Election Recount, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 807, 836
n.99 (2001) (“The view that uncertainty increases litigation costs appears to be generally held.”);
Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 153, at 1148 (“A substantial literature also indicates that uncertainty
about the likely outcome of a trial will diminish the chance that the case will be settled.”); see, e.g.,
Priest & Klein, supra note 154, at 45 (“Substantial uncertainty over the outcome of individual trials, of
course, will lead in general to high rates of litigation . . . .”).
393
MITCHELL, supra note 316, at 112 (“A related problem is that litigation over terms and
obligations is actually encouraged (and hence costs incurred) by courts adopting a contextual approach,
. . . .”) (emphasis in original); LINZER, 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 310, § 25.15[A], at 190
(nothing that a “common argument against the loosening of the parol evidence rule” is that “the use of
extrinsic evidence to show ambiguity could open floodgates” to more litigation); see also BURTON,
supra note 9, § 1.1.2, at 7 (explaining that “predictability encourages performance [and] discourages
disputes . . . .”).
394
See Cohen, supra note 272, at 133 (“Alternatively, allowing contextual evidence may
undermine certainty and therefore make settlement less likely.”); see also BURTON, supra note 9,
§ 1.1.2, at 7 (explaining that “predictability . . . fosters settlement”); GOLDBERG, supra note 336, at 163
(“The role of the formal law, in this view, is to provide an anchor. If the litigation outcome is relatively
certain, it provides a clear base point for negotiating a settlement.”); Katz, supra note 357, at 531 (“To
the extent that it [textualism/formalism] conditions the outcome of litigation on publicly available
information, and reduces the variations of litigant’s expectations regarding that outcome, it probably
also encourages settlement.”).
Note that textualists abroad sometimes argue that discovery and trials last longer under
contextualism and that trials are harder to predict. See, e.g., MacLauchlan, supra note 10, at 36
(explaining that the English case adopting contextualism “was seen as a recipe for a further increase in
the already substantial cost of the discovery process and the lengths of trials”); MCMEEL, supra note
305, §§ 1.107, 1.109, 1.110 (same). That might be true under the versions of textualism used in other
countries. But as I explained previously, textualist and contextualist courts in the United States generally
concur on the evidence that may be used at trial after the court has determined that an ambiguity exists.
See supra note 298 and accompanying text. Accordingly, there generally should be no difference in the
length of discovery, the length of trials, or the predictability of trials under the two approaches. Some
scholars, however, have argued that a more limited range of evidence should be used at trial. See, e.g.,
BURTON, supra note 9, ch. 6, at 193; id. § 6.1.3.
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language that tends to conflate the various arguments just discussed. An
excellent example can be found in Trident Center v. Connecticut General
Life Ins. Co.395 There, Judge Kozinski set forth his now famous assault on
California contract interpretation doctrine.396 Taking aim at Pacific Gas &
Electric Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co.,397 the watershed
California Supreme Court decision that paved the way for modern
acceptance of the contextualist approach, he wrote the following:
Pacific Gas casts a long shadow of uncertainty over all transactions negotiated
and executed under the law of California. As this case illustrates, even when the
transaction is very sizeable, even if it involves only sophisticated parties, even if
it was negotiated with the aid of counsel, even if it results in contract language
that is devoid of ambiguity, costly and protracted litigation cannot be avoided if
one party has a strong enough motive for challenging the contract. While this
rule creates much business for lawyers and an occasional windfall to some
clients, it leads only to frustration and delay for most litigants and clogs already
overburdened courts.398

Comparable statements abound in the caselaw.399
395

Trident Center v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1988).
See Linzer, supra note 311, at 814 (referring to Judge Kozinski’s Trident opinion as
“famous”).
397
442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968).
398
Trident Center, 847 F.2d at 569.
399
Indeed, California Supreme Court Justice Stanley Mosk made essentially the same arguments
in one of the cases commonly associated with Pacific Gas that was decided later that same year:
Given two experienced businessman dealing at arm’s length, both represented by
competent counsel, it has become virtually impossible under recently evolving rules of
evidence to draft a written contract that will produce predictable results in court. The
written word, hereto for deemed immutable, is now at all times subject to alteration by
self-serving recitals based upon fading memories of antecedent events. This, I submit, is a
serious impediment to the certainty required in commercial transactions.
Delta Dynamics, Inc. v. Arioto, 446 P.2d 785, 789–90 (Cal. 1968) (Mosk, J., dissenting). Another
excellent example can be found in Steuart v. McChesney, where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court wrote
this:
Accordingly, the plain meaning approach enhances the extent to which contracts may be
relied upon by contributing to the security of belief that the final expression of consensus
ad idem will not later be construed to import a meaning other than that clearly
expressed. . . . Likewise, resort to the plain meaning of language hinders parties
dissatisfied with their agreement from creating a myth as to the true meaning of the
agreement through subsequently exposed extrinsic evidence. Absent the plain meaning
rule, nary an agreement could be conceived, which, in the event of a party’s later
disappointment with his stated bargain, would not be at risk to having its true meaning
obfuscated under the guise of examining extrinsic evidence of intent. Even if the
dissatisfied party in good faith believed that the agreement, as manifest, did not express the
396
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Not surprisingly, some advocates of contextualism counter that
textualism is the approach with higher enforcement costs. They offer
several arguments in defense of this position. First, because textualism
prohibits the review of extrinsic evidence when determining whether an
agreement is ambiguous, the principal inputs at that stage are (1) the
contract, and (2) the judge.400 But judges “come from a variety of
backgrounds—private law practice, government service, business,
academia—and their fields of experience represent an even wider
variance.”401 Such differences can lead judges to reach disparate
conclusions regarding the same contractual language. Indeed, “[a]ppellate
courts’ reviews of four corner determinations are often arbitrary and
extremely subjective.”402 Critically, the parties will not know which trial
judge is going to interpret their contract until a lawsuit is filed. Nor will
they know which appellate judges are going to be assigned to the case if the
dispute reaches a higher court.403 This makes it immensely difficult for
parties to predict the results of ambiguity decisions in textualist
jurisdictions.404 Such uncertainty increases the number of lawsuits and
hinders settlements.405

consensus ad idem, his post hoc judgment would be inclined to be colored by belief as to
what should have been, rather than what strictly was, intended.
444 A.2d 659, 663 (Pa. 1982) (citations omitted).
400
See supra notes 285–88 and accompanying text. Other textualist inputs include dictionaries,
the rules of grammar, the canons of construction, and any arguments made by the parties. See supra note
286.
401
Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit, 619 F.2d 1001, 1011–12 n.12 (3d Cir. 1980).
402
LINZER, 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 310, § 25.14[B], at 163.
403
See Burton, supra note 10, at 357.
404
See LINZER, 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 310, § 25.14[B], at 163 (explaining that “it
is difficult to predict how the appellate courts will read words claimed to be ambiguous” in textualist
states). See also Mellon Bank, 619 F.2d at 1010 (“If each judge simply applied his own linguistic
background and experience to the words of a contract, contracting parties would live in a most uncertain
environment.”); Burton, supra note 10, at 353 (“So, because the parties will not know who the judge
will be if litigation ensues, OCI [Objective Contextual Interpretation] better contains pre-litigation costs.
OCI better enables the parties to forecast an adjudicatory result when they draft a contract, consider
whether to perform or breach, decide whether to challenge the other party’s performance, attempt to
settle a dispute, and plan for litigation.”).
405
Burton, supra note 10, at 357 (“Due to the uncertainties [regarding which judge the parties
will appear before], moreover, both trial and appellate proceedings would proliferate, the latter because
appellate judges will have different backgrounds from both the trial judges and from one another.”); id.
at 353 (quoted in footnote 404, supra).
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Second, in many cases, extrinsic evidence can show that a contract that
appears ambiguous on its face is actually perfectly clear. “[M]ost words
have several meanings in the abstract (acontextually). With a little context,
we may know easily which meaning is apt.”406 As a result, contextualism
may well decrease the number of lawsuits in which the court finds the
contract to be ambiguous, reducing the length of these actions and
promoting greater certainty.407
Third, under textualism, parties have an incentive to write longer and
more complete contracts.408 Since the court will not consider anything but
the text of the agreement during the first stage of the interpretive process,
any understanding of the parties not expressly reduced to writing will be
inoperative when their contract is facially unambiguous. The parties cannot
rely upon extrinsic evidence, such as usages of trade, to explain,
supplement, or qualify the contractual terms. But longer written contracts
are more complex. And “[g]reater complexity can in fact lead to more
litigation, as the chance that terms will conflict or support alternative
conduct increases,”409 making a finding of ambiguity more likely.
I will add a fourth contextualist argument of my own. In my
experience, the average person, whether a consumer or in business, is
angered or even outraged when a counter-party insists on the strict
application of unambiguous contractual language that appears to conflict
with the prior contextual understanding of the parties. This is especially true
when the counter-party stated during preliminary negotiations that the
relevant language was of no consequence or would not be relied upon
should conditions change or a dispute arise. Such conduct may infuriate a
406

See BURTON, supra note 9, § 6.1.2.2, at 210.
See Posner, supra note 312, at 562 (“Courts that support soft-PER argue that soft-PER
increases commercial certainty by allowing judges and juries to consider all relevant evidence.”);
LINZER, 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 310, § 25.14[B], at 163 (“Given the arbitrariness of the
decisions [in Texas], the courts would have been better off making them with the additional information
offered by the rejected extrinsic evidence.”); MacLauchlan, supra note 10, at 35 (explaining that
allowing the admission of prior negotiations could reduce interpretive uncertainty since it will
sometimes reveal “that the parties formed a common intention as to the meaning of the words in
dispute”).
408
See Cohen, supra note 272, at 134.
409
Id. For an excellent example, see Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Dupree, 745 N.E.2d 1270, 1281
(Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (settlement agreement contained both a general release extinguishing claims against
numerous third-party beneficiaries and a clause stating that the contract was not intended to provide
contractual rights to any third-party beneficiaries).
407
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consumer or business sufficiently to motivate them to sue, or to resist to the
point that the other side is compelled to file an action. If textualism
incentivizes parties to stand on language that is inconsistent with the other
side’s reasonable expectations more than contextualism410—if textualism
promotes behavior that increases the likelihood that contractual partners
will become frustrated and accept going to court—then this may be another
pathway through which textualism increases litigation.411
4. Other Policy Arguments
Scholars have offered a number of policy arguments regarding contract
interpretation that do not fit squarely into the accuracy/transaction
costs/enforcement costs framework set forth above. This subpart briefly
discusses the most important of those arguments.
Textualism is frequently defended on the ground that businesses prefer
that method of construction.412 This view finds support in the work of Lisa

410
Mitchell explains that textualism is subject to this type of abuse: “[A] party may strategically
seek an advantage by relying on the strict words of a contract while knowing that the documents did not
reflect the parties’ joint understanding . . . .” MITCHELL, supra note 316, at 113.
411
One final note is in order. As Parts IV.B.1. and IV.B.3 demonstrate, both sides in the debate
tend to claim superiority on accuracy and enforcement costs. However, many commentators
conceptualize the choice between the two interpretive approaches as one involving trade-offs. These
scholars are willing to concede that the other side has the better argument on at least one of the three,
key issues; but they contend that their own side is still superior because it is much stronger on the
remaining dimension(s). For example, as explained in Part IV.B.2., textualists generally acknowledge
that contextualism lowers transaction costs; but they believe that it raises enforcement costs by a higher
amount. See also Cohen, supra note 272, at 133 (observing that a “number of scholars have argued that
the optimal contract rules of interpretation and implied terms are determined by the tradeoff between ex
ante negotiation and drafting costs and ex post litigation costs”); supra note 328 (setting forth several
secondary sources that use the trade-off framework). Similarly, some textualists concede that
contextualist interpretation is superior on the issue of accuracy, but that such accuracy is not worth the
increased enforcement costs. See, e.g., Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9, at 933 (“Moreover, we concede
that a court is more likely to make an accurate interpretation if it sees more evidence, but we argue that
sometimes accuracy is not worth the costs of achieving it.”); compare LINZER, supra note 310, § 25.4, at
39 (conceding that textualism lowers enforcement costs, but arguing that contextualism’s greater
accuracy is worth the price).
412
STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 276 (2004) (explaining that textualism is grounded
on the assumption that those drafting the contract intended that the terms “be read narrowly and
literally”; “[t]he context of commercial drafting, in other words, is one that asks the reader to ignore the
context outside of the physical document”); see, e.g., Spigelman, supra note 328, at 429 (“Nevertheless,
the idea that an arbitrator or a judge would be called upon to determine the true intention of the parties
by going beyond the written contract to encompass anything which disputing parties can relevantly
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Bernstein. Bernstein surveyed the contract interpretation practices of
merchant courts in the private legal systems of the grain and feed industry
and the cotton industry. She found that the tribunals in both industries use
interpretive methods that are substantially textualist in nature.413 This
supports the conclusion that businesses favor textualism.414 A common
explanation for this preference is that merchants prefer the certainty of
transaction costs to the uncertainty of enforcement costs.415 Alternatively,
Bernstein hypothesizes that businesses “do not necessarily want the
relationship-preserving norms they follow in performing contracts to be
used by third-party neutrals to decide cases when they are in an end-game

imagine, would be regarded by most parties, at the time of formation of the contract, to constitute a
commercial disaster.”); id. at 412 (“In this paper, I will be concerned with contracts between
commercial parties—not with consumers.”); see also Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9, at 932 (“[B]oth
the available evidence and prevailing judicial practice support the claim that sophisticated parties prefer
textualist interpretation.”).
413
See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1769–70 (1996) [hereinafter Bernstein, Merchant
Law] (finding that National Grain and Feed Association arbitrators, “despite their industry expertise,
take a formalist approach to adjudication”; these arbitrators are “reluctant to look to” course of
performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade in construing agreements and “do not permit these
considerations to vary either trade rules or written contract provisions”); Lisa Bernstein, Private
Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation through Rules, Norms and Institutions,
99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1735 (2001) [hereinafter Bernstein, Private Commercial Law] (“[D]espite the
fact that cotton arbitrators are chosen for their industry expertise, they use a relatively formalistic
adjudicative approach that gives little explicit weight to elements of the contracting context.”); id. at
1735–36 (noting (1) that cotton trade rules do not make course of performance, course of dealing, and
usage of trade relevant to the interpretation of contracts, (2) that cotton arbitrators “are reluctant to take
[course of performance and course of dealing] into account,” and (3) that “references to custom or usage
in [cotton arbitration] opinions are extraordinarily rare”); see also Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable
Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 713–17, 751–53 (1999)
[hereinafter Bernstein, Questionable Empirical Basis] (concluding, based on an empirical study of the
hay, grain and feed, textiles, and silk industries, that usages of trade rarely exist in the form
contemplated by the Uniform Commercial Code).
414
See MITCHELL, supra note 316, at 103 (explaining that Bernstein’s studies “suggest that some
contractors, in some circumstances, prefer a more formalist approach to be taken”); Geoffrey P. Miller,
Bargains Bicoastal: New Light on Contract Theory, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1477 (2010)
(“Bernstein’s work suggests that industry actors, when given the freedom to devise their own
procedures, opt for a system of rules much like that predicted in Schwartz and Scott’s [formalist]
theory.”).
415
See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 272, at 134 (“Judge Posner posits that the four corners rule is
based on the assumption that parties prefer ex ante contracting to the expense and uncertainty of a jury
trial.”) (citing Posner, supra note 195, at 1602–03); MITCHELL, supra note 316, at 91 (“Given this
uncertainty [caused by contextualism], the possibility presents itself that some parties may prefer a more
formal interpretative method[.]”).
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situation.”416 They favor a system that permits them to deploy contextualist
methodologies when negotiating informally with a counterparty “while at
the same time retaining their right to insist on strict adherence to the terms
of their written contract if their relationship breaks down.”417 If textualism
is in fact preferred by merchants, then there is good reason to believe that it
maximizes the value of commercial agreements since businesses are in the
best position to determine the optimal trade-off of accuracy, transaction
costs, and enforcement costs in their dealings.418
Contextualism is also defended on the ground that contracting parties
favor that approach. Indeed, the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code
justified the statute’s highly contextualist interpretive rules, in part, on the
belief that merchants intend and understand trade usage and other aspects of
the commercial context to be essential components of business
agreements.419 And subsequent commentators, particularly those from the

416
Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 413, at 1770; see also id. at 1770–71, 1796–1820
(elaborating on this argument).
417
Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, supra note 413, at 1780–81. See also Theodore Eisenberg
& Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of
Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1475–77, 1490,
1504 (2009) (empirical study of choice-of-law and choice-of-forum provisions in 2,882 contracts
reflecting major transactions and attached as exhibits to SEC filings; far more contracts opted for New
York law or a New York forum than for California law or a California forum); Miller, supra note 414, at
1477–79 (2010) (concluding, based on the study described in the prior parenthetical, that “the verdict of
thousands of sophisticated parties whose incentives are to maximize the value of contract terms . . . is
that New York’s formalist rules win out over California’s contextualist approach”). Eisenberg and
Miller’s work has been cited for the proposition that businesses favor textualist interpretation. See
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9, at 956–57. But Miller’s article identified roughly seventeen doctrinal
differences between New York and California, only one of which was contract interpretation. See
Miller, supra, at 1481–1522. Thus, it is far from clear that differences in interpretive regimes played an
important role in the choice of law and forum decision-making that Eisenberg and Miller studied. See
also Burton, supra note 10, at 348–49 n.64 (essentially identifying the same problem with relying upon
Eisenberg and Miller’s study to defend the claim that firms prefer textualism).
418
See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9, at 930 (explaining, in a closely related context, that
“parties are better informed than courts about benefits and costs, so parties commonly have a
comparative advantage over courts in making the required tradeoffs”).
419
See LARRY A. DIMATTEO ET AL., VISIONS OF CONTRACT THEORY: RATIONALITY,
BARGAINING, AND INTERPRETATION 160 (2007); Bernstein, Questionable Empirical Basis, supra note
413, at 746–47. Note that Bernstein’s empirical studies are directed at challenging the approach of the
Uniform Commercial Code, see, e.g., Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 413, at 1766, including the
Code’s assumption about the preferences of merchants, see, e.g., Bernstein, Questionable Empirical
Basis, supra, at 751–52.
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relational contracting school of thought, have endorsed a similar view.420
One possible explanation for such a preference is that parties would rather
reduce transaction costs than enforcement costs. That is because transaction
costs are incurred with certainty and in the present while enforcement costs
are incurred rarely and well into the future.421 Note also that scholars have
challenged the claim that Bernstein’s work supports the conclusion that
businesses prefer textualism. For example, her findings might be explained
by the fact that the arbitrators serving on commercial tribunals have
extensive industry experience and thus understand the relevant customs and
usages. As a result, submitting additional contextual evidence in cases
before these courts will not sufficiently reduce the risk of an interpretive
error to justify the increased enforcement costs. But generalist judges and
juries lack the commercial background of industry experts. Accordingly,
the fact that firms prefer textualist interpretation when appearing before
private commercial tribunals does not entail that they would have the same
preference in a lawsuit heard in state or federal court where the accuracyenhancing effects of extrinsic evidence might be worth the added cost.422
A third possibility is that the interpretive preferences of contracting
parties are heterogeneous.423 For example, some commentators have
hypothesized that risk-averse parties favor contextualism while risk-neutral
parties prefer textualism.424
The possibility of diverse preferences raises another issue. Much of the
interpretation debate presumes that one school of thought is inherently

420
See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, Regulating Contracts by Hugh Collins, 27 J.L. & SOC’Y 338, 343
(2000) (summarizing the relational contracting theory of Ian Macneil).
421
MITCHELL, supra note 316, at 109–10 (citing Schwartz & Scott, supra note 338, at 585).
422
Katz, supra note 357, at 526–27; see also Burton, supra note 10, at 348 n.64 (contending that
Bernstein’s studies “cannot be easily generalized” beyond the specific industries addressed in her work).
Bernstein recognizes the possibility raised by Katz. See Bernstein, Private Commercial Law, supra note
413, at 1735 n.57 (“Given the expertise of these arbitrators, however, these considerations [namely, the
commercial context] may enter the moving papers and/or influence the arbitrators’ decision-making
processes in ways too subtle to detect.”); see also Bernstein, Questionable Empirical Basis, supra note
413, at 716 n.18 (“The opinions produced by merchant tribunals reveal that arbitrators’ background
knowledge of the trade may enable them to better assess the credibility of testimony and may give them
a better understanding of the types of evidence that ought to be submitted.”).
423
See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9, at 930 (“[P]arty preferences over interpretive rules are
heterogeneous.”).
424
See Cohen, supra note 272, at 143 (discussing such theories).
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superior.425 But perhaps the optimal interpretive regime varies based on the
circumstances, such as the type of contract and the identity of the parties.
This view is increasingly popular in the literature.426 For example, some
courts and scholars believe that textualism should be used to construe
agreements between businesses, while contextualism is the best approach
for contracts involving consumers.427 Others have developed sophisticated
models to explain when each interpretive approach is likely to be
superior.428
The last argument worth discussing here is the contention that
contracting parties should be entitled to choose which interpretive rules
govern their agreement. In other words, contract interpretation doctrine
should consist of default rules, like the bulk of the rest of contract law,
rather than mandatory rules.429 This position has strong support among
academic commentators. Indeed, it is apparently endorsed by most
economists who have studied the subject.430 Perhaps the leading advocates
of this view in the legal academy are Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott. Their

425
Adam B. Badawi, Interpretive Preferences and the Limits of the New Formalism, 6 BERKELEY
BUS. L.J. 1, 4 (2009).
426
See, e.g., id. at 5 (“This article argues that the desirability of an interpretive regime depends, at
least to some degree, on the attributes of the underlying transactions and not solely on the independent
merits of formal or contextual interpretation.”); Katz, supra note 357, at 538 (explaining that this essay
presents a “basic framework” for determining “in which contexts and for which parties formalism is
most useful and in which contexts and for which parties a substantive approach is most useful”);
Kostritsky, supra note 317, at 44 (“This article argues that it is wrong to think that courts must make a
dichotomous choice always to prefer extrinsic evidence or always to exclude it. Sometimes the
appropriate interpretive methodology should explicitly forego extrinsic evidence while at other times it
should embrace extrinsic evidence.”).
427
Katz, supra note 357, at 538; see also Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra note 413, at 1820–21 &
n.168 (acknowledging that the case for contextualist interpretation is “far stronger in merchant-toconsumer transactions” than in merchant-to-merchant transactions).
428
See supra note 426; see also Hermalin et al., supra note 9, at 90–91 (setting forth “some
general rules of thumb” that identify the circumstances in which textualist interpretation is more
efficient than contextualist interpretation, and vice versa) (“It follows from these heuristic principles that
substantive interpretation is relatively more valuable to small and infrequent traders . . . [while] large
and experienced traders should prefer their contracts to be governed by relatively formalistic rules of
interpretation.”).
429
“Default rules are rules that parties can contract around, whereas mandatory rules apply
regardless of the parties’ intentions.” Cohen, supra note 272, at 135.
430
See id. (also summarizing the general case for default rather than mandatory terms). But cf.
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9, at 939 (“Just about everyone who creates, applies, or analyzes the
interpretive rules believes that they should be mandatory.”) (probably referring to people working in the
legal field rather than economists).
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argument that contracts between businesses431 should be governed by
default interpretation rules goes as follows. First, contracting parties wish to
maximize the gains from trade and courts should embrace this goal in
construing commercial agreements.432 Second, private parties are better
than judges at identifying efficient interpretive rules for their contractual
relationships because they possess more information about transaction
costs, enforcement costs, and the benefits of accurate interpretations.433
Third, “party preferences over interpretive rules are heterogeneous”
because the optimal trade-off of costs and benefits varies from contract to
contract.434 Given these three points, a court should defer to the parties’
choice of interpretive rules “just as it defers . . . to party preferences over a
contract’s substantive terms.”435 In other words, when an agreement sets
forth the interpretive approach that the parties wish the court to use in
construing the agreement’s substantive provisions, the court should follow
that instruction.436
5. The Need for Empirical Evidence
Most of the issues discussed in the prior four subparts raise questions
of empirical fact that can only be answered with empirical evidence. The
431
Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9, at 939 n.36 (“Recall that our theory holds only for the
interpretation of contracts between business firms.”).
432
Id. at 930.
433
Id. at 942, 944.
434
Id. at 930.
435
Id. at 930–31.
436
Id. at 942; see also id. at 943 (“Goal neutrality gives the parties control over the substantive
terms of the contract. It takes an argument to reject the obvious implication that the parties should also
have control over the rules that determine how those terms are identified and understood. . . .
Sophisticated parties now can waive the right to a jury trial, or even the right to a trial in court, so they
seemingly also should be able to waive the protection of exhaustive interpretive hearings.”). Schwartz
and Scott further argue that the default interpretation rules ought to be textualist in nature because the
majority of businesses favor that interpretive approach. Id. at 931, 940, 944–47, 955–57. For other
sources arguing that contract interpretation doctrine should consist of default rules, see Bernstein,
Merchant Law, supra note 413, at 1820–21 (contending that the Uniform Commercial Code should be
amended to allow merchants to opt-out of either all or some of the Uniform Commercial Code’s
contextualist provisions); Hermalin et al., supra note 9, at 90 (explaining that in the absence of certain
special assumptions, and given that “it is difficult to draw strong general conclusions regarding how
interpretation should proceed” because of the numerous ways that an interpretive regime can influence
the parties, “perhaps the best that can be said is that private parties should be allowed the leeway to
choose their favored interpretative regime—a leeway not always recognized by the legal system. . . .”).
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bulk of the interpretation policy debate focuses on interpretive accuracy,
transaction costs, and enforcement costs. Identifying which approach is
most successful across these dimensions cannot be done in the abstract.437
But there are virtually no scholarly sources (or judicial opinions) that even
purport to present systematic evidence on these questions.438 Of course,
many of the theoretical, conceptual, and doctrinal arguments articulated in
the caselaw and secondary literature are sophisticated and reasonably
persuasive. But without quantitative empirical evidence and statistical
analysis to support them, too many of these arguments merely constitute
well-informed speculation. One goal of this article is to add to the small
number of pieces, such as Lisa Bernstein’s, that marshal genuine empirical
evidence on fundamental questions of contract interpretation.
V. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF THE IMPACT OF THE TEXTUALIST AND
CONTEXTUALIST APPROACHES ON ENFORCEMENT COSTS
A. Study Outline
Recall the policy issue my study is designed to address.439 Textualists
contend that enforcement costs are lower under their approach to contract
interpretation than under contextualism. Contextualists disagree. In fact,
they argue that their system best minimizes litigation expenses. There are

437
See Cohen, supra note 272, at 148 (“The real question is which methodology has the lowest
error rate and at what cost. It is hard to answer that question in the abstract.”); MITCHELL, supra note
316, at 102 (explaining that “commentators on formalism have recognised that neoformalism must be
justified on the basis of empirical evidence”); id. at 114 (“Whether formalist or nonformalist judges will
produce more errors depends on empirical evidence.”).
438
See MITCHELL, supra note 316, at 102 (noting that neoformalists/textualists “have not
necessarily been concerned with providing [empirical] evidence” to support their claims”) (“One
exception to this is Lisa Bernstein . . . . Other, law and economics, scholars have relied on ‘rational
behavior models’ to make their point.”). As Mitchell observes, Lisa Bernstein’s empirical studies of
adjudication practices in private, commercial courts, discussed supra at notes 413–17 and accompanying
text, are a notable exception. See also Lawrence Solan et al., False Consensus Bias in Contract
Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1268 (2008) (reporting the results of experimental studies
conducted with both judges and laypeople regarding their interpretation of insurance contracts). For an
example of an author writing on interpretation who properly acknowledges the weaknesses of his
evidence, see Spigelman, supra note 328, at 429–30 (contending that businesses prefer textualist
interpretation but noting that this claim is based on the author’s “own, necessarily limited experience”
and that the author “knows of no empirical research” that supports the belief).
439
See supra text accompanying note 15; Part IV.B.3.
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two basic components to enforcement costs—(1) the number of lawsuits
filed, and (2) how long those lawsuits last. Each side maintains that it is
superior on both elements; each asserts that fewer actions are commenced
and that those actions end more quickly under its approach, reducing total
enforcement costs.
Accordingly, there are actually two hypotheses that merit testing
empirically rather than one: the textualist hypothesis and the contextualist
counter-hypothesis. For each, the causal or independent variable is the
school of interpretation employed by the courts and the dependent variables
are the quantity of lawsuits filed and the length of those actions.440 The null
hypothesis is that there is no difference between textualism and
contextualism in their impacts on the number of contract interpretation
lawsuits commenced and how long those cases last.
In a world of unlimited resources, I might test the two hypotheses
through a comprehensive review of court files from contracts actions
commenced across the country in both contextualist and textualist
jurisdictions. Using such a method, I could directly measure the number of
interpretation cases brought and the length of those actions. And I could
attempt to control for variables such as contract complexity, the nature of
the parties, and many of the important differences between states. But this
is not a world of unlimited resources. And so I chose to use reported
judicial opinions with certain key number classifications (the sample), from
which I drew inferences about contract interpretation cases generally (the
population).441

440
See generally Epstein & King, supra note 7, at 35 (“All of these questions ask whether a
particular ‘event’—the presence or absence of which we refer to as the key causal variable . . . caused a
particular ‘outcome, or dependent variable . . . .”).
441
See generally id. at 31 (“It is up to the researchers, not the readers, to specify the target of their
inference. Should that target be elusive or unclear to the investigators, what they might do is imagine
how they would proceed with an unlimited budget and no limits on the amounts of time and effort they
could expend.”); id. at 99–100 (“When we collect data to make inferences, a critical step is to identify
the target population (or ‘population of interest’). This is all subjects, cases, countries, or other units in a
specified time frame about which the researcher would collect information if time and resources were
unconstrained.”) (emphasis removed).
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B. Study Methodology, Raw Totals, and Statistical Analysis
To conduct the study, I began by identifying ten states where the
caselaw appeared sufficiently clear to support including the jurisdiction
rather firmly in either the textualist or contextualist camp. I sought five
states for each category. And the ultimate classifications were based upon
my own review of the doctrine in each jurisdiction.442
I also placed two additional restrictions on the selection of territories.
First, each state needed to have an intermediate appellate court.443 Second,
the two groups of states had to be of roughly comparable size in terms of
population. The ten jurisdictions I settled on, with the population ranks set
forth in parentheses, are listed in Table 2.444
Table 2. States Included in the Study
Textualist
Contextualist
Indiana (16)
Arizona (15)
Minnesota (21)
California (1)
Missouri (18)
Colorado (22)
New York (3)
New Jersey (11)
Texas (2)
Washington (13)
I turned next to which key numbers should be used in my Westlaw
searches. There are thirty-five topics that fall under the general category of
“Contracts,”445 and many of these topics contain key numbers that relate to
interpretation. Examples include Sales, Insurance, Compromise and
Settlement, and Release.446 In addition, numerous topics classified under

442
The research supporting the textualist and contextualist classifications is on file with the
author and will not be detailed here.
443
In conducting a key number study, one might focus solely on intermediate appellate courts.
The advantage of such a design is that most appeals to these courts are of right whereas state supreme
court jurisdiction is generally discretionary. Thus, focusing on intermediate appellate courts would
eliminate at least one variable: differences in case selection by state high courts. However, there is an
important weakness: typically, all state supreme court decisions are published while most intermediate
appellate court rulings are not. See supra notes 155–58 and accompanying text. Which problem is more
important—high court discretionary jurisdiction or intermediate court publication limitations—is
unknown and may vary from project to project.
444
See List of state and U.S. territories by population, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
List_of_U.S._states_and_territories_by_population (last visited Nov. 15, 2014).
445
WEST’S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 69, at XI.
446
Id. at 301, 978–79, 1484, 1499–1500.
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the other categories—Persons, Property, Torts, Remedies, and
Government—implicate contracts.447 To illustrate, issues relating to
damages for breach of contract are coded almost exclusively under the
Damages topic, which is contained in the Remedies category.448 Principally
because this was my first attempt at using the Key Number System as a
coding device, I decided to focus on the core key numbers relating to
contracts, contract interpretation, and the parol evidence rule, rather than
construct a dataset using all potentially relevant key numbers.449
The label “Contracts” is used both for the third general digest category
and for a distinct digest topic—“95. Contracts.”450 I concentrated on that
topic and on “157. Evidence,” which falls under the Remedies category,451
since one section of the Evidence key numbers concerns both the parol
evidence rule and the use of extrinsic evidence in the construction of
contracts and other writings.452 I incorporated the key numbers that govern
the parol evidence rule because of that rule’s extremely close relationship to
contract interpretation. All other digest topics were excluded from the
study.453
447

See generally id. at IX to XIV.
Id. at XII & 558–66.
449
Another reason I settled on a narrower approach is that a broader study involves additional
technical and methodological issues that I have not yet resolved. For example, the character limitation
on Westlaw searches might make it impossible to run the queries necessary to conduct a truly
comprehensive key number study of contract interpretation using all of the pertinent digest topics. See
supra notes 268–69 and accompanying text (discussing the character limit governing Westlaw
searches). I spent some time working with West reference attorneys to solve this problem, but we were
unable to find an answer. However, I have not finished investigating the issue. If I am able to resolve the
problem—and a few others—I plan to conduct a broader study and publish (1) the substantive results,
(2) the solution to the technical problem created by the character limitation, and (3) the solutions to
various other difficulties that may arise with more comprehensive key number projects.
450
Id. at XI & 370–81.
451
Id. at XII, XVI.
452
Id. at 706–10 (“XI. Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting Writings.”).
453
A brief note is in order regarding the key numbers that concern Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (topic 343—“Sales”), a statute that is at the center of contract law. Article 2 embraces
contextualist interpretation. See U.C.C. § 1-303(d); id. § 2-202 & cmt. 1(c). Thus, courts in every state
should use contextualism when construing agreements governed by the Code. If the courts are
complying with the law, then cases tagged with Sales key numbers are irrelevant to my study because
there are no measurable legal differences between the states when it comes to contracts for the sale of
goods. Now, at least one respected source contends that judges frequently ignore the dictates of Article 2
and use a form of textualism, requiring a finding of facial ambiguity before admitting extrinsic evidence
for interpretive purposes. See WHITE ET AL., supra note 316, § 3:14, at 221–22. But this was not enough
to persuade me that Sales key numbers ought to be included in the study. For a discussion of a type of
448

Vol. 34, No. 2 (2016) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2016.103 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu

288

JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE

[Vol. 34:203

I then analyzed the various interpretation and parol evidence rule key
numbers under topics 95 (Contracts) and 157 (Evidence). This involved
running more than one hundred searches in the ALLCASES database on
Westlaw to identify precisely which key numbers should be used in my
ultimate queries.454 To illustrate, these searches lead to the exclusion of the
key number that deals primarily with the duty of good faith,455 which is
generally considered a separate topic from interpretation and the parol
evidence rule.
Next, I organized the selected key numbers into three groups:
(1) contract interpretation key numbers from the Contracts digest topic,
(2) contract interpretation key numbers from the Evidence digest topic, and
(3) parol evidence rule key numbers from the Evidence topic. Using these
groups, I constructed three search queries for each state. The first query
contained only the key numbers in group (1). The second contained the key
numbers in groups (1) and (2). And the third contained the key numbers in
all three groups—(1), (2), and (3). The three queries were run in both the
relevant state database and the relevant mixed state/federal database, so
there were actually six searches in total for each jurisdiction. I included the
mixed state/federal databases in the study because many cases applying
state contract law are litigated in federal court under diversity
jurisdiction.456 The results of the six searches served as proxies for the level
of contract interpretation litigation in each state during the relevant time
period.457

project where Sales key numbers would have a role to play, see infra notes 514–17 and accompanying
text. Note also that based on several tests I ran, cases applying the U.C.C. rather than the common law
probably did not create any bias in the dataset I created employing only the Contracts and Evidence key
numbers.
454
Such a search would now be run on WestlawNext with “All States” and “All Federal” selected
in the dropdown menu next to the search box on the home page.
455
95k168. “Terms implied as part of contract.”
456
To limit the cases to the appropriate jurisdiction in the mixed state/federal databases,
additional limiting search language was necessary. The precise searches I used are set forth in Appendix
1. Note also that the dataset that includes federal decisions is arguably superior because it includes a
much higher number of trial court opinions. However, because the federal trial court opinions included
in the digest are such a small percentage of the total number of trial court orders and lawsuits, see supra
notes 152–53 and accompanying text, the inclusion of federal trial court decisions might do more to
skew the sample set than improve it.
457
After I began work on this article, Westlaw was replaced by WestlawNext. However, I reran
all of my searches in WestlawNext, and the raw number of cases recovered by each search changed by,
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At this stage, there was still one piece missing. I could not simply
compare the search results from the textualist states to those from the
contextualist states. That is because there are far too many differences
between the ten jurisdictions included in my study to make such a
comparison fruitful—differences in population, business activity, the
number of contracts executed per person, litigation culture, rules of
procedures, opinion publishing practices,458 and countless others.459 And
using states with comparable populations and intermediate appellate
courts460 barely scratches the surface of what would be necessary to account
for these variations. Therefore, I needed to add something to the study that
attempts to control for the differences among my ten states.461
The control I decided to employ was a search in every relevant
Westlaw database for all cases that use any key number from the Contracts
digest topic (again, topic 95). This search served as a proxy for the total
level of contract litigation in each state during the time period of the study.
With the addition of this query, I could compare the cases coded for
contract interpretation to the cases coded as contract disputes generally. If
textualism and contextualism—in relation to each other—do not impact
how many lawsuits are filed or how long those lawsuits last, then one might
reasonably expect the ratio of contract interpretation cases to general
contract cases to be roughly the same in textualist and contextualist states.
Put another way, if the ratio of cases returned by my three queries to the

at most, a trivial amount. For example, all of the New York searches for state court cases returned
identical results in Westlaw and WestlawNext. And the New York searches for state and federal cases in
WestlawNext returned one additional case for queries one, two, and three, and six additional cases for
the control query (discussed in the next two paragraphs). Likewise, every Texas search was either
identical in Westlaw and WestlawNext or differed by a single case.
458
For example, opinions from trial courts in New York (a textualist state) and New Jersey (a
contextualist state) are reported sufficiently often to warrant citation rules for that type of case. See THE
BLUEBOOK, supra note 151, at 277, 280. The other eight states in my dataset do not publish enough trial
court decisions to justify such rules. See id. at 250, 252, 254, 263, 272, 274, 295, 300.
459
See Korobkin, supra note 4, at 1063 (“Studying the effects on contracting behavior of specific
contract rules by comparing across jurisdictions or time periods raises a number of methodological
problems, most prominent among them how to account for the many other known and unknown
variables, besides the differences in contract law, that could also account for differences in observed
behavior.”); see also Epstein & King, supra note 7, at 44 (“The fact is that even the best empirical
research can be inadvertently affected by hundreds of confounding factors.”).
460
See supra notes 443–44 and accompanying text.
461
See Epstein & King, supra note 7, at 78 (identifying the types of confounding variables that
researchers should attempt to control for).
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cases returned by the control search is constant for textualist and
contextualist states, then the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.
Alternatively, if the fraction of contracts cases that are interpretation cases
is higher in contextualist jurisdictions by a statistically significant amount,
this suggests that (i) parties file more interpretation lawsuits in contextualist
states, (ii) the interpretation lawsuits in those states last longer, as
demonstrated by the fact that more reach the appellate level or otherwise
result in a reported decision,462 or (iii) some combination of the two. And
the reverse is true if the fraction is higher in textualist states by a
statistically significant level.463
I chose cases classified with a key number from topic 95 as the control
for three reasons. First, I wanted the study to rely as much as possible on
key number searches. Second, a control that focuses on reported decisions
reduces the likelihood that any differences in opinion publishing practices
across states will bias my results. That is because such differences should
apply equally to contract interpretation cases and general contract cases.464
Third, numerous other factors that vary among the states in my study—such
as population, contracts executed per person, and rules of procedure—
probably impact the levels of contract interpretation litigation and general
contract litigation in many of the same ways. Thus, comparing
interpretation cases specifically to contract cases generally should control
for a large number of differences between the relevant states.465 Of course,
the control is far from perfect (as discussed more in the next subpart).466

462
Recall that most reported cases with key numbers are appellate cases. See supra note 150 and
accompanying text.
463
Of course, all of this assumes that reported decisions with key numbers are representative of
litigation generally. That is likely not the case as explained previously. See supra notes 168–205 and
accompanying test; see also infra note 484 (addressing the application of inferential statistics to a nonrandom sample).
464
The first two reasons together explain why I did not compare reported decisions tagged with
interpretation key numbers in a given state to all civil filings in that state classified as contract disputes
by the local administrative office of the courts (assuming such information is available in every relevant
territory).
465
Comparing contract interpretation litigation directly to measures like population, contracts
executed per person, state gross domestic product, total civil filings, or even an index of these types of
factors, will likely control for far fewer differences across states. With that said, such comparisons may
provide helpful information and thus might be worth pursuing in future work.
466
See infra notes 498–503 and accompanying text.
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Nonetheless, I think it is the best candidate given the purposes of this
project.
Note also that in measuring the impacts of the two interpretive
approaches, my study protocol does not distinguish between the two aspects
of enforcement costs—the number of lawsuits filed and how long those
lawsuits last. As explained above, any causal effect that is suggested by an
analysis of my key number searches could flow from a change to either
parameter or a combination of the two.467 However, this is not a problem.
The debate between textualists and contextualists is focused on overall
enforcement costs. Accordingly, any results that bear upon that issue are
valuable even if the precise mechanism through which interpretive
approach increases enforcement costs is unidentifiable.
Five additional concerns regarding my study methodology are worth
discussing. First, recall the problem of “under-coding” explained previously
in the section regarding the advantages and disadvantages of using key
numbers in empirical research.468 To recap, there is significant overlap
among many of the digest topics and subtopics. As a result, headnotes that
could have been classified under a given topic are frequently classified
instead under a different, related topic. This raises an issue for my study
because I used only (1) the interpretation key numbers in topics 95
(Contracts) and 157 (Evidence) to gather interpretation decisions, and
(2) topic 95 to gather contract decisions. Accordingly, I excluded numerous
cases that involve interpretation specifically or contracts generally. For
example, during the time period of my study, state courts in the ten relevant
jurisdictions issued 823 opinions that are coded with contract interpretation
key numbers from the Insurance topic, but that contain none of the
Contracts and Evidence key numbers I used to collect interpretation
decisions.469
467
See supra text accompanying notes 462–63. To repeat, if the ratio of interpretation cases to
general contract cases recovered by my searches is higher in one set of states, this suggests that (i) more
interpretation actions are commenced in that set of jurisdictions, (ii) interpretation lawsuits last longer in
that set, or (iii) a combination of each.
468
See supra notes 246–52 and accompanying text.
469
To see this, run the following search on Westlaw for all state cases: co(in) co(mn) co(mo)
co(ny) co(tx) co(az) co(ca) co(co) co(nj) co(wa) & 217XIII(G) & DA(aft 12/31/1999) & DA(bef
01/01/2010) % (157XI(D) (95k143 95k143.5 95k147 95k148 95k149 95k150 95k151 95k160 95k161
95k162 95k163 95k164 95k165 95k166 95k167 95k169 95k170 95k171 95k172 95k173 95k174
95k175 95k176) (157XI(A) 157k439 157k440 157k441 157k442 157k443 157k444)).
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It is unclear how under-coding impacted my findings. Indeed,
determining the effect would probably require running a full study using
more of the relevant key numbers.470 For now, the important point is this: It
is possible that a methodology employing a larger group of key numbers
would lead to a different result.471
Second, my key number searches retrieved cases for the specific
interpretation datasets that do not actually concern contract interpretation.
The searches were over-inclusive for two reasons. First, key numbers are
often added to opinions even though the associated topic was not litigated. I
previously labelled this the problem of “over-coding.”472 Second, several of
the key numbers that address contract interpretation suffer from
overbreadth—they also cover the construction of other types of legal
documents, such as wills.473 When I discussed these limitations above, I
hypothesized that for most empirical studies using large samples, any overcoding or overbreadth is likely to balance out. But I also conceded that each
limit might pose genuine problems for certain projects.474
Accordingly, I conducted several tests for the prevalence of overcoding and overbreadth within my sets of interpretation cases. These tests
included manually reviewing a quasi-random sample of 400 cases in the
largest set (query 3, state and federal)—200 from textualist states and 200
from contextualist states—and running dozens of searches on Westlaw,
both generally and within my dataset, for key numbers and terms that signal

470
For additional information on the possibility of conducting a broader study, see supra note
449; infra text accompanying note 511.
471
To elaborate, recall that my study excluded 823 state court cases coded with key numbers from
the Insurance digest topic that concern the interpretation of insurance agreements. See supra text
accompanying note 469. Of the cases, 482 were from the five textualist states and 341 were from the
five contextualist states. If those cases were added to the results for query 3 as run in the relevant state
court databases, the ratio of interpretation cases to contract cases would change significantly. As the
reader will see shortly, the ratio of interpretation cases to contract cases in state courts was 5.0% higher
in textualist states using the query 3, weighted measure. But if the insurance cases were included, the
ratio would have been 7.0% higher in contextualist states. See infra Table 3. That is a considerable shift.
Of course, Insurance is only one of several digest topics excluded by my study protocol. But this
example should illustrate how the under-coding problem might, in theory, have dramatically impacted
my findings.
472
See supra notes 241–44 and accompanying text. Note that the control dataset includes
opinions that do not involve contract litigation for the same reason.
473
See supra notes 257–59 and accompanying text.
474
See supra notes 244, 259 and accompanying text.
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whether an opinion suffers from over-coding or overbreadth. While the
various tests I employed did not yield identical results, the outcome of the
most comprehensive test suggests that over-coding and overbreadth
probably do balance out in my dataset.475 Nonetheless, given the
inconsistency in my test findings, it is possible that over-coding and
overbreadth distorted my results.476
Third, my study addresses how each state’s approach to construing
contracts impacts the level of interpretation litigation in that jurisdiction.
However, courts located in one state often apply the law of another state or
federal law. If a significant number of cases in either the textualist set of
interpretation cases or the contextualist set (but not both) apply the law of a
foreign jurisdiction, then the study is no longer comparing apples to apples.
As with the problems of over-coding and overbreadth, I used a variety
of techniques to test for the incidence of cases applying foreign law in my
dataset. This included reviewing the same 400 decisions noted two
paragraphs above and running multiple searches on Westlaw. These tests
support two conclusions. First, virtually every interpretation case applying
foreign law in my dataset was filed in federal court. The study findings
based solely on state court decisions were thus almost certainly not biased
by the incidence of foreign law opinions. Second, substantially more federal
cases from the contextualist states concerned foreign law than from the
textualist states. Therefore, the study results based on both state and federal
decisions may have been biased by foreign law cases.477
Fourth, there can be more than one reported opinion from the same
lawsuit, such as where an appellate decision is appealed to the state

475
To elaborate, of the cases in the largest interpretation set (again, query 3, state and federal),
18.84% of the textualist decisions and 18.42% of the contextualist decisions contain markers indicating
they likely were included as a result of over-coding or overbreadth. Those results comes close to
perfectly balancing out. The precise protocol used to obtain these figures is on file with the author.
476
Given that under-coding, over-coding, and overbreadth all have significant potential to corrupt
the integrity of datasets created using contract interpretation key numbers, it is possible that contract
interpretation is not the best subject for empirical work employing the American Digest System. Further
research will be necessary to assess this theory.
477
For example, one of the tests I conducted on the largest set (query 3, state and federal) found
that 304 out of 2548 textualist decisions, or 11.93%, and 189 out of 847 contextualist decisions, or
22.31%, contained markers indicating they likely applied foreign law. This result supports the
conclusion that the foreign law decisions do not balance out, unlike the over-coded and overbroad cases.
Additional details regarding this test are on file with the author.
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supreme court.478 However, based on my review of the interpretation and
control groups, there are simply too few cases that (1) are from the same
lawsuit as another published opinion, and (2) contain the same pertinent key
numbers as the related decision, to corrupt the integrity of my data.
Fifth, when running searches for state and federal cases together, I
have found West’s search algorithm to be somewhat less reliable than
normal. In particular, not all federal decisions applying the law of a state
are retrieved in such searches.479 And sometimes cases are found by these
searches that have nothing to do with the relevant state.480 Unfortunately, I
am not sure how common this problem is. Determining the scope will
require additional analysis in subsequent work.
There are two final aspects of my methodology worth noting. First, I
relied solely on the Key Number System for the data coding in this study. I
did not exclude from or include in the dataset a single case based on my
own analysis of the opinion. And I read only a small fraction of the cases in
my sample.481 Second, all searches were run with a date restriction that
limited the dataset to cases decided from January 1, 2000, through
December 31, 2009.
The next two pages set forth the raw totals from my study. The first
page is the data that is exclusively from state courts. The second page
contains the data from state and federal courts combined.

478
See Zirkel & Johnson, supra note 114, at 7 (observing that using key number searches to
measure the quantity of education-related litigation results in some degree of double counting because
there are cases “that have multiple different decisions due to appeals, remands, and separable issues
extending from the threshold stage, such as discovery or statutes of limitations, to the post-trial stage,
such as attorney’s fees”); Zirkel & Richardson, supra note 109, at 769 (same).
479
For example, my search for the relevant key numbers in Arizona caselaw—both state and
federal—did not find GTE Wireless, Inc. v. Cellexis Int’l, Inc., 341 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003), even though
this decision contained one of the relevant key numbers and applied Arizona law, id. at 4–5.
480
For example, my search for Arizona state and federal authorities included a case from the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided in 1792—Field for the use of Oxley v. Biddle, 2 Dall. 171 (Pa.
1792)—which is nearly seventy years before the beginning of the Arizona Reports. Likewise, my search
for Illinois state and federal authorities retrieved Utica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Vigo Coal Co., 393 F.3d
707 (7th Cir. 2004), which clearly applies Indiana law, id. at 715–16, and is an appeal in a lawsuit that
originated in the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, id. at 707. (Note that Illinois
was not included in my study.)
481
For examples of reasons why I read some of the cases, see supra notes 472–77, 479–80 and
accompanying text.
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Table 3: State Court Cases Only (2000-2009)
Query 1
Query 2
Query 3
Group 1
95(II)(A)
Selected482

Group 1
95(II)(A)
Selected
+
Group 2
157XI(D)
All

Group 1
95(II)(A)
Selected
+
Group 2
157XI(D)
All
+
Group 3
157XI(A)
All
&
157XI(C)
Selected

295

Control
Search
95
All

Textualist
Indiana
229–53.9%
240–56.5%
251–59.1%
425
Minnesota
64–44.8%
70–48.9%
71–49.7%
143
Missouri
219–48.0%
236–51.8%
243–53.3%
456
New York
382–31.7%
449–37.2%
497–41.1%
1208
Texas
566–45.5%
610–49.0%
645–51.8%
1244
Total–Weighted*
1460–42.0%
1605–46.2%
1707–49.1%
3476
Total–Unweighted**
44.8%
48.7%
51.0%
Contextualist
29–33.0%
32–36.4%
33–37.5%
88
Arizona
177–30.4%
223–38.3%
249–42.7%
583
California
84–48.9%
89–51.7%
91–52.9%
172
Colorado
74–35.9%
84–40.8%
86–41.7%
206
New Jersey
96–38.7%
111–44.8%
113–45.6%
248
Washington
460–35.5%
539–41.6%
572–44.1%
1297
Total–Weighted
37.4%
42.4%
44.1%
Total–Unweighted
Textualist minus Contextualist
Weighted Unweighted
6.5%
4.6%
5.0%
Unweighted
7.4%
6.3%
6.9%
*“Weighted” means the sum of the interpretation cases from all five states divided by the sum of
all contracts cases from the same five states. Larger states have more impact under this measure.
**“Unweighted” means the sum of the percentages in each column divided by five. Each state has
the same impact under this measure.

482
Included with each group is a brief description of the key numbers that constitute that group
using terminology from West’s outline of the topic. The precise key numbers that constitute each group
are identified in Appendix 1.
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Table 4: State and Federal Court Cases (2000-2009)
Query 1
Query 2
Query 3
Group 1
95(II)(A)
Selected

Textualist
Indiana
280–50.5%
Minnesota
119–40.3%
Missouri
266–45.3%
New York
761–32.2%
Texas
732–44.7%
Total–Weighted
2158–39.7%
Total–Unweighted
42.6%
Contextualist
45–28.5%
Arizona
287–28.2%
California
112–43.1%
Colorado
108–29.9%
New Jersey
116–37.2%
Washington
668–31.7%
Total–Weighted
33.4%
Total–Unweighted
Textualist minus Contextualist
Weighted
8.0%
Unweighted
9.2%

Control
Search

Group 1
95(II)(A)
Selected
+
Group 2
157XI(D)
All

Group 1
95(II)(A)
Selected
+
Group 2
157XI(D)
All
+
Group 3
157XI(A)
All
&
157XI(C)
Selected

296–53.4%
134–45.4%
289–49.2%
875–37.1%
789–48.1%
2383–43.8%
46.6%

307–55.6%
145–49.2%
301–51.3%
961–40.7%
834–50.9%
2548–46.9%
49.5%

554
295
587
2361
1639
5436

49–31.0%
359–35.3%
120–46.2%
123–34.1%
138–44.2%
789–37.4%
38.2%

51–32.3%
403–39.6%
124–47.7%
128–35.5%
141–45.2%
847–40.2%
40.1%

158
1017
260
361
312
2108

6.4%
8.4%

6.7%
9.4%
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Some additional explanation of the data is in order. First, the
percentages listed for each state reflect the ratio of cases recovered by
queries 1, 2, and 3, to the cases recovered by the control search. For
example, in Table 3, query 1 returned 280 cases in Indiana. The control
search for that state returned 425 cases. Two-hundred eighty is 53.9 percent
of 425. Second, I combined the numbers for the five textualist states and for
the five contextualist states in two ways—a weighted total and an
unweighted total. To illustrate, in Table 3, the combined weighted total for
the textualist states under query 1 is 42.0%. That figure was created by
adding up all of the query 1 results for each state (1460) and dividing that
number by the sum of all the control search results for those states (3476).
Using this measure, the states with more cases have greater impact on the
ultimate percentage. By comparison, the combined unweighted total for the
textualist states under query 1 is 44.8%. That number was created by adding
all of the query 1 percentages (53.9%, 44.8%, 48.0%, 31.7%, and 45.5%)
and dividing by five. Using this measure, each state has equal impact on the
ultimate percentage.
Turning to analysis of the data, and focusing first on the raw numbers,
states using a textualist approach had noticeably more contract
interpretation litigation as a fraction of general contract litigation than states
using a contextualist approach. Most relevant are the weighted and
unweighted combined totals for each group of five states. Consider the
unweighted figures in Table 3. For the ten years of the study, interpretation
litigation constituted 44.8%, 48.7%, and 51.0% of total contract litigation in
textualist state courts, depending on the measure used for interpretation
cases (queries 1, 2, and 3). For contextualist states, the numbers are 37.4%,
42.4%, and 44.1%. The smallest difference between textualist and
contextualist states on these measures is 6.3% (query 2).
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Table 5 lists all of the differences between the combined textualist
percentages and the combined contextualist percentages from the bottom of
Tables 3 and 4.
Table 5: Differences Between Combined Totals from Tables 3 and 4
Table 3: State Court Cases Only
Query 1
Query 2
Query 3
Textualist minus Contextualist
Weighted
6.5%
4.6%
5.0%
Unweighted
7.4%
6.3%
6.9%
Table 4: State and Federal Court Cases
Query 1
Query 2
Query 3
Textualist minus Contextualist
Weighted
8.0%
6.4%
6.7%
Unweighted
9.2%
8.4%
9.4%

As this table makes clear, the ratio of contract interpretation litigation to
general contract litigation was larger in the textualist states under all twelve
measures used. The greatest difference between textualist and contextualist
states was 9.4% (query 3, unweighted, state and federal). The smallest was
4.6% (query 2, weighted, state only).
While the raw totals are somewhat illuminating, they lack genuine
persuasive force standing alone. Accordingly, I retained professional
statisticians from the University of Georgia Statistical Consulting Center483
to analyze the data.484 The statisticians ran t-tests on each of the twelve

483
See Statistical Consulting Center, UNIV. OF GA. FRANKLIN COLL. OF ARTS AND SCI. (last
visited Feb. 27, 2016), http://www.stat.uga.edu/consulting. The center performs statistical analysis for
academics who lack the training to conduct such analysis themselves. They were extremely helpful in
writing this article. My primary contact was Associate Director Kimberly Love-Meyers (who has since
moved on to another job).
484
Technically, the use of inferential statistics is valid only when applied to a random sample.
Konrad Lajer, Statistical Tests as Inappropriate Tools for Data Analysis Performed on Non-Random
Samples of Plant Communities, 42 FOLIA GEOBOTANICA 115, 116–18 (2007) (“Standard statistical tests
cannot be validly used with non-random samples. . . .”); Phillips et al., supra note 232, at 89 (“In
opposition to probability samples, nonprobability samples tend to be biased and are not generalizable,
and so are not recommended for statistical analysis.”); Sarah H. Ramsey & Robert F. Kelly, Social
Science Knowledge in Family Law Cases: Judicial Gate-Keeping in the Daubert Era, 59 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1, 68 (2004) (“First, if the study’s sample was not selected randomly . . . it is inappropriate to
report the level of statistical significance for relationships among variables found in the sample. . . .
Second, a corollary to the first point is that the appropriate use of tests of statistical significance has
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measures and logistic regressions on two measures—(1) query 1, weighted,
state courts, and (2) query 1, weighted, state and federal courts.485 The two
logistic regressions found no statistically significant difference between the
contextualist and textualist jurisdictions. And the t-tests also found no
statistically significant difference for eleven of twelve measures. On the
twelfth measure—query 3, unweighted, state and federal—the higher level
of litigation in textualist states was statistically significant at the .05 level.
This measure had the largest raw difference between textualist and
contextualist states—9.4%.486 And it is the most comprehensive; it included
all the relevant key numbers and covered both state and federal courts. The
twelfth measure thus used the biggest dataset.487 However, given that
eleven of twelve t-tests and the two logistic regressions failed to find a
statistically significant difference, the ultimate conclusion of this study is
that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected: The study cannot reject the

everything to do with whether the sample was randomly selected . . . . Studies using large nonrandom
samples have no more legitimate call to use tests of statistical significance than small convenience
samples.”); id. at 68–69 n.237 (“What is key here is that the use of confidence levels/intervals involves
the same statistical reasoning as significance tests and that each requires a randomly drawn sample in
order to be validly employed.”); see also Kevin S. Marshall et al., The Habit Evidence Rule and its
Misguided Judicial Legacy: A Statistical and Psychological Primer, 36 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 31–32
& n.200 (2012) (“Inferential statistics is a body of scientific and mathematical methods used to draw
conclusions or inferences about unknown characteristics of a population on the basis of known sample
data.”) (collecting authorities); Brian Root, Statistics and Data in Human Rights Research, 107 AM.
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 65, 66 (2013) (“Generally speaking, all statistics fall into two broad categories:
descriptive and inferential. Descriptive statistics simply describe the data that were collected. Inferential
statistics use observed data to predict what is true of areas beyond the data.”). This creates a problem for
those who wish to use statistical analysis to draw inferences from a sample created using the Key
Number System since such a sample is seldom a random subset of the population under study. See supra
notes 168–205 and accompanying text; see also infra text accompanying notes 536–37 (describing a
second sampling problem with the specific protocol followed in this study). However, when the choice
is between (1) relying solely on the raw totals of a non-random sample (i.e., relying solely on descriptive
statistics), and (2) relying on both the raw totals and statistical analysis of the non-random dataset (i.e.,
relying on both descriptive and inferential statistics), the latter is the superior approach. Indeed,
inferential statistics are regularly applied to non-random datasets. See, e.g., Georgakopoulos, supra note
115, at 127–30; McChesney, supra note 56, at 170–85; see also Hoffman et al., supra note 153, at 687
(explaining that scholars who analyze the legal system by using samples of judicial opinions normally
“claim that that the dataset of opinions is good enough for statistical inference”). This should be
unsurprising given that the use of non-random samples is justified in many contexts. See supra note 231.
485
Appendix 2 explains why there are only two logistic regressions.
486
See supra Table 5.
487
Technically, measure 12 was tied for largest. Measure 9—query 3, weighted, state and
federal—used the same dataset as measure 12.
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hypothesis that there is no difference between textualism and contextualism
in their impacts on the number of contract interpretation lawsuits filed and
the length of those proceedings. Put another way, the study finds no support
for the textualist hypothesis that contextualism has higher enforcement
costs and very little support for the contextualist counter-hypothesis that
textualism has higher enforcement costs.488
C. Discussion
This subpart discusses potential explanations for my failure to find a
statistically significant difference in enforcement cost levels between
textualism and contextualism. The explanations are of two types. Some
reject the finding as invalid because of problems with my study
methodology. Others presume that the result is valid and constitute theories
as to why the two approaches to contract interpretation might have similar
impacts on enforcement costs.
1. Methodological Explanations for the Study Findings
There are multiple grounds upon which one could challenge the results
of this study. First, recall the many qualifications regarding my protocol
discussed above. Most importantly, the study attempts to draw inferences
about the population of all cases from a sample of reported cases.489 But the
latter is probably not a representative subset of the former. That is a
considerable weakness.490 Also critical is the fact that there are countless
differences between the ten states in the study that I did not—and probably
could not—control for.491 The other problems noted previously,492 such as
concerns with West’s coding protocols, are not as serious as the first two
issues. But taken together, they likewise justify healthy skepticism about
the study results.

488

For additional details regarding the statistical tests, see Appendix 2.
See supra Parts V.A.–B.
490
See supra notes 168–205 and accompanying text; see also supra note 484.
491
See supra notes 458–65 and accompanying text.
492
See supra notes 235–69, 467–80 and accompanying text.
489
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Second, remember that the caselaw regarding contract interpretation is
extraordinarily convoluted.493 This complexity sometimes makes it difficult
to classify a state as textualist or contextualist.494 Indeed, most jurisdictions
fall somewhere along the continuum between the two approaches rather
than clearly on one side. While I believe I selected ten states for the study
that fit firmly in either the textualist or contextualist camp, my classification
decisions are not immune from criticism. For example, I categorized New
Jersey and Arizona as contextualist. But there are multiple precedents in
each jurisdiction that apply the textualist approach.495 Similarly, Texas
courts consistently note that textualism is the governing system in their
state.496 Yet they sometimes implement that approach in a manner that
looks more like contextualism.497 Given these examples, one might object
that the groups of states I chose are too similar in their contract
interpretation practices for any differences between textualism and
contextualism to show up in the study. An experiment with territories that
employ purer forms of the two approaches could lead to different results.
Unfortunately, such a project may not be possible because there are likely
too few states that use textualist and contextualist interpretation in their
ideal forms.

493

See supra notes 312–16 and accompanying text.
See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
495
Regarding New Jersey, compare Conway v. 287 Corporate Center Associates, 901 A.2d 341,
346–47 (N.J. 2006) (explaining that New Jersey has adopted contextualist contract interpretation), with,
for example, Barr v. Barr, 11 A.3d 875, 882 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (stating that extrinsic
evidence may only be considered in interpreting a contract if the language on the face of the agreement
is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning, which is the textualist approach). Regarding
Arizona, compare Taylor v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 854 P.2d 1134, 1138–41
(Ariz. 1993) (explaining that Arizona has adopted the contextualist approach), with, for example, Scalia
v. Green, 271 P.2d 479, 482 (2011) (“In interpreting an easement created by deed or grant, we apply the
rules of contract construction. . . . When a deed is unambiguous, we will not consider extrinsic evidence
of the parties’ intent.”).
496
See, e.g., David J. Sacks, P.C. v. Haden, 266 S.W.3d 447, 450–51 (Tex. 2008) (“An
unambiguous contract will be enforced as written, and parol evidence will not be received for the
purpose of creating an ambiguity. . . . Only where a contract is ambiguous may a court consider the
parties’ interpretation and admit extraneous evidence to determine the true meaning of the instrument.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
497
See LINZER, 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 310, § 25.14[a], at 158 (further arguing that
the Texas Supreme Court’s interpretive method “misleads planners into thinking they can rely on plain
meaning when in fact the courts are not that rigid”); id. at 155–61.
494
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Third, a textualist could object that my study failed to take into
account that the interpretive approach a state employs is generally
correlated with other rules of contract law in that jurisdiction. Textualism is
a “classical” doctrine. States that use that method of interpretation also
typically follow other classical doctrines. Likewise, contextualism is a
“modern” doctrine. Jurisdictions that employ this approach normally
conform to modern contract principles.498 Classical contract law is marked
by clear rules and strict adherence to legal formalities such as the statute of
frauds. By contrast, modern contract law favors general standards, such as
“good faith” and “unconscionability,” and shows greater sympathy for
equitable precepts.499 Many scholars, especially those in the field of law and
economics, contend that legal norms that take the form of general standards
cause more litigation than narrow rules.500 This creates a potential problem
for my study protocol.
To measure the impact of interpretive approach on enforcement costs,
I compared the ratios of contract interpretation litigation to general contract
litigation in textualist and contextualist states—with the levels of each type

498
See Miller, supra note 414 (discussing numerous differences between California’s
“contextualist” contract law and New York’s “formalist” contract law, including differences regarding
formation, defenses, interpretation, choice-of-law clauses, and arbitration clauses). See also Grumman
Allied Indus., Inc. v. Rohr Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 729, 733–34 (2d Cir. 1984) (referring to the textualist
and contextualist approaches to contract interpretation as the “classical” and “modern” approaches).
499
See KNAPP ET AL., supra note 273, at 31–32.
500
See Ehud Guttel & Alon Harel, Uncertainty Revisited: Legal Prediction and Legal
Postdiction, 107 MICH. L. REV. 467, 481 & nn.84, 85 (2008) (“The use of rules and standards, as law
and economics scholars have shown, involves different costs and benefits. . . . [S]tandards usually entail
higher enforcement and compliance costs than rules.”) (collecting authorities); Russell B. Korobkin,
Behavioral Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards Revisited, 79 OR. L. REV. 23, 56 (2000)
(concluding that combining behavioral analysis with economic analysis leads to the insight that
“standards will be more expensive to apply [than rules] both because applying a standard usually will be
more expensive than applying a rule and because more cases will be litigated in a standards regime than
in a rules regime . . . .”); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557, 562–63, 570, 572 (1992) (explaining why rules should have lower enforcement costs than
standards); but see id. at 573 n.35, 575 n.41 (discussing various reasons why there might be more or less
litigation under standards than under rules). There are two principal bases for this conclusion. First,
standards increase litigation because they generate more uncertainty than rules. See Korobkin, supra, at
32 (“The ex ante certainty that rules provide should encourage more disputes to settle out of court and
not require adjudication at all.”). Second, when employing rules, adjudicators need merely decide
whether the relevant facts are present. Id. But under standards, adjudicators must both uncover the facts
and determine the precise content of the law since this was not done by the enactor ex ante. Id.; accord
Kaplow, supra, at 562–63, 570. The extra step requires the expenditure of additional resources.
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of litigation being determined by the results of my key number searches.501
I used a search for all cases tagged with a key number from the Contracts
topic (95) as my control search in the denominator because I theorized that
such a query would control for numerous differences between textualist and
contextualist jurisdictions.502 But this search could not control for any
variations in contract law across states that impact the level of general
contract litigation. Suppose there is more contract litigation in contextualist
states because these jurisdictions have adopted most modern doctrines. This
would lower the ratios (i.e., the percentages) established by my key number
searches for those territories, distorting any comparison between the two
sets of states. In other words, perhaps my finding that the ratio of
interpretation cases to contracts cases does not vary by a statistically
significant amount in textualist and contextualist territories simply reflects
the fact that contextualist states have more of both types of litigation.
While this is an interesting explanation for my results, it is inconsistent
with at least one aspect of the data: The totals for interpretation cases and
for general contract cases were much higher in textualist states by every
measure used. To illustrate, for query three in state and federal court, there
were 2,548 cases in the textualist group and 847 in the contextualist group.
For the control search in state and federal court, there were 5,436 cases in
textualist states and 2,108 in contextualist states.503 These numbers do not
preclude the possibility that differences in areas of contract law beyond
interpretation distorted my results by increasing the number of cases in the
denominator for the contextualist group. But they are a challenge that must
be accounted for by such an explanation.
Fourth, beliefs about the law can influence behavior in ways that make
it difficult to empirically measure the impact of variations in legal doctrine.
Suppose, for example, that sophisticated contracting parties (and/or their
attorneys) generally believe that contextualism raises enforcement costs in
comparison to textualism. This might lead such parties to act in ways that
increase the probability that textualist principles will govern their
agreements. They could use tools like choice-of-law and choice-of forum
clauses, or they could locate more of their business activity in textualist
501
502
503

See supra notes 445–63 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 458–65 and accompanying text.
See supra Table 4.
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states. Sophisticated parties would be particularly motivated to follow such
practices for transactions that are more likely to result in an interpretive
dispute. If this analysis is accurate, then a disproportionate amount of
interpretation litigation will be commenced in textualist jurisdictions,
inflating the ratio of interpretation cases to general contract cases in
comparison to contextualist states.504 Alternatively, perhaps the view that
contextualism increases uncertainty (and thus raises enforcement costs)
induces sophisticated parties to settle disputes more quickly when they are
embroiled in litigation in jurisdictions that follow the broader interpretive
approach. This would lower the ratio of interpretation cases to contract
cases in those territories vis-à-vis textualist states.505
Both of the theories discussed in the prior paragraph are intended to
defend textualism against my findings. And my data provides some support
for the first hypothesis. As discussed two paragraphs above, my Westlaw
queries returned far more interpretation and general contract cases in
textualist states than in contextualist states. That is consistent with
businesses taking steps to have their contracts governed by textualist
doctrine. But the analysis in each theory could easily be reversed to support
contextualism.506 And other pro-contextualist explanations of my findings
are imaginable. The key point is this: If contracting parties are changing
their behavior because of their beliefs about the impacts of interpretation
law, then it might be difficult or impossible to measure the actual impacts
of the two interpretive approaches.507

504
My thanks to Omri Ben-Shahar of the University of Chicago School of Law for this
suggestion.
505
My thanks to Russell Korobkin of the UCLA School of Law for this suggestion.
506
To illustrate, if parties believe that textualism increases enforcement costs, they might be more
likely to settle lawsuits filed in textualist states, lowering the ratio of interpretation actions to contract
actions in those jurisdictions.
507
Robert Thompson identified a similar problem in his empirical study of the factors that lead
courts to pierce the corporate veil. He explained that any assessment of these factors “can be affected to
the extent that litigants understand the prior learning on a legal issue and use that knowledge to decide
which cases to file, to continue on appeal, or to settle.” Thompson, supra note 101, at 1046. He offered
as an example undercapitalization. Courts frequently state that undercapitalization is the most important
factor in deciding whether to pierce the veil. But if defendants are aware of this, then they are probably
more likely to settle cases in which the corporate entity was undercapitalized. Id. at 1046 n.67. And this
means that undercapitalization will not appear in the caselaw as often as other, less significant piercing
factors. Therefore, an empirical finding that undercapitalization is seldom litigated in reported decisions
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Given the methodological concerns presented in this subpart,
textualists and contextualists are justified in harboring considerable doubts
about my results. And there are likely multiple additional objections one
could raise. But it is also possible that I failed to find a statistically
significant difference in the level of enforcement costs between textualism
and contextualism because there actually is no real difference between the
two approaches when it comes to such costs. The next subpart addresses
that possibility.
2. Alternative Explanations for the Study Findings
For thirteen of fourteen measures used in my study there was no
statistically significant difference between textualism and contextualism.
Perhaps that is because the number of lawsuits filed and the length of those
proceedings are substantially the same under the two schools of contract
interpretation. This subpart offers three potential explanations for why that
might be the case.
Both textualists and contextualists have articulated multiple theories to
justify the conclusion that their school of interpretation best reduces
enforcement costs.508 One potential explanation for my findings is that all
(or the bulk) of these theories are false. To illustrate, textualists assert that it
is easier to establish the existence of an ambiguity under contextualism
because parties have more material available out of which to craft
reasonable understandings of the relevant contract language. That seems
plausible enough. But maybe additional evidence typically does not
seriously improve a claim that an agreement is ambiguous. The driving
force in ambiguity determinations, even in contextualist states, might be the
express terms of the contract. Similarly, contextualists maintain that
textualism creates incentives to write longer contracts because parties are
less able to rely upon extrinsic evidence should a dispute arise. And longer
agreements are more likely to have contradicting terms, increasing
litigation. This too is a plausible theory. But perhaps the incentives in
textualist states are too weak to influence drafting practices. In particular,

(or in other cases) does not necessarily support the conclusion that undercapitalization is less important
than as suggested by judicial pronouncements regarding piercing doctrine.
508
See supra Part IV.B.3.
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parties might be more concerned about transaction costs than enforcement
costs, and so they prefer to take their chances that litigation will result
rather than spend time constructing longer agreements.509 Another
possibility is that parties and their lawyers are quite proficient at drafting
extensive contracts and so the predicted contradictions seldom materialize.
A second explanation for my findings is that there is considerable truth
in all or most of the textualist and contextualist theories about enforcement
costs, but the impacts of each approach largely cancel out. For example,
textualists argue that contextualism promotes uncertainty because parties
cannot know in advance which evidence a court is likely to find persuasive
when deciding whether a contract is ambiguous. Indeed, until discovery
commences, parties will often not even have access to all of the pertinent
materials. This makes it difficult to predict the result of an ambiguity
determination. Contextualists counter that textualism promotes uncertainty
because the only inputs at the ambiguity stage under that approach are the
contract and the judge, and judges vary dramatically in their acontextual
understandings of contract language. Moreover, until a lawsuit is filed, the
parties will not even know which judge is going to preside over their
dispute. This also makes it difficult to predict the outcome of an ambiguity
determination.
It is entirely conceivable that both of these theories are correct, but that
the resulting levels of uncertainty are substantially equivalent. In other
words, the uncertainty created by not knowing what evidence a
contextualist judge will find persuasive could be substantially the same as
the uncertainty created by not knowing how a textualist judge is going to
view contract language in the absence of any extrinsic evidence—i.e., given
only his or her background. One might respond that such equivalence is
unlikely. But when all of the possible pathways to increased (or reduced)
enforcement costs under each approach are added into the mix, it would not
be surprising if the full panoply of countervailing forces sufficiently
balance out such that there is no statistically significant difference between
textualism and contextualism.

509
See supra notes 374–75 (discussing why parties might be more concerned with transaction
costs than enforcement costs).
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A third possibility is that the countless other factors that influence
whether a lawsuit is filed and how long it lasts swamp any impact resulting
from the interpretive approach in use by the courts. To illustrate, the
inherent ambiguities in language might make litigation over the meaning of
agreements extremely unpredictable regardless of which school of
interpretation is employed. If that is the case, then the construction of
contracts may be so difficult under either approach that changing between
them has only a small effect on enforcement costs. Indeed, the general lack
of predictability in interpretation cases is well known and has been cited as
a basis for the belief that a shift towards contextualism will have no effect
on the level of uncertainty parties face.510 Furthermore, the problems
inherent in language that infect interpretation litigation are only one of
many factors that can influence whether a case is filed and the length of the
proceeding. Others include (1) the rules of procedure and evidence, (2) the
capacities of judges, lawyers, and jurors, (3) the nature of the parties (i.e.,
are they businesses or consumers), and (4) the relationship of the parties
(i.e., are they long-term partners or was this their first deal). When all of
these forces are considered, it makes sense to believe that even if the choice
of interpretive approach matters to some degree, the impacts are too trivial
to be measurable.
To recap, according to the first explanation, the underlying textualist
and contextualist theories about enforcement costs are generally false.
According to the second explanation, the underlying theories are largely
true, but the impacts of each approach cancel out. And according to the
third explanation, the theories are again largely true, but all of the other
factors that influence enforcement cost levels swamp any difference
between the two approaches. If one of these explanations is valid, then
enforcement costs probably should no longer play a substantial role in
debates over the best approach to contract construction.

510
See McLauchlan, supra note 10, at 35 (“As I pointed out at the very beginning of this article,
contract interpretation cases tend to be the most intractable of all contractual disputes and their outcome
is notoriously difficult to predict. It is difficult to believe, therefore, that a more liberal approach to the
reception of evidence of prior negotiations would result in any greater uncertainty. Indeed, in those
cases where the evidence revealed that the parties formed a common intention as to the meaning of the
words in dispute, the opposite might be the case.”).
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IV. CONCLUSION
I had two general purposes in writing this article. First, I sought to
explain how authors can employ the West Key Number System as a data
collection and coding device to facilitate empirical scholarship, and why
research conducted using key numbers is worthwhile. Second, I intended to
contribute to the academic literature and caselaw regarding the optimal
method of contract interpretation by executing the first empirical study
analyzing the relationship of interpretive approach to enforcement costs.
Starting with the second purpose, the findings of my study suggest that
enforcement costs do not vary between textualism and contextualism. This
undercuts a signature claim advanced by textualist courts and
commentators—that contextualism increases the level of interpretation
litigation from the textualist baseline. And it similarly undermines the
contextualist counterclaim that textualism is the approach with higher
enforcement costs. Of course, this was a single study employing a
methodology with considerable limitations. Further work is necessary
before even tentative conclusions are possible about which approach to
contract interpretation (if any) best minimizes the number of lawsuits filed
and the length of those proceedings. But this paper contains the beginnings
of an empirically-informed debate about contract interpretation
enforcement costs.
I am currently investigating several potential follow-up projects that
would further analyze the relationship of interpretive approach and
enforcement costs. Each would employ key numbers for data collection and
coding. First, I may conduct a more comprehensive study using essentially
the same methodology employed in this article. The principal difference
between the two projects is the quantity of key numbers involved. In the
new work, I hope to include key numbers from all or most of the topics that
concern the interpretation of agreements rather than just classifications
contained in the Contracts and Evidence topics. However, the
comprehensive study faces technological difficulties that might make its
completion impracticable.511

511

For a summary of the problem, see supra note 449.
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Second, I might rerun the queries from the current project in a larger
sets of states. The principle roadblock to this approach is that it was quite
difficult to identify ten states that I could fairly classify as either textualist
or contextualist. Creating a larger data set will be even more challenging, if
not impossible.
Third, I may attempt to run the same or modified searches in states
before and after they shifted from one interpretive approach to another. In
several jurisdictions there might be a seminal case in which the state
supreme court changed the local approach to contract interpretation from
textualism to contextualism.512 Comparing the ratio of interpretation
litigation to general contract litigation before the shift to the ratio
afterwards could provide helpful information regarding the impact of
interpretive approach on enforcement costs. In particular, this protocol
would eliminate the need to control for variations between states. The
comparison would not be textualist states versus contextualist states during
a single time period. Rather, it would be a set of states at time one (the
textualism era) versus the same states at time two (the contextualist era).513
This methodology would introduce new confounding variables—namely
legal and social variations between the two time periods in each state. But
combining the findings of such a study with those of my current project
may provide a more complete picture of the effects textualism and
contextualism have on litigation.
Fourth, Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code embraces
contextualist interpretation.514 This means that courts in textualist states are
required to use contextualism when construing agreements for the sale of
goods.515 One possible study protocol focusing exclusively on textualist
states would involve comparing the ratio of common law interpretation
cases to common law contract cases with the ratio of U.C.C. interpretation
cases to U.C.C. contract cases. Since the common law decisions in these
states apply textualism and the U.C.C. decisions apply contextualism, this

512
See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641
(Cal. 1968).
513
This oversimplifies. There would be a time one and time two for each jurisdiction since states
obviously changed from textualism to contextualism at different points.
514
See U.C.C. §§ 1-303(d); id. 2-202 & cmt. 1(c).
515
See supra note 453 for a discussion of a possible disjunction between what the U.C.C. requires
and what courts in textualist states actually do.
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type of comparison could highlight the impacts of each interpretive
approach within a single state during a single time period. Thus, as with the
third project, all data comparisons would be intrajurisdictional, nullifying
the need to control for differences across state lines. And because the
textualist and contextualist data for each state would come from the same
era, legal and social changes would not be a problem with this protocol. But
again there would be new confounding variables, including potential
distinctions between common law litigation and statutory litigation and
differences between the two areas of contract law (common law versus the
U.C.C.). In addition, because the U.C.C. adopted other modern contract
doctrines, using general contract litigation in the denominator would
reintroduce an important problem from my current study.516 Nonetheless,
this project might contribute to obtaining a better overall understanding of
the relationship between interpretive approach and enforcement costs.517
As the reader can see, contract interpretation is a topic ripe for
empirical analysis via the Key Number System. But the same is also true
for legal issues arising in numerous other fields of law. Indeed, any time the
quantity of litigation is relevant to a policy question or sociological inquiry,
the data available through key number searches might provide helpful
insights. To illustrate, litigation levels are frequently a factor in rule
selection. One of the most common arguments in clashes about the
appropriate legal norm is that a particular option will “open the litigation
floodgates.”518 An excellent general example is that increased litigation is
allegedly one of the principal problems with adopting broad standards
rather than specific rules as a governing norm.519 Scholars can conduct
empirical work employing key numbers to assess such assertions about

516

See supra notes 498–503 and accompanying text.
Note also that one could conduct a study mixing key numbers with other information. For
example, one could analyze the ratio of interpretation cases tagged with a pertinent key number to some
non-key number denominator, such as civil filings denoted as contracts cases by administrative offices
of the courts, assuming such data exists.
518
Searches on Westlaw run on September 2, 2015, returned 1,460 journal articles and 557 state
and federal cases containing “floodgates” within four words of “litigation.” See also Ellie Margolis,
Closing the Floodgates: Making Persuasive Policy Arguments in Appellate Briefs, 62 MONT. L. REV.
59, 73 n.74 (2001) (explaining that the litigation floodgates argument is “much overused”); Michael R.
Smith, The Sociological and Cognitive Dimensions of Policy-Based Persuasion, 22 J.L. & POL’Y 35, 58
(2013) (noting that the litigation floodgates argument is “popular”).
519
See supra note 500 and accompanying text.
517
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litigation quantities in countless circumstances, as I have here with the
textualist and contextualist theses concerning enforcement costs.
The Key Number System also makes it easier to answer calls for
certain types of empirical research long neglected by law professors. For
example, Hall and Wright note that legal scholars have “largely
overlooked” studies that treat “case law as an independent variable,
meaning they ask how case law influences other social and economic
conditions.”520 This is surprising, they explain, because, “[w]ith its diverse
‘laboratory of states,’ the United States offers boundless opportunities to
learn from the ‘natural experiments’ created by the inevitable differences in
case law among jurisdictions and over time.”521 Korobkin highlights this
problem in the contracts context, observing that scholars seldom investigate
empirically whether rival rules of contract law have different impacts on the
behavior of contracting parties.522 He argues that the “measurable
differences in doctrine between jurisdictions” create opportunities for
comparing the impacts of competing approaches.523 That, of course, is
precisely what I attempted to do via my study of the effects of textualist and
contextualist interpretation on enforcement costs.524 And the fourth
potential follow-up project discussed above—contrasting litigation levels
under the common law with those under the U.C.C.—is essentially
concerned with the same type of comparison. Korobkin further explains
that “changes in doctrine over time can make it possible to study the effects
of doctrine by comparing behavior in the same jurisdiction before and after
a landmark case, series of cases, or statutory change.”525 That is what I am

520

Hall & Wright, supra note 3, at 86.
Id. at 87.
522
Korobkin, supra note 4, at 1062; see also Crystal, supra note 56, at 306 (“Other internal
empirical studies could focus on the operation of rules. By gathering data about the relative percentage
of types of litigated cases, it would be possible to identify those rules of law that are frequently litigated.
Focus could then turn to normative questions. Is the amount of litigation of a particular rule or doctrine a
matter of concern? Are there alternative dispute resolution mechanisms that could be developed?”).
523
Korobkin, supra note 4, at 1063.
524
See also Richard Danzig, Comments on Professor White’s Paper, 1988 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 49,
59 (1988) (“One then asks about the anvil, how does it affect the disposition of real cases in an everyday
way? How does it affect the settlement process, etc.?”).
525
Korobkin, supra note 4, at 1063; accord Geis, supra note 4, at 492 (“The basic idea here is to
find a situation where there has been a doctrinal change—perhaps due to a landmark court decision or
statutory enactment—and measure the impact of the change on subsequent contract terms in the
jurisdiction. Parallel jurisdictions might also be included as a form of control. This would be analogous
521
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proposing to do in the third follow-up project—contrasting enforcement
costs during an earlier textualist period with those during a later
contextualist period.
Remember also that key number projects can be completed
expeditiously and with minimal resources. Indeed, they require
substantially less time and money than most other types of empirical work.
Scholars thus can execute the types of projects called for by Hall, Wright,
Korobkin, and others with relative ease.
Of course, the methodological problems inherent in using the
American Digest System for data collection and coding undercut the value
of this type of research. But empirical work need not be perfect to possess
significant value.526 This is especially true in fields such as law and public
policy where decision-makers often must act despite “profound empirical
uncertainty.”527 Practitioners in the social and hard sciences normally have
the option of awaiting better evidence before reaching a conclusion. But
deferring on legal and policy questions is frequently impossible. Judges
must adjudicate the cases that come before them.528 And when legislators
postpone a decision, they simply leave the status quo legal rule in place.529
When choice is unavoidable, greater methodological rigor can be an
unaffordable luxury. Accordingly, while the research protocol
recommended in this article suffers from many limitations, the findings of
key number studies are worthy of consideration by courts, legislatures, and
scholars, especially when such studies address issues for which there is no
better evidence.
West’s American Digest System is a treasure trove of coded data. My
hope is that this article inspires scholars in every field of law to mine that
data in order to analyze countless empirical questions of fundamental
importance to our nation’s legal system.
to an event study in finance or economics and might help to shed light on the incentives and effects of
differing legal default rules.”).
526
See supra notes 209–34 and accompanying text.
527
Goldsmith & Vermeule, supra note 230, at 154.
528
Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 25 (1983).
529
For a contracts example illustrating this principle, see Geis, supra note 4, at 492 (“After all,
lawmakers cannot abandon the job; there must be some legal rule or standard that takes effect in the
absence of stated contractual intentions. Even a decision to eschew default rules or, analogously, to
strike contracts void for indefiniteness whenever undocumented contingencies arise is itself a default
rule.”).
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APPENDIX 1: WESTLAW SEARCHES USED IN THE STUDY
This appendix sets forth the searches I ran on Westlaw to collect the
data for my study. Recall that I organized the key numbers chosen for the
study into three groups: (1) contract interpretation key numbers from the
Contracts digest topic (topic 95), (2) contract interpretation key numbers
from the Evidence digest topic (topic 157), and (3) parol evidence rule key
numbers from the Evidence topic. The search terms for each group are
listed below.
Next, I constructed three search queries for each state. The first query
contained only the key numbers in group (1). The second contained the key
numbers in groups (1) and (2). And the third contained the key numbers in
all three groups—(1), (2), and (3). The three queries were run in both the
relevant state database and the relevant mixed state/federal database. Thus,
there were six searches in total for each jurisdiction. The results of these
searches served as proxies for the level of contract interpretation litigation
in each state during the time period of the study.
The three queries were run in exactly the same form in every state
database and each of the three is presented below. Running the queries in
the mixed state/federal databases required additional search language to
limit the cases retrieved to the appropriate jurisdiction. Accordingly, I have
set forth the three queries as run in the Indiana state/federal databases to
highlight the limiting language that was necessary.
I also ran a control search for all cases classified with a contracts key
number. This search served as a proxy for the total level of contract
litigation in each state during the time period of the study. Like the three
interpretation queries, the control required additional restrictive language
when it was run in the mixed state/federal databases. I thus have set forth
both versions of the control search—state and state/federal—again using
Indiana as an example of the latter.
Finally, all queries were run with a date restriction that limited the
dataset to cases decided from January 1, 2000 through December 31, 2009.
The search language restricting the results to this time period is contained in
the queries below.
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Group 1: Topic 95 (Contracts), Section II, Subsection (A)—Selected Key
Numbers.
95k143 95k143.5 95k147 95k148 95k149 95k150 95k151 95k160 95k161
95k162 95k163 95k164 95k165 95k166 95k167 95k169 95k170 95k171
95k172 95k173 95k174 95k175 95k176
Group 2: Topic 157 (Evidence), Section XI, Subsection (D)—All Key
Numbers.
157XI(D)530
Group 3: Topic 157 (Evidence), Section XI, Subsection (A)—All Key
Numbers and Subsection (C)—Selected Key Numbers.
157XI(A)
157k439 157k440 157k441 157k442 157k443 157k444531
Query 1—State (Group 1).
(95k143 95k143.5 95k147 95k148 95k149 95k150 95k151 95k160 95k161
95k162 95k163 95k164 95k165 95k166 95k167 95k169 95k170 95k171
95k172 95k173 95k174 95k175 95k176) & da(aft 12/31/1999) & da(bef
01/01/2010)
Query 2—State (Groups 1 & 2).
(157XI(D) (95k143 95k143.5 95k147 95k148 95k149 95k150 95k151
95k160 95k161 95k162 95k163 95k164 95k165 95k166 95k167 95k169
95k170 95k171 95k172 95k173 95k174 95k175 95k176)) & da(aft
12/31/1999) & da(bef 01/01/2010)
Query 3—State (Groups 1, 2 & 3).
(157XI(D) (95k143 95k143.5 95k147 95k148 95k149 95k150 95k151
95k160 95k161 95k162 95k163 95k164 95k165 95k166 95k167 95k169
95k170 95k171 95k172 95k173 95k174 95k175 95k176) (157XI(A)
157k439 157k440 157k441 157k442 157k443 157k444)) & da(aft
12/31/1999) & da(bef 01/01/2010)532

530
Using this term in a search will retrieve all cases with any key number contained in this
section of the Evidence topic outline.
531
These are the selected key numbers from topic 157, section XI, subsection (C).
532
Note that some of the parentheses in these searches are superfluous. I included them when I
ran the searches because they make it easier to see precisely what I was searching for without altering
the results retrieved.
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Query 1—State & Federal (Group 1).
Here is the search I ran for Indiana state and federal cases in the
database IN-CS-ALL:
co(in) & (95k143 95k143.5 95k147 95k148 95k149 95k150 95k151 95k160
95k161 95k162 95k163 95k164 95k165 95k166 95k167 95k169 95k170
95k171 95k172 95k173 95k174 95k175 95k176) & da(aft 12/31/1999) &
da(bef 01/01/2010)
Notice the italicized language at the start of the search, which was not
included in query 1 when I searched only for state cases. The Westlaw
database IN-CS-ALL contained “[c]ases from Indiana state courts, the U.S.
Supreme Court, federal appellate courts authoritative in the Seventh Circuit,
U.S. bankruptcy and district courts in Indiana, and the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation.”533 A search in that database using query 1 without
the italicized language would have retrieved numerous cases that did not
originate in Indiana, such as Seventh Circuit cases that were initially filed
in Illinois or Wisconsin. The italicized language (substantially) restricted
the search to cases arising in Indiana. The addition of that language is
significant. Compare the following results:
Query 1—State (run in IN-CS): 229 cases
Query 1—State & Federal (run in IN-CS-ALL with the limiting language):
280 cases
Query 1—State & Federal (run in IN-CS-ALL without the limiting
language): 372 cases
Without the limiting language, the state/federal search would have retrieved
an additional 92 cases for Indiana that were irrelevant to my research
hypotheses. Comparable language was used in all state/federal searches.
For example, I included “co(ny)” for the New York queries and “co(ca)”
for the California queries.534

533
This was the Westlaw.com description of the IN-CS-ALL database. Note that accessing
databases works differently at WestlawNext.com. To search all Indiana cases, one would now access the
dropdown menu next to the search box and select “Indiana” and “Include Related Federal,” and confirm
that nothing else is selected.
534
Note that WestlawNext now uses the letters “ca” to refer to California and to courts of appeal.
Thus, to restrict a search to federal cases arising in California, the appropriate court restrictor is co(#ca).
The pound sign ensures that WestlawNext reads “ca” as referring to a state rather than a type of court.
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Query 2—State & Federal (Group 1 & 2).
co(in) & (157XI(D) (95k143 95k143.5 95k147 95k148 95k149 95k150
95k151 95k160 95k161 95k162 95k163 95k164 95k165 95k166 95k167
95k169 95k170 95k171 95k172 95k173 95k174 95k175 95k176)) & da(aft
12/31/1999) & da(bef 01/01/2010)
Query 3—State & Federal (Group 1, 2, & 3).
co(in) & (157XI(D) (95k143 95k143.5 95k147 95k148 95k149 95k150
95k151 95k160 95k161 95k162 95k163 95k164 95k165 95k166 95k167
95k169 95k170 95k171 95k172 95k173 95k174 95k175 95k176)
(157XI(A) 157k439 157k440 157k441 157k442 157k443 157k444)) &
da(aft 12/31/1999) & da(bef 01/01/2010)
Control Search—State.
to(95) & da(aft 12/31/1999) & da(bef 01/01/2010)535
Control Search—State & Federal.
co(in) & to(95) & da(aft 12/31/1999) & da(bef 01/01/2010)

535

This search retrieves all cases tagged with any topic 95 (Contracts) key number in the relevant

database.
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APPENDIX 2: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
A. t-tests
My study compared the ratio of contract interpretation litigation to
general contract litigation in textualist states to the same ratio in
contextualist states. The ratio of interpretation litigation to general contract
litigation was calculated in twelve distinct ways for each of the ten
jurisdictions in the study. The statisticians from the University of Georgia
Statistical Consulting Center ran t-tests on each of these twelve measures.
The t-tests found no statistically significant difference for eleven of the
twelve. On the twelfth measure—query 3, unweighted, state and federal—
the higher level of litigation in textualist states was statistically significant
at the .05 level.
Table 6 presents the t-test results for each of the twelve comparisons.
The first three columns in the table list the means, the ninety-five percent
confidence intervals, and the standard deviations for the two groups of
states. Those columns also include the differences between the two sets of
states on each of these benchmarks. The last two columns contain the tvalue and the p-value. Note that the method (pooled), the variances (equal),
and the degrees of freedom (eight) are the same for each of the twelve ttests. Thus, those parameters were not included in the table.
The t-tests concern two relevant populations—all textualist states and
all contextualist states. The five states in my textualist group and the five in
my contextualist group are samples taken from these populations. However,
a t-test presumes that the samples were chosen randomly from the
population. That is not the case here. I exercised my judgment in selecting
the states for my two sample sets.536 This limits the validity of the t-tests.
Note that the lack of random sampling in selecting states for the study
is distinct from the problem of non-random sampling discussed earlier in
this paper. Previously, I explained that virtually all cases that receive key
number treatment are reported and that reported decisions are probably not
a random subset of all litigated matters.537 This means that there is a high
536
537

See supra notes 443–44 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 148–49, 168–205 and accompanying text.
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likelihood that the t-tests are infected with two types of selection bias:
(1) the mostly reported cases used to calculate the relevant ratios in each
state are not representative of all cases in those states; and (2) the
jurisdictions chosen for the study are not representative of all states that
employ textualist and contextualist interpretation.
The p-value of the t-test is the probability that the data would produce
differences as large as those seen between the samples here (between the
two sets of five states) if it is assumed that there is no true difference
between the textualist and contextualist populations (all textualist states and
all contextualist states). When the p-value is smaller than a preset
significance level, sufficient evidence exists to state that there are
statistically significant differences between the textualist and contextualist
approaches. If the p-value is larger than the preset significance level, then
the two approaches are not significantly different. The typical significance
level is .05 and that was the level used in the t-tests for this study. When the
t-test reaches a result at or below the .05 level, it can be stated with ninetyfive percent confidence that the differences in the two samples reflect
genuine differences in the populations.538
To explain further, the t-tests start from the assumption that the two
populations—all textualist states and all contextualist states—are not
different, and thus have comparable means. In other words, the average
ratio of interpretation litigation to contract litigation in textualist states is
the same as the average ratio in contextualist states. If the population means
are the same, we would expect the sample means (the average ratios from
my two groups of five states) to be largely the same.539 Given that
assumption, the differences between the means of the two samples must be
explained. Since the sample means are different, it is possible that the

538
See LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 19, at 233 (“Traditionally, when a result has a 5 percent or
less chance of occurring but occurs nonetheless, researchers consider the result to be statistically
important. The reason for choosing 5 percent is largely because in a normal distribution . . .
approximately 95 percent of the observations fall within two standard deviations above and below the
mean. Thus, an observation more than two standard deviations above or below the mean has only a 5
percent chance of being observed. This has become a norm for what counts as a meaningful statistical
outcome.”).
539
When samples are taken from two populations with identical means, the expectation is that the
means of the samples will be similar, not identical, because there is variability among the members of
each population—i.e., because the numerical values of the population members are spread out to some
degree.
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populations are different—i.e., that some difference in the populations is
causing the ratio of interpretation cases to contract cases to be higher in
textualist states. However, the t-test results indicate that the sample means
are not sufficiently different to rise to the level of statistical significance for
eleven of the twelve measures used in the study. Thus, we cannot say, with
appropriate confidence, that the means of the two populations are actually
different by those eleven measures. In sum, the conclusion of the t-tests is
that even if the population means of textualist and contextualist states are
identical, it would not be surprising to find that the means of the two
samples differ by the amount reflected in my data (again, for eleven of
twelve measures).
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Table 6. t-Tests
Legend: C = Contextualist; T = Textualist; Q1 = Query 1; Q2 = Query 2;
Q3 = Query 3; S = State; S/F = State & Federal; W = Weighted; U =
Unweighted. Bold Italics = statistically significant result.
Measure
Mean
95% CL Mean
Std. Dev.
t value p value
Lower Upper
C-Q1-S-W
0.3549 0.2694 0.4404 1.1087
T-Q1-S-W
0.4203 0.3096 0.5310 2.3511
Difference
-0.0654 -0.2033 0.0725 1.8381
-1.09
0.306
C-Q2-S-W
0.4159 0.3503 0.4815 0.8507
T-Q2-S-W
0.4618 0.3653 0.5583 2.0496
Difference
-0.0459 -0.1636 0.0718 1.5691
-0.90
0.3948
C-Q3-S-W
0.4410 0.3864 0.4955 0.7078
T-Q3-S-W
0.4908 0.4037 0.5780 1.8505
Difference
-0.0499 -0.1550 0.0552 1.401
-1.09
0.3056
C-Q1-S-U
0.3738 0.2850 0.4626 0.0715
T-Q1-S-U
0.4478 0.3467 0.5489 0.0814
Difference
-0.074 -0.1858 0.0378 0.0766
-1.53
0.1653
C-Q2-S-U
0.4240 0.3486 0.4994 0.0607
T-Q2-S-U
0.4868 0.3984 0.5752 0.0712
Difference
-0.0628 -0.1593 0.0337 0.0662
-1.50
0.1719
C-Q3-S-U
0.4408 0.3698 0.5118 0.0572
T-Q3-S-U
0.5100 0.4288 0.5912 0.0654
Difference
-0.0692 -0.1588 0.0204 0.0615
-1.78
0.1129
C-Q1-S/F-W 0.3168 0.2437 0.3899 1.2091
T-Q1-S/F-W 0.3969 0.3014 0.4923 2.5343
Difference
-0.08
-0.1975 0.0374 1.9855
-1.57
0.1548
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Mean

95% CL Mean
Lower Upper
C-Q2-S/F-W 0.3743 0.3071 0.4416
T-Q2-S/F-W 0.4383 0.3531 0.5236
Difference
-0.0640 -0.1696 0.0416
C-Q3-S/F-W 0.4018 0.3408 0.4627
T-Q3-S/F-W 0.4688 0.3912 0.5464
Difference
-0.0670 -0.1630 0.0290
C-Q1-S/F-U 0.3338 0.2524
T-Q1-S/F-U 0.4260 0.3410
Difference
-0.0922 -0.19

Std. Dev.

321

t value

p value

-1.40

0.1996

-1.61

0.1461

-2.18

0.0613

-2.11

0.0682

-2.51

0.0365

1.1118
2.2650
1.7842
1.0078
2.0611
1.6223

0.4152 0.0655
0.5110 0.0685
0.00555 0.067

C-Q2-S/F-U 0.3816 0.2990 0.4642 0.0665
T-Q2-S/F-U 0.4664 0.3911 0.5417 0.0606
Difference
-0.0848 -0.1776 0.00801 0.0636
C-Q3-S/F-U 0.4006 0.3206 0.4806 0.0644
T-Q3-S/F-U 0.4950 0.4277 0.5623 0.0542
Difference
-0.0944 -0.1812 -0.00757 0.0595
B. Logistic Regressions
The Georgia statisticians also ran mixed-effect logistic regression
models on two of my comparisons between textualist and contextualist
states—(1) query 1, unweighted, state courts, and (2) query 1, unweighted,
state and federal courts. The two logistic regressions found no statistically
significant difference between the contextualist and textualist jurisdictions.
Let me begin by briefly explaining why the logistic regressions were
run for only two of the twelve comparisons. First, any comparisons
involving queries 2 and 3 could not be included because the type of
regression used assumes that the ratio of contract interpretation cases to
contract cases can never be greater than one (or negative). That is true when
using query 1 because query 1 contained selected key numbers from topic
95 and the control search used all of the key numbers from topic 95. But
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queries 2 and 3 included numbers from both topic 95 and topic 157. Thus,
in theory, the raw totals for queries 2 and 3 could be larger than the control
search in a given circumstance. While that is highly unlikely in practice, the
fact that it is possible made it improper to run mixed-effect logistic
regression models for the eight comparisons using queries 2 and 3. Second,
the goal of the study was to analyze the variability across states with regard
to the ratio of contract interpretation litigation to general contract litigation.
The comparison of textualism to contextualism was done at the state level.
The number of observations (i.e., cases) within each jurisdiction is ignored
in such a comparison; the observations are only used to calculate the
ratios/percentages for each territory. This means that each state counted
equally towards the comparison in the mixed-effect logistic regression
models. And that disqualified the weighted query 1 comparisons since, in
those comparisons, the states do not count equally. Instead, states with a
greater number of observations count for more.
Next, note that once again the selection bias created by not using
random sampling limits the validity of the logistic regressions. In other
words, the results of the two regressions do not necessarily provide a valid
answer to the question about the effects of textualism and contextualism
because of the sampling techniques employed.
The statistical model for this study is modelling the probability of a
case being contract interpretation litigation given that it is contract
litigation, based on the data from the ten states in the two interpretation
groups. The predictor included in this model is the method of
interpretation—textualist or contextualist—with textualist serving as the
baseline.
Logistic Regression 1—Query 1, Weighted, State.
Table 7. Fit Statistics
-2 Res Log PseudoLikelihood
8.15
Generalized Chi-Square
7.64
Gener. Chi-/Square/DF
0.95
Typically, if the italicized value in Table 7 is close to 1, this indicates that
the model is an acceptable fit for the data.
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Table 8. Covariance Parameter Estimates
Cov. Parm. Subject
Estimate
Standard Error
Intercept
State
0.09685
0.05387
The italicized value in Table 8 is an estimate of the variability among the
different states.
Table 9. Solution for Fixed Effects
Effect Interpret
Estimate Std. Error DF
t value P-value
Intercept
-0.2229 0.1464
7.776 -1.52
0.1674
Interpret Contextualist -0.3035 0.2131
8
-1.42
0.1921
Interpret Textualist
0
The “Estimate” column in Table 9 gives the estimated effects of the method
of interpretation. In particular, the -0.3035 estimate means that the log odds
of p—the probability of a case being a contract interpretation case given
that it is a contract litigation case—decreases by -0.3035 on average when
changing the interpretive method from textualist to contextualist. The log
odds is a function of p, that is log(p/1-p). In sum, using contextualist
interpretation will make p decrease. But according to the P-value (0.1921),
this decrease is not statistically significant.
Table 10. Type III Tests of Fixed Effects
Effect
Num DF
Den DF
F Value
P-Value
Interpret
1
8
2.03
0.1921
The output from Tables 7 through 10 identifies the effect of the method of
interpretation (contextualist or textualist) on the probability of a case being
contract interpretation litigation given that it is contract litigation. Ignoring
all problems with the data and assuming the pertinent assumptions are met,
the result in these tables shows that there is no significant relationship
between the method of interpretation and the probability of a case being
contract interpretation litigation given that it is contract litigation. In other
words, a state being contextualist or textualist does not have a significant
association with a higher or lower proportion of contract interpretation
litigation among all instances of contract litigation.
Logistic Regression 2—Query 1, Weighted, State & Federal.
The same basic explanations of the tables in the first regression also apply
to the second regression. Thus, there is no elaboration on the meaning of
the results in Tables 11 through 14.
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Table 11. Fit Statistics
-2 Res Log PseudoLikelihood
Generalized Chi-Square
Gener. Chi-/Square/DF
Cov. Parm.
Intercept

6.13
7.83
0.98

Table 12. Covariance Parameter Estimates
Subject
Estimate
Standard Error
State
0.075222
0.04181

Table 13. Solution for Fixed Effects
Effect Interpret
Estimate Std. Error DF
t value
Intercept
-0.3065 0.1278
7.559 -2.4
Interpret Contextualist -0.3955 0.1855
8
-2.13
Interpret Textualist
0
Effect
Interpret

Table 14. Type III Tests of Fixed Effects
Num DF
Den DF
F Value
1
8
4.55

P-value
0.045
0.0655

P-Value
0.0655
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